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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation aims to contribute to research on family firm governance, an area that 
has attracted only little attention in the past. Governance of family firms differs from 
corporate governance of diffusely-owned, large corporations because important owners, 
i.e. the owner family members, may have multiple roles in the business, and because 
relationships between key stakeholders are enduring, and the shares of family firms are, 
to a degree, illiquid. Because of such characteristics, the governance of family firms 
presents a distinctive challenge for research and practice. The overall research question 
of the dissertation is: What are the impacts of the governance mechanisms on the per-
formance of family firms? The study specifically focuses on relationships between fam-
ily firm governance and strategic decision-making quality, defined in terms of decision 
quality and decision commitment.  
 
This study develops and tests two models of family firm governance, one focusing on 
contractual, and the other on relational, governance. Mirroring the prescriptions of 
agency theory, contractual governance addresses aspects of the formal control exercised 
by the boards of directors. The contractual governance model argues that ownership 
structure determines the composition of the board of directors, and that representation of 
outside members on the board influences how the board functions and affects strategic 
decision-making quality. A relational governance perspective is used because the social 
ties are strong in family firms, providing potential for social control. Drawing on social 
capital theory, the relational governance model addresses different forms of social capi-
tal embedded in social relationships. The relational governance model argues that social 
interaction is a key factor influencing the formation of a shared vision and trust; these in 
turn, improve the strategic decision-making quality. The model also posits that social 
interaction within the owner family can be increased by establishing various family in-
stitutions. Decision quality and decision commitment are used as dependent variables in 
the models. Constructs related to both contractual and relational governance are em-
ployed as independent and mediating variables. Links between decision-making quality 
and overall firm performance are tested in a third model. 
 
The hypotheses are tested using mail survey data from 192 family firms in Finland. The 
study uses confirmatory factor analysis to validate the constructs and multiple regres-
sion analysis to test the hypothesized relationships. For multi-item constructs, previ-
ously validated operationalizations are used whenever possible. The validity and 
reliability of the constructs are further checked using secondary proxies obtained 
through telephone interviews. The hypotheses on governance mechanisms, as well as 
those on the influence of these on decision-making quality, are mostly supported in the 
empirical analyses. Also, the results suggest that contractual and relational governance 
mechanisms are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Hypotheses on the rela-
tionship between the decision-making quality variables and the overall family firm per-
formance received partial support. This dissertation contributes to the understanding of 
how family firms are governed and of the impacts of various governance mechanisms 
on family firm performance. The results of the dissertation support the claim in the ex-
tant literature that family firms need to address the governance of the family in addition 
to the governance of the business. The dissertation proposes relevant practical implica-
tions for family firm owners and executives, and suggests directions for future research. 
 
Keywords:  family business, corporate governance, agency theory, social capital, 
strategic decision making  
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1        INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Background  
 
This dissertation sets out to study family firm governance, addressing the relationship 
between the owners and management of family businesses. Family businesses constitute 
a wide spectrum of enterprises, from small family-owned and managed companies to 
large internationally operating family-controlled corporations. A firm can be regarded 
as a family business if a given family holds the voting control of the firm (Neubauer & 
Lank, 1998).  
 
Regardless of many differences, family businesses share some common characteristics, 
largely due to the interacting and overlapping domains of family, ownership and man-
agement (Tagiuri & Davis, 1982). Family firms have a complex stakeholder structure 
that involves family members, top management, and a board of directors. Family mem-
bers, who are often significant owners, usually play multiple roles in managing and 
governing the firm (Tagiuri & Davis, 1982). This involvement promotes loyalty and 
also commitment to long-term value creation (Dyer & Handler, 1994) and reduces prob-
lems that arise from separation of ownership and control, as experienced in large, public 
corporations (Jensen, 1989).  
 
Also, family businesses may enjoy a competitive advantage due, for example, to re-
maining entrepreneurial in character and having a strong sense of responsibility to soci-
ety (Neubauer & Lank, 1998), fast verbal and nonverbal communication, aided by a 
shared identity and common language of families (Gersick, Davis, McCollom Hampton 
& Landsberg, 1997), family members business expertise gained during early childhood 
onward (Kets De Vries, 1996), and a strong organizational culture contributing to exter-
nal adaptation and internal integration (Schein, 1983). 
 
However, the familys involvement in governing the firm may induce a focus on busi-
ness and non-business goals, possibly leading to inefficiency (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino 
& Buchholtz, 2001). If the owner family is not regularly informed about the companys 
affairs, differing visions of the companys future may develop between management 
and the family. The resulting feuds between family factions may distract managements 
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attention from value-creating activities and so reduce their commitment to strategic de-
cisions. Owner-managers also may act opportunistically by satisfying their own needs at 
the expense of the companys performance and long-term survival. Entrenched owner-
managers may not share their powers with others, especially not with the companys 
board. 
 
Moreover, the survival of family firms is often challenged by autocratic rule, resistance 
to change, lack of professionalism in management capabilities, confusion in family and 
business roles, rivalry and enlarged human emotions among family members, conflicts 
between interests of the family and the business, and a low rate of investment in busi-
ness development (Donnelley, 1964; Gersick et al., 1997; Kets De Vries, 1993). 
 
Given the many challenges family businesses face, they are rather short-lived, although 
some of them have been able to survive for a long time. Approximately three out ten 
family businesses survive into a second generation and one out of ten to a third genera-
tion (Kets De Vries, 1996). Neubauer & Lank (1998) estimate that 66-75% of family 
businesses are sold out or ceased during the founding generations tenure and 5-15% 
continue in the control of the third generation of the founding family. The average life 
expectancy of a family business in the United States is twenty-four years, which is, co-
incidentally, the same as the average tenure of the founder (Beckhard & Dyer, 1983). 
 
Contrary to the somewhat common belief, family firms form an important sector of 
economic life. According to one estime, 70-95% of all registered companies in selected 
European countries are family businesses (Neubauer & Lank, 1998). In a sample of 
1132 small- and medium-sized companies in eight European countries, 66% were found 
to be family businesses (Donckels & Fröhlich, 1991). Depending on how family busi-
nesses are defined, one study suggests that 19-92% of all businesses in the United States 
are family businesses, that they employ 15-59% of the total work force, that they create 
19-72% of new jobs, and that their contribution to the gross domestic product is 12-49% 
(Shanker & Astrachan, 1996). Family businesses are the predominant form of enterprise 
in many other areas in the world as well, in the East Asia, for example (Chau, 1991).  
 
Considering the large economic impact of family businesses and their distinctive char-
acteristics, it seems important to study how family firms are governed in terms of  rela-
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tionships among the owners and managers. Generally, a firms ownership plays an im-
portant role in determining its governance structure (Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel & 
Gutierrez, 2001), which influences its strategic decision making process (Judge & 
Zeithaml, 1992; Pearce & Zahra, 1991). This is especially the case in family businesses 
where owners may also be managers who lead the development and execution of their 
companies strategies. The unique ownership structure and interpersonal dynamics that 
pervade family firms make them an interesting setting in which to study the contribu-
tions of ownership for these firms governance and strategic decision making. 
 
Yet, little family business research has focused on family firm governance (Neubauer & 
Lank, 1998; Dyer & Sánchez, 1998) and how family control affects firm performance 
(Lansberg, Perrow & Rogolsky, 1988; Litz, 1995). As Neubauer & Lank noted, par-
ticularly scarce are research and writings in the area of governance in family enter-
prises (1998: xv). Previous research on family business has mostly addressed the 
question of how to improve family relationships rather than business performance 
(Sharma, Chrisman & Chua, 1997), and a large part of past studies has dealt with man-
agement succession (Wortman, 1994).  
 
The lack of research on family firm governance is surprising because literature provides 
plenty of anecdotal evidence of governance challenges in family businesses, dating back 
to Levinson (1971). Lansberg (1999) has claimed that most family companies are under 
governed, and that family firm governance should address both family governance and 
business governance. Also, mainstream corporate governance research may not di-
rectly apply to family enterprises because it deals mostly with diffusely-owned, large 
corporations where shareholders and management do not generally interact, and where 
the relationship is contractual. This means that the formation and functioning of con-
tracts describe to a large extent the nature of the relationships between different agents. 
 
This dissertation argues that, given the duality of the economic and non-economic goals 
family firms pursue (Danes, Zuiker, Kean & Arbuthnot, 1999), and the complexity of 
the stakeholder structures, family firms need a governance structure that matches the 
complexity of their constituent stakeholders. Accordingly, a better theoretical and em-
pirical understanding as to how family firms are governed is needed; the performance 
implications that come to light through this better understanding also need to be re-
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searched. As yet, it is not clear how governance, strategic decision-making, and per-
formance are related within family firms, or how family firms should be governed for 
long-term value creation. 
 
Several researchers have claimed that describing governance relationships only in terms 
of contracts among the parties is not sufficient, but that the social context and rela-
tional aspects of the relationships among the contracting parties need to be addressed 
also (Granovetter, 1985; Macaulay, 1963; Macneil, 1980; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). 
Accordingly, the view taken in the present study is that, in addition to management su-
pervision and control, family firms need to develop relational governance mechanisms 
that reduce harmful conflict and promote cohesion within the family. This study follows 
Huse (1993; 1994) in using the dual approach of applying neoclassical economics to 
organizations as well as social theories of relationships for the purpose of studying cor-
porate governance. Huse applied both socio-economic (Macneil, 1980) and agency 
theoretic approaches to study the relationship between board of directors and manage-
ment.  
 
This dissertation aims to make three contributions to research on family business and 
corporate governance. First, it addresses the lack of previous research on the governance 
of family firms. As noted, past corporate governance research has investigated mostly 
contract-based systems ignoring the potential influence of relational governance. The 
present study seeks to expand agency theory driven corporate governance by incorporat-
ing elements from social capital theory and literature on relational governance. By ana-
lyzing relational governance within family firms, the dissertation offers a more 
comprehensive analysis of governance systems.  
 
Second, this dissertation contributes toward the understanding of how contractual and 
relational governance systems affect the quality of strategic decision making (Dooley & 
Fryxell, 1999) in family firms. Little is known about strategic decision making proc-
esses in family firms (Sharma et al., 1997). This study also responds to Harris, Martinez 
& Wards (1994) call for research on ownership and strategy formulation and imple-
mentation in family firms. This research can improve the appreciation of the roles of 
family institutions, an area that has been identified as requiring attention (Lansberg, 
1999). 
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Third, the dissertation uses data from Finnish family firms. Most governance research 
has used data from Fortune 500 corporations, or from US and British firms (Dalton, 
Johnson & Ellstrand, 1999; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). Research employing data from 
other countries is necessary. Studying Finnish family firms helps address this gap. The 
Scandinavian business culture usually depicts a more relational emphasis and smaller 
power distances than the more transaction-oriented Anglo-Saxon business cultures 
(Hofstede, 1997). 
 
 
1.2 Research questions  
 
There is a limited understanding, both in corporate governance literature and family 
business literature, about how family firms are governed. Literature on corporate gov-
ernance has mainly focused on the external and internal control of  open corporations, 
i.e. corporations that are large, and that the shares of which are diffusely-owned and can 
be traded without restrictions on a stock market (Fama & Jensen, 1983a). The govern-
ance context of open corporations reflects the managerialistic view of corporations that 
emphasizes the role of professional, hired management in running the business accord-
ing to industry and capital market standards (Johannisson & Huse, 2000). In the mana-
gerial context, the owners are not required to have any role in the corporation other than 
that of providing equity capital and bearing the associated financial risk. This separa-
tion of ownership from control leads to a divergence of interests between the share-
holders and management (Berle & Means, 1932). In the light of this managerial 
context, family firms seem an anomaly because they violate almost all of the assump-
tions held in the mainstream corporate governance literature. For example, in family 
firms, ownership and management are overlapped to a varying degree, the number of 
owners is small, and the shares cannot be easily traded.  
 
On the other hand, extant family business literature has recognized many distinctive 
governance challenges that family firms face due to their complex stakeholder structure. 
Yet, empirical research on the governance of family businesses is scant. This disserta-
tion aims at contributing to the knowledge of family firm governance by applying ideas 
and concepts from the broader governance literature to a family business context. The 
overall research question of the dissertation is: What are the impacts of the governance 
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mechanisms on the performance of family firms? This overall research question is ap-
proached by addressing several more specific research questions.  
 
The approach taken in this study is to use outcomes of strategic decision-making proc-
esses as measures of family firm performance. Family business literature provides many 
examples of how effective decision-making processes can be disturbed and so lead to 
poor organizational performance (e.g., Levinson, 1971). A firms long-term perform-
ance and survival are vitally influenced by the quality of strategic decisions and stake-
holders commitment to their implementation (Dooley & Fryxell, 1999). Therefore, 
decision quality and decision commitment, which are collectively regarded in this study 
defining strategic decision-making quality, are selected as the main measures of the 
family firm performance. 
 
Corporate governance literature addresses potential governance problems due to almost 
the complete separation of owners risk bearing and managerial decision functions ex-
perienced in large, publicly held corporations. Although family firms are generally dif-
ferent from these corporations, separation of ownership from managerial control does 
also occur in family firms. The separation may grow as the family or the firm becomes 
larger (e.g., Gersick et al., 1997). Thus, it may be possible that family firms face similar 
agency problems, i.e. problems induced by different interests between the owners and 
managers, as large, publicly held corporations. Consequently, family firms may employ 
contractual governance mechanisms that minimize managerial opportunism, mirroring 
the prescriptions of agency theory. Contractual governance addresses aspects of the 
formal control exercised by the boards of directors.  
 
Research question 1a: What are the key mechanisms of contractual governance in fam-
ily firms? 
Research question 1b: How does contractual governance affect the strategic decision-
making quality of family firms? 
 
Analyzing relationships among the owners and management from only a contractual 
perspective would be unlikely to provide a sufficient understanding of family firm gov-
ernance, because the social ties are strong in family firms. Strong ties are formed as a 
result of a complex and self-reinforcing web of social relationships in which the key 
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agents may operate in multiple roles as managers, owners, or family members. The en-
during bonds that tie family members may also motivate participants in the governance 
systems to maximize the welfare of others, rather than pursuing their own individual 
interests. Building cohesion among the various stakeholders calls for the implementa-
tion of relational governance mechanisms that enhance the different forms of social 
capital embedded in social relationships (Granovetter, 1985). Relational governance is 
predicated on open communications and frequent exchanges that foster solidarity among 
family members and reduce opportunism and self-interest (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Rela-
tional governance is likely to address a number of social control mechanisms that regu-
late relationships among the owner family members and management.  
 
Research question 2a: What are the key mechanisms of relational governance in family 
firms? 
Research question 2b: How does relational governance affect the strategic decision-
making quality of family firms? 
 
Two aspects of strategic decision-making quality are used as the main measures of fam-
ily firm performance. This implies an assumption that a high quality of strategic deci-
sion making has a positive effect on a family firms overall performance. Although one 
of the fundamental questions in strategy research is why some firms are more successful 
than others (Rumelt, Schendel & Teece, 1995), past empirical research has not been 
able to demonstrate clearly how strategy process and firm performance are linked (Dean 
& Sharfman, 1996; Janis, 1989). Studying organizational performance is problematic 
because there are so many possible ways to define performance and because of the 
complexity of the causal structure of performance (March & Sutton, 1997). Further, it is 
questionable whether a firms performance can be analyzed without taking into account 
its distinctive set of goals (Sanchez & Heene, 1997). To contribute to this discussion, 
the present dissertation addresses links between the overall performance of family firms 
and related aspects of strategic decision-making processes. 
 
Research question 3: What are the impacts of strategic decision-making quality on the 
overall performance of family firms? 
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1.3 Objectives of the dissertation  
 
The overall objectives of this dissertation are to chart distinctive challenges of family 
firm governance and to identify mechanisms through which family firms are governed. 
The study addresses the following topics in particular: contractual and relational aspects 
of governance, effects governance mechanisms on strategic decision-making quality, 
and the association between decision-making quality and overall firm performance. The 
detailed objectives that guide the research process are 
 
-  to review and analyze relevant theoretical, and other, streams of literature that fo-
cus on corporate governance, strategic decision-making, and family business 
-  to conceptualize the key factors relating to contractual governance and relational 
governance, so as to reflect aspects of both formal control and social control 
-  to develop a set of empirically testable hypotheses linking factors relating to gov-
ernance, strategic decision-making quality, and overall firm performance  
-  to empirically test the hypotheses by operationalizing the theoretical constructs, 
identifying a suitable sample, designing the research instrument, collecting data, 
and testing the hypotheses using suitable quantitative methods 
-  to assess the significance, reliability, and validity of the results; to discuss the 
theoretical, empirical, and practical implications of the findings; to assess the limi-
tations of the study, and to present suggestions for future research 
 
 
1.4 Scope of the dissertation 
 
The present study addresses the governance of family firms, focusing on the nature of 
various governance mechanisms and how they affect firm performance. Family busi-
nesses provide a fruitful research context to study corporate governance due to lack of 
governance research in the area and the distinctive characteristics of family firms. The 
family business context, especially, enables the study of how aspects of formal and so-
cial control vary according to characteristics of ownership structure.  
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The analysis of this study is set at firm level, addressing effects of governance a firms 
performance. The analysis covers a set of related issues, including the ownership struc-
ture, relationships among the owner family members, board of directors, and top man-
agement and the strategic and overall performance of the family firm. By addressing 
how governance influences strategic decision-making quality, this study also contrib-
utes to emerging research on the interaction between corporate governance and strategic 
management (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). 
 
Family businesses have been defined in numerous different ways in past research, de-
pending on the research problem under study. For example, family businesses have 
been defined in terms of ownership (e.g., Barnes & Hershon, 1976), generational trans-
fer (e.g., Ward, 1987), and family members participation in management (e.g., Litz, 
1995). This dissertation adopts a broad definition of family business, taking the familys 
voting control of the firm as the defining element. This approach allows larger variation 
of the key variables in the research models. Governance challenges are likely to be very 
different in a family firm managed by the first generation owner-manager from those in 
a family firm controlled, for example, by a third generation extended family (e.g., Lans-
berg, 1999). The study is limited to family firms that are corporations, because these 
have boards of directors required by law. The board of directors is often a central gov-
ernance body in family corporations.  
 
The empirical study is geographically limited to Finland. All the provinces of mainland 
Finland are covered; only the Swedish speaking Åland Islands are not part of the study. 
A single country analysis allows control for country-specific influences. A wide range 
of industries is represented, including production-, trading-, and service-related busi-
nesses. The companies in this study are six years old or more, representing firms with 
established governance structures. 
 
 
1.5 Research approaches and methods 
 
Research approaches can generally be categorized as nomothetic or idiographic (e.g., 
Dooley, 1995). Research following a nomothetic approach aims at developing general 
laws or properties and using them in a variety of settings in the real world, while re-
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search based on an idiographic approach studies the particulars of an individual research 
object. The present study adopts a nomothetic approach, because it allows rigorous em-
pirical testing of hypotheses with a large number of firms. However, developing general 
laws in organizational studies, or, more generally, in social sciences, may not be possi-
ble because quantitative testing can only reveal statistical associations among variables, 
not causal laws. 
 
This study is divided into two major parts: theory development and theory testing. The 
theory is presented in the form of theoretical models describing the constructs and their 
hypothesized relationships. Derivation of the theoretical models is based on extant theo-
retical and empirical literature related to the research problem of the present study.  
 
The main theoretical frameworks used in the study are agency theory and social capital 
theory. The agency theory helps to explain why different forms of organizations behave 
as they do and also it helps to develop refutable propositions that can be empirically 
tested. The positive theory of agency addresses contracting problems between self-
interested, maximizing parties and uses the agency costs minimizing tautology (Jensen, 
1983). The agency theory provides insights to the very different functions of ownership 
and management. 
 
The quality of relationships can be a source of mutual benefit between contracting par-
ties. A growing stream of literature, collectively called social capital theory, and a re-
lated approach known as the relational view (Dyer & Singh, 1998), provides a 
framework to assist our understanding of how networks of relationships contribute to 
organizational advantage (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). In addition to these main theo-
retical frameworks, the present study is influenced by many other streams of literature, 
most notably by family business, corporate governance, and strategic management lit-
erature. 
 
The hypotheses are empirically tested by using quantitative statistical methods. Multiple 
regression analyses are employed to study whether the hypothesized relationships 
among the constructs are supported by the data. The quantitative data for statistical test-
ing of the hypotheses are collected via a mail survey. This allows the collection of a 
large amount of data to be completed cost efficiently and in a relatively short time. In 
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this study, the data obtained via the mail survey is cross-sectional in nature; this means 
that the data are collected at one point in time.  
 
The reliability and validity of the results are carefully assessed throughout the empirical 
testing. The quantitative mail survey has its potential problems, including difficulties in 
operationalizing the theoretical constructs, low response rates and the resulting possibil-
ity of non-response bias, and respondent-related threats to reliability of the data (Babbie, 
1990). A number of measures are taken to improve the quality of the data. The survey 
instrument is pre-tested and previously validated operationalizations are used whenever 
available. Otherwise, new measures based on the received theory are developed. All 
multi-item measures are confirmed by using factor analysis and by assessing their reli-
ability. Possible non-response bias is assessed statistically. To further check the reliabil-
ity of the survey data, additional telephone interviews are conducted in randomly 
selected respondent firms, consisting of two interviews in each company with respon-
dents other than the original respondent.  
 
 
1.6 Structure of the dissertation  
 
This introductory chapter is designed to guide the research process by setting forth the 
research problem, defining the objectives and scope of the study, and discussing the se-
lection of the research approaches and methods. Figure 1.1 illustrates the structure of 
the dissertation by showing the main phases of the research. 
 
Chapter 1:
Research questions, objectives, scope, and research approaches and methods
Chapter 2 & 3:
Key concepts,
literature review:
Chapter 4:
Theoretical models
and hypotheses
Chapter 5 & 6:
Methodology,
results
Chapter 7:
Discussions
 
Figure 1.1  Structure of the dissertation 
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Chapters 2 and 3 review extant literature. Chapter 2 discusses the key underlying con-
cepts of the study. Chapter 3 presents the literature review with an assessment of differ-
ent theoretical frameworks in the light of the research problem. Chapter 4 represents the 
theory development phase of the study, developing theoretical models and related hy-
potheses. Chapters 5 and 6 form the theory-testing phase of the dissertation. Methodol-
ogy employed in study is reviewed in Chapter 5, and a description of the sample and the 
results of the statistical analyses testing the hypotheses are presented in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation by discussing the empirical results, theoretical and 
practical implications, and limitations of the study, and ends by suggesting directions 
for further research. 
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2 DISCUSSION OF KEY CONCEPTS USED IN THE STUDY 
 
This section discusses the underlying key concepts relevant to the study, including (1) 
ownership, corporation, and corporate governance, (2) family business, and (3) strategic 
decision. These concepts are not directly used as constructs in the research models of 
this dissertation. Rather, the key concepts described in this section provide the concep-
tual background, which, together with received theories, contribute to the development 
of the models. All the constructs that are employed in the models will be conceptualized 
and defined in Chapter 4, and operationalized for the empirical study in Chapter 5. 
 
 
2.1 Ownership, corporation, and corporate governance  
 
Ownership, corporation, and corporate governance are closely related concepts. Owner-
ship of a firms assets is usually regarded as a bundle of rights. Hansmann (1996) con-
cisely defined a firms owners as persons having two formal rights: the right to control 
the firm and the right to appropriate the firms profits (1996: 11). The concepts resid-
ual risk and residual claim are important in the study of ownership and different forms 
of economic organization (Fama & Jensen, 1983a). The term residual risk refers to the 
difference between uncertain inflows of cash and promised payments to management, 
employees, and other providers of factors of production. The terms residual claimants 
or residual risk bearers refer to actors who have rights to these uncertain net cash flows. 
Alchian & Demsetzs (1972) definition of ownership of the classical capitalist firm 
addresses several rights: the right to receive the residual cash flows, the right to be the 
central party in writing contracts with input providers and to observe their behavior, the 
right to decide on the members of the management team, and the right to sell all these 
rights. The notion of the classical capitalist firm regards the owner as an active entre-
preneur also. Jensen & Meckling (1998: 103) defined ownership as possession of a de-
cision right along with the right to alienate that right. The term alienability refers to 
the right to sell a right and capture the proceeds offered in the exchange (1998: 103). 
Summarizing the above points, the ownership of a firm involves three elements: (1) the 
right to control the firm, (2) rights to residual claims, and (3) the right to sell the owner-
ship rights. The characteristics of the ownership rights are dependent upon the legal 
form of the organization. 
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There are many different forms of economic organizations, including, for example, pro-
prietorships, partnerships, and corporations. Different organizational forms vary in 
terms of, amongst others, the characteristics of residual claims and how the owners par-
ticipate in decision processes (Fama & Jensen, 1985). The corporation is a well-
established organizational form; it is used from small, privately-held companies to 
large, diffusely-owned corporations. Common to all corporations is the general limita-
tion of the owners liability to the amount of common stock they have, and the fact that 
a corporation is a legal entity of its own, represented by individuals such as a chief ex-
ecutive officer (Monks & Minow, 1996). Fama & Jensen (1983a) divided corporations 
into open corporations and closed corporations. In the open corporation, the common 
stock residual claims are freely alienable and they are rights in net cash flows for the 
whole lifetime of the organization. Also, the stockholders do not need to have any other 
role in the corporation. Large companies are typically open corporations having special-
ized ownership and management roles. Closed corporations are usually smaller compa-
nies that are likely to have restrictions on the alienability of the common stock. Both 
open and closed corporations can survive, but on the basis of a different set of advan-
tages and disadvantages (Fama & Jensen, 1983a). This dissertation posits that a family 
firm can fall anywhere between open and closed forms of corporations, depending on 
the extent to which owners participate in managing the business, and how easily the 
shares can be traded in capital markets. 
 
Organizational economics, especially the agency theory, views a corporation as a nexus 
of contracts (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In this view, the 
corporation serves as a focal point in coordinating a set of contracts, both implicit and 
explicit, with creditors, suppliers, customers and all other exchange partners. The corpo-
ration is seen as a legal fiction, behaving much like a market in bringing conflicting 
objectives of individuals into equilibrium (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
 
Development of corporate governance has largely been induced by the separation of 
ownership from control in large corporations (Berle & Means, 1932). There is no clear 
definition of what corporate governance actually means. This is illustrated by the fol-
lowing examples. Monks & Minow (1996: xvii) defined corporate governance as the 
relationship among various participants in determining the direction and performance of 
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corporations. The key participants in this definition are the shareholders, the manage-
ment, and the board of directors. According to Demb & Neubauer, corporate govern-
ance is the process by which corporations are made responsive to the rights and wishes 
of stakeholders (1992: 187). In their book devoted to family business governance, 
Neubauer & Lank defined corporate governance as a system of structures and proc-
esses to direct and control corporations and to account for them (1998: 60). Johnson & 
Sholes (1999: 203) argued that governance framework determines whom the organiza-
tion is there to serve and how the purposes and priorities of the organization should be 
decided.  
 
The most common view is that corporate governance addresses the relationship among 
the owners and the management (e.g., Monks and Minow, 1996). The central question 
in corporate governance is how this relationship influences strategy formulation, deci-
sion-making, value creation and value distribution (Jensen, Baker, Baldwin & Wruck, 
1996). The present study adopts this owner-manager relationship-centered view of cor-
porate governance, because it focuses on relationships among owners, family members, 
and managers. This view does not refute the need to be responsive to all stakeholders of 
the company (e.g., Donaldson & Preston, 1995). 
 
 
2.2 Family business  
 
There is no common agreement as to what the term family business actually means. This 
is probably due to multiple research approaches adopted in past research and the rather 
short time research in this area has been conducted. The wide scope of family busi-
nesses ranging from small shops to large family-controlled corporations contributes to 
the definitional confusion (Handler, 1989a).  
 
Table 1 provides a representative sample of definitions published in scholarly journals 
and books. In the table, eight definitions explicitly refer to family ownership or owner-
ship control, six refer to family involvement in the companys management, five ad-
dress multiple generations or generational transfer, four refer to family participation in 
the companys goal setting and other strategic decision making, two address the fam-
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ilys intention or vision of continuing the business as a family business, one addresses 
family goals, and one the interaction between the family and business systems. 
 
The definitions imply six themes for clarifying the boundaries of the domain of family 
business: (1) ownership, (2) management, (3) generational transfer, (4) the familys in-
tention to continue as a family business, (5) family goals, and (6) interaction between 
the family and business. These themes are similar to those found in the extant literature. 
For example, Handler (1989a) categorized family business definitions under four head-
ings: ownership and management, interdependent subsystems, generational transfer, and 
multiple conditions.  
 
Table 2.1  Family business definitions 
a company is considered a family business when it has been closely identified with at least two genera-
tions of a family and when this link has had a mutual influence on company policy and on the interests 
and objectives of the family (Donnelley, [1964] 1988: 428). 
controlling ownership rested in the hands of an individual or of the members of a single family (Barnes 
& Hershon, 1976: 106). 
Organizations where one or more extended family members influence the direction of the business 
through the exercise on kinship ties, management roles, or ownership rights (Tagiuri & Davis, [1982] 
1996: 199). 
It is the interaction between the two sets of organization, family and business, that establishes the basic 
character of the family business and defines its uniqueness (Davis, 1983: 47). 
What is usually meant by family business...is either the occurrence or the anticipation that a younger 
family member has or will assume control of the business from an elder (Churchill & Hatten, 1987: 52). 
We define a family business as one that will be passed on for the familys next generation to manage and 
control (Ward, 1987: 252). 
A business in which the members of a family have legal control over ownership (Lansberg et al., 1988: 
2). 
A family business is defined here as an organization whose major operating decisions and plans for 
leadership succession are influenced by family members serving in management or on the board (Han-
dler, 1989b: 262). 
firms in which one family holds the majority of the shares and controls management (Donckels & Fröh-
lich, 1991: 149). 
A business where a single family owns the majority of stock and has total control. Family members also 
form part of the management and make the most important decisions concerning the business (Gallo & 
Sveen, 1991: 181). 
A business firm may be considered a family business to the extent that its ownership and management 
are concentrated within a family unit, and to the extent its members strive to achieve, maintain, and/or 
increase intraorganizational family-based relatedness (Litz, 1995: 78). 
A business governed and/or managed on a sustainable, potentially cross-generational, basis to shape and 
perhaps pursue the formal or implicit vision of the business held by members of the same family or a 
small number of families (Sharma et al., 1997: 2). 
A family enterprise is a proprietorship, partnership, corporation or any form of business association 
where the voting control is in the hands of a given family (Neubauer & Lank, 1998: 8). 
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Some definitions are more inclusive. For example, Gallo & Sveens (1991) definition 
includes mention of majority ownership, total control, participation in management, and 
strategic decision making. Some other definitions are less inclusive, for example, the 
definition of Barnes & Hershon (1976) addresses only the controlling ownership.  
 
The present study does not categorize companies into family businesses and non-family 
businesses by applying some strict definition. Instead, some dimensions are treated as 
variables in the models presented in this study, most notably ownership structure and 
family size. For the purposes of the present dissertation, the family business is defined 
broadly as a proprietorship, partnership, corporation or any form of business associa-
tion where voting control is in the hands of a given family. (Neubauer & Lank 1998: 
21). More specifically, the voting control is defined here as the power to exercise dis-
cretion over major decision making, including specifically the choice of directors 
(Leech & Leahy, 1991: 1418). The terms family business and family firm are used inter-
changeably in this study.  
 
The extant literature on family business research has largely neglected the definition of 
the family itself. By modifying Winters, Fitzgerald, Heck, Haynes & Danes (1998) 
definition of the family, the present study defines it as a kinship group of people related 
by blood or marriage or comparable relationship. This definition allows a multi-
generational view of an extended family.  
 
 
2.3 Strategic decision  
 
Only a few decisions made in a company can be termed strategic. Although it is diffi-
cult to make a well-defined distinction between the strategic and non-strategic decision, 
some distinctive characteristics have been proposed in the literature. Mintzberg, Rais-
inghani & Theoret defined the term decision as a specific commitment to action (usu-
ally a commitment to resources), the term strategic as important, in terms of the 
actions taken, the resources committed, or the precedents set, and the term decision 
process as a set actions and dynamic factors that begins with identification of stimulus 
for action and ends with the specific commitment to action (1976: 246). Chandler de-
fined strategic and tactical decisions as follows: Strategic decisions are concerned with 
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long-term health of the enterprise. Tactical decisions deal more with day-to-day activi-
ties necessary for efficient and smooth operations. But decisions, either tactical or stra-
tegic, usually require implementation by an allocation or reallocation of resources-
funds, equipment, or personnel (1962: 11). Following Mintzberg et al. (1976), Nutt 
defined a strategic decision as a choice with important consequences and resource de-
mands for the organization (1998: 198). The above definitions capture the essential 
elements of a strategic decision, including a long-term view, decision as a choice, re-
source commitment, and important consequences. The present study adopts Nutts 
(1998) definition of the strategic decision, because it captures the essence of the concept 
and explicitly recognizes the notion of choice implying that there are alternative courses 
of action.  
 
The term strategic choice (Child, 1972) is occasionally used in this study. Strategic 
choice is similar to the concept of strategic decision, yet having some differences of nu-
ance. The term strategic choice is commonly used in situations where the top manage-
ment team as a decision agent is of interest. Hambrick & Mason noted that the term 
strategic choice is intended to be a fairly comprehensive term to include choices made 
formally and informally, indecision as well as decision, major administrative 
choices...as well the domain and competitive choices more generally associated with the 
term strategy (1984: 195). This definition implies that in addition to competitive 
strategy, the strategic choice concept encompasses issues often included in the notion of 
organizational strategy. This study uses the terms strategic decision and strategic choice 
interchangeably.  
 
In addition to defining strategic decisions in terms of their importance to organizations, 
they can be characterized on the basis of their cognitive features. Typically, strategic 
decisions are described as poorly structured, complex, ambiguous, unique, and non-
routine. Schweiger, Sandberg & Ragan (1986) described strategic problems as wicked 
because they address complicated links between the organization and environment, un-
certain and dynamic environments, ambiguity of information, and conflicts between in-
terested parties.  
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
This chapter reviews extant research literature relevant to the research problem of fam-
ily firm governance. First, the practical and theoretical aspects of corporate governance 
are reviewed on a general level, and then the two theoretical governance frameworks of 
this dissertation are selected. Next, these two theoretical frameworks, the agency theory 
and the social capital theory, are discussed in more detail. Then the literature on strate-
gic decision making and on family business is reviewed. The chapter concludes by ad-
dressing the distinctive challenge of family firm governance, and by comparing the 
theoretical frameworks and assessing their applicability to the study of family firm-
governance. 
 
 
3.1 Corporate governance and selection of theoretical frameworks  
 
3.1.1 Introduction to the central theme in corporate governance 
 
The central theme in corporate governance was laid out by Berle & Means. They noted 
that [t]he separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the inter-
ests of the owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge ([1932] 1997: 7). 
In the modern corporation, ownership is dispersed among numerous individuals and de-
cision making is taken care of by hired, professional management. This allows a con-
centration of power in the hands of management who may advance their own interests at 
the cost of the owners interests. Consequently, the owners are left in a weak position 
compared to management. Berle & Means are not the first authors to recognize the po-
tential problems of the separation of ownership and management control, but it is they 
who brought the issue under systematic study. It is noteworthy that, Adam Smith 
([1776] 1937), the first of the great classic economic theorists, noted that the directors 
of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other peoples 
money than of their own, it cannot be well expected, that they should watch over it with 
the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently 
watch their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to 
small matters as not for their masters honour, and very easily give themselves a dispen-
sation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more 
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or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company (quoted in Jensen, 2000: 
83).  
 
The separation of ownership from control has been made possible by the emergence of 
the joint stock company, i.e. the modern corporation. According to Collin (1995), the 
corporate form of organization has evolved during three periods: the first industrial 
revolution from about 1600 to 1870, the second industrial revolution from 1870 to 1930, 
and the period following the Second World War. Among the first applications of the 
corporate form of company were British and Dutch joint stock trading companies (Berle 
& Means, ([1932] 1997), which typically took part in risky oversees exploration and 
shipping operations. The second phase is marked by an expansion of corporations and 
the creation of some giant enterprises. Business historian Alfred Chandler (1962) has 
written a widely referred to book about how these corporations operated. The third 
phase, i.e. the period following the Second World War, is covered by a large body of 
governance and management literature (e.g., Galbraith, 1972; Jensen, 1993).  
 
To a large extent, corporate governance literature deals with the various ways of in-
creasing the owners position against potential malfeasance of top management (Bran-
cato, 1997; Monks & Minow, 1996). Corporate governance literature addresses 
extensively how to protect the shareholders interests by employing various external and 
internal governance mechanisms (Walsh & Seward, 1990). Although corporate govern-
ance may address the interests of any stakeholder group of a company, it has tradition-
ally studied relationships among the owners and companys top management. The main 
actors in corporate governance literature are typically the owners, board of directors, 
and top management (Monks & Minow, 1996). The degree of dispersion of ownership 
varies from closely held corporations where owners are often key managers, to very 
widely held corporations where individual owners have only a small fraction of the 
common stock. The modes of corporate governance vary greatly between these various 
kinds of organizational forms (Fama & Jensen, 1983b).  
 
Corporate governance is influenced by institutional factors also. For example, the legal 
system defines property rights and sets boundaries within which the companies must 
operate (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Also, the efficiency of capital markets directly influ-
ences how corporate governance is shaped in different countries (Kaplan, 1997). Lubat-
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kin, Lane, Collin & Very (1999) proposed that corporate governance is nationally 
bounded because of different national demographics, histories, values and norms, and 
formal institutions. 
 
 
3.1.2 Theoretical frameworks related to corporate governance  
 
Agency theory has emerged as the dominant theoretical framework used in corporate 
governance because it can provide plausible explanations useful to the study of the 
separation of ownership from control (Collin, 1995; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). Agency theory is based on neoclassical economics, it directly studies the rela-
tionship between owners and management, it assumes limited rationality and self-
interested behavior of human beings, and it predicts behavioral consequences in numer-
ous agency relationships and situations (e.g., Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Agency the-
ory will be discussed separately in Chapter 3, Section 2. In addition to agency theory, 
there are other theoretical approaches that have been applied in corporate governance or 
interorganizational governance, to a varying degree of explicitness. Table 3.1 shows six 
theoretical frameworks that may be used in corporate governance or in the governance 
of interorganizational relationships. 
 
Table 3.1 Theoretical frameworks used in governance 
Theoretical  
Frameworks 
Basic approach Applications in  
governance 
Agency theory Minimization of problems caused by the 
separation of ownership from control 
 
Relationships between principal and 
agent, usually among owners and 
management 
Transactions cost 
economics 
Selecting governance structures that 
minimize transaction costs 
Vertical integration, strategic alli-
ances, acquisitions 
Evolutionary  
approaches  
 
Population, organization, and intraor-
ganizational level conditions and out-
comes of evolutionary processes 
Influencing the variation, selection, 
and retention processes to increase 
the likelihood of firm survival 
Resource-based view 
 
A firm is seen as bundle of tangible and 
intangible resources rather than as a 
product-market position 
Resource leverage and complemen-
tary resources in interfirm relations 
Resource dependence 
Theory 
Political approach to manage interde-
pendencies between organizations 
Networks, interfirm, intrafirm gov-
ernance 
Social capital theory 
 
Socially constructed reality creates re-
sources embedded in relationships  
Network and interorganizational 
relationship governance 
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Transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; 1985) attempts to specify 
optimal boundaries of a firms activities by taking into account the transaction costs 
caused by dealing with other organizations. Initially, the analysis focused on whether to 
source a good or service externally by an arms length market transaction or to produce 
it within the hierarchy of a firm. Because of increasing interorganizational cooperation, 
transaction cost economics has begun to address intermediate forms of organizations 
used in strategic alliances, partnerships, coalitions, franchises, and various forms of 
network organizations (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). Concentrating solely on the costs, 
transaction cost economics has been criticized in not addressing the value creation as-
pect of interorganizational cooperation (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). Although transaction 
cost economics is the dominant theoretical framework in interfirm governance (Keil, 
2000), its use in corporate governance is rare.  
 
Evolutionary approaches (Aldrich, 1999; Nelson & Winter, 1982) form a set of theories 
looking at the development of nations, industries, and companies over time in a dy-
namic and multi-level fashion. Hannan & Freeman (1989) argued that at a company 
population level, the survival of organizations is mostly determined by impersonal 
forces. At a company level, evolutionary approaches give more room to managerial 
choice in determining organizational survival. For example, the adaptive value of a 
companys strategy can be increased by promoting autonomous strategy processes 
(Burgelman, 1991). One contribution of evolutionary approaches to governance and 
management of companies is that evolution is not a static process and that company de-
velopment is path dependent, i.e. history matters. A review of the literature shows that 
evolutionary approaches are not explicitly used as a theoretical framework in corporate 
governance, although the evolutionary perspective is consistent with it. Jensen (1983) 
noted that understanding a firms survival process involves understanding how low-cost 
control of agency problems is achieved. 
 
The resource-based view sees the firm as a bundle of tangible and intangible resources 
(Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). A firms resources can be the basis of sustained 
competitive advantage if the resources are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and not 
substitutable (Barney, 1991). According to the resource-based view, a firms strategy 
should be driven by exploiting existing resources and by developing new ones. This 
view is opposed to the industrial organization view that maintains that the basis of com-
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petitive advantage is understanding the forces of competition in the firms industry, and 
in building a strong position in it (e.g., Porter, 1980). The dynamic capabilities approach 
builds on the resource-based view and offers a more dynamic view to competitive ad-
vantage. Dynamic capabilities refers to a firms ability to integrate, build, and recon-
figure internal and external competences to address changing environments (Teece, 
Pisano & Shuen, 1997). In the area of governance, the resource-based view of the firm 
has been applied in interfirm relationships (e.g., Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). 
Habbershon & Williams (1999) introduced a resource-based framework for studying 
family firms. In this kind of framework, the notion of familiness refers to family 
business resources arising from the interaction between the business, family, and its in-
dividual members.   
 
Resource dependence theory focuses on those strategic actions of organizations that are 
intended to influence and control interdependencies with other organizations in their 
environment. The need to manage interdependencies is ultimately induced by the re-
source-scarcity of organizations; they cannot produce all the resources they need, and, 
consequently, they depend on resources offered by other parties. The resource depend-
ence theory is influenced by earlier studies of interorganizational exchanges that em-
phasized the social aspects of exchange relationships (e.g., Levine & White, 1961; Blau, 
1964). For example, beyond pure economic considerations, the reciprocal nature of a 
series of transactions between exchange partners was addressed. Central to the resource 
dependence theory is the proposition that power and dependence are tightly related. 
Party A is dependent on party B to the extent that party A cannot manage without the 
resources controlled by party B while party A is unable to obtain them elsewhere (Em-
erson, 1962). This resource dependence can lead to an asymmetric power relation be-
tween the parties. Firms can increase their power by reducing their dependence on other 
parties by either acquiring control over the resources they need or by acquiring control 
over the resources that the other parties need (Pfeffer, 1981). The resource dependence 
theory takes an active managerial approach to interorganizational relations. Behavior 
within those relations is explained by managerial motives to gain more autonomy and to 
reduce the impact of external threats (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Managers seek some 
interdependencies and avoid some others based on the availability of power and control 
possibilities inherent in those interdependencies. The resource dependence approach to 
interorganizational relations proposes aggressive intervention and is the most overtly 
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political model compared to the other approaches to organizational studies (Aldrich, 
1999). 
 
The sixth theoretical framework introduced in Table 3.1 represents the social capital 
theory. This theory is rooted in sociology and has emerged as a new approach to explain 
interorganizational relations. The social capital theory posits that there are valuable re-
sources embedded in social relations (Granovetter, 1985). The social capital framework 
is reviewed separately in Chapter 3, Section 3.  
 
 
3.1.3 Selection of the main theoretical governance frameworks used in the study 
 
All the six theoretical frameworks briefly reviewed above have the potential to be ap-
plied in empirical studies on corporate governance of family firms. Table 3.2 indicates 
such potential use of the frameworks. 
 
Table 3.2 Potential use of the theoretical frameworks in family firm governance 
Theoretical frameworks Potential application in family firm governance 
Agency theory Effects of the separation of ownership from managerial control 
Transaction cost economics Firm boundaries; ownership and financing structures 
Evolutionary approaches Factors promoting and inhibiting survival of family firms 
Resource-based view Family-related resources leading to sustained competitive advantage 
Resource dependence theory Power and resource aspects of relationships in family firms 
Social capital theory Effects of resources embedded in relationships 
 
 
In this study, the agency theory and the social capital theory have been selected as the 
main theoretical frameworks. The effects of separation of ownership and control on 
family firm governance and decision making are an essential part of the research prob-
lem. This motivates the use of the agency theory. Family businesses are rich in relation-
ships. Relationships between owners and management in family firms are much 
stronger than in large, open corporations. The social dimension of relations in family 
firms motivates the use of the social capital theory as the second main theoretical 
framework in the study.  
 
 36
In addition to specific consideration of family firms, the selection of the theoretical 
frameworks can be motivated by a more general theoretical basis. Transaction cost eco-
nomics, evolutionary approaches, the resource-based view, and resource dependence 
theory all fall short in some theoretical respects. First, the overall purpose of this disser-
tation is to study how corporate governance, strategic decision making, and firm per-
formance are related in a particular ownership context. Some frameworks may not be 
fully consistent with this overall purpose. Transaction cost economics addresses mainly 
the cost efficiency aspects of governance. By doing so, it ignores the value creation as-
pect of governance, which is of vital importance when analyzing strategic decision 
processes. The resource dependence theory may offer too political a view of the rela-
tionship between the owners and managers, thus downplaying the effects of good ongo-
ing social relationships. Second, not all the theoretical frameworks are equally suitable 
concerning the unit of analysis of the study, which is generally the individual firm. For 
example, the resource-based view analyses how a firms internal characteristics contrib-
ute to achieve its competitive advantage. Such characteristics address lower level organ-
izational characteristics such as physical assets, knowledge, capabilities, and processes. 
Third, as the strategic choice is important to the topic of the dissertation, not all the 
frameworks are well suited for this purpose. Especially not evolutionary approaches, 
which offer rather deterministic views on a firms strategic behaviors, without leaving 
much room for managerial strategic choice. However, these theoretical frameworks are 
not necessarily completely inconsistent with the study. Whenever feasible, these, or 
other theoretical frameworks, may be used in the study along with the agency theory 
and the social capital theory.  
 
 
3.2 Agency theory  
 
3.2.1 Introduction to agency theory 
 
Agency theory is an economic approach that aims at explaining why and how firms be-
have as they do (Jensen, 1983). The notion of the relationship of agency is central in the 
agency theory. According to Ross the relationship of agency is one of the oldest and 
commonest codified modes of social interaction. We will say that an agency relation-
ship has arisen between two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts 
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for, on behalf of, or representative for the other, designated the principal, in a particular 
domain of decision problems. Examples of agency are universal. Essentially all contrac-
tual arrangements, as between employer and employee, or the state and the governed, 
for example, contain important elements of agency (1973: 134). Typically, in agency 
theoretical analyses, the owners of a firm are considered as principals and managers 
as agents. Based on the agreement between the principal and agent, the agent makes 
choices and takes actions and, then, both parties share the consequences (Ross, 1973).  
 
Agency theory deals with potential problems of the agency relationship and how differ-
ent ways of contracting and organizing affect the outcomes of that relationship. Agency 
problems arise due to differences in goals, attitudes toward risk, and information asym-
metries among the principals and owners. As Eisenhardt (1989a) noted, the agency the-
ory addresses two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The first problem 
arises when the goals of the principal and agent conflict and when it is also difficult to 
verify what the agent is actually doing. The second problem deals with risk sharing 
when the principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk, and thus may prefer 
different actions. Before proceeding with the agency theory, its roots in economics are 
briefly discussed below. 
 
Classical economics, and, later, neoclassical microeconomics do not offer any theory of 
how the firm works internally (Demsetz, 1983; 1997a; 1997b; Jensen & Meckling 
1976). Neoclassical economics provides models on how the price system coordinates 
the use of resources in a large, decentralized commercial system. Neoclassical theory 
assumes that markets function freely and that prices and technology are known by all 
interested parties. The firm is treated like a profit maximizing black box transforming 
inputs to outputs using known technology. The outputs of firms are consumed by 
households who also supply resources to firms. The firm and managerial resource allo-
cation do not play a central role in the neoclassical theory. The firm in the neoclassical 
theory is often likened to an entrepreneur or owner-manager, while multi-person firms 
are not needed in the analysis. Coordination occurs through impersonally determined 
prices, not by managerial planning. Owners are expected to be in effective control of 
their assets. Neoclassical theory does not address how the often-conflicting interests of 
owners and managers are brought into equilibrium. Many theories of the firm are ac-
tually theories of markets in which firms are important value-maximizing actors. In 
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economics, maximizing models are not capable of explaining managerial behavior in 
corporations, because the firm is often treated as a black box. 
 
Ronald Coases (1937) article can be regarded as the main impetus for developing vari-
ous theories of the firm. Coase was concerned with the question of why firms exist at 
all if resources are allocated through the price mechanism, i.e. through arms-length 
market transactions. Coase proposed that there are contracting costs of using the price 
mechanism and that these costs may be avoided if certain operations are conducted 
within a firm. Coase discussed many concepts that are key to modern economic theories 
of the firm, including the employer-employee relationship, the contractual nature of a 
firms activities, and the affect uncertainty has on the existence of firms.  
 
Three related but distinctive main branches of economic theories of the firm can be 
identified: transaction cost economics, property rights theory, and agency theory (Wil-
liamson, 1985). They all emphasize the contractual nature of the firm and explain the 
existence of firms in terms of efficiency as compared to classical market exchange. 
Transaction cost economics is concerned with those conditions that determine whether 
transactions are made in the markets or in the hierarchy of a firm (Williamson 1975; 
1985). Diverse literature on the property rights emphasize the interconnectedness of 
ownership rights, incentives, and economic behavior (Furubotn & Pejowich, 1972). 
Property rights literature has implications for the agency theory. Jensen & Meckling 
(1976) noted that the distribution of costs and rewards among the participants in any 
organization is determined by the specification of individual rights. Because the specifi-
cation of rights is generally affected through implicit or explicit contracting, managerial 
behavior will depend on the nature of these contracts. 
 
Jensen (1983) identified two streams of literature covering the agency theory: the posi-
tive theory of agency and principal-agent literature. Both branches of the agency litera-
ture study the contracting problem between self-interested, maximizing parties and uses 
the agency costs minimizing approach. The principal-agent literature has concentrated 
on modeling the effects on contracts between principal and agent, addressing the struc-
ture of the preferences of the parties, the nature of uncertainty, and the informational 
structure in the environment. Attention is generally focused on the form of the optimal 
contract and risk sharing between principal and agent, and on welfare comparisons (e.g., 
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Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971; Ross, 1973; Raviv, 1979; Harris & Townsend, 1981; 
Holmström, 1979; Shavell, 1979). Holmström (1979), for example, studied the role of 
imperfect information in a principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard. In prin-
cipal-agent literature, moral hazard refers to lack of effort on the part of the agent, 
and adverse selection refers to the mispresentation of ability by the agent (Eisenhardt, 
1989a: 61). 
 
The positive agency literature has generally concentrated on modeling the effects of the 
means of monitoring and bonding on the form of the organizations and contracts that 
survive (Jensen, 1983). It also addresses additional aspects of the contracting environ-
ment, for example, capital and labor markets, the degree of specialization of assets, and 
capital intensity.  
 
Principal-agent literature relies heavily on mathematics and is less empirically oriented, 
whereas the positive theory of the agency is less mathematically inclined and it can di-
rectly be used for developing empirically testable theories (Jensen, 1983). Jensen (1983) 
suggests that the two streams of agency literature are likely to become closer in the fu-
ture. He also noted that the principal-agent literature could contribute to generate non-
obvious testable propositions. However, some authors regard mathematical models 
found in the principal-agent literature not applicable to organizational studies. For ex-
ample, Tosi, Katz & Gomez-Mejia noted that mathematical models that carefully spec-
ify contract conditions and lead to deterministic solutions (e.g., Holmström, 1979) are 
divorced from organizational realities because of the impossibility of capturing all pos-
sible eventualities, the presence of uncertainty, lack of information, and the dynamic 
nature of the principal-agent relationships (1997: 585).  
 
The positive theory of agency takes into account many organizational contingencies, 
and it studies behavioral implications of different organizational forms. One of the main 
parameters in the positive theory of agency is the degree of separation of ownership and 
control, or, more precisely, separation of the residual risk-bearing functions and deci-
sion management (Jensen, 1983). Jensen & Mecklings (1976) widely referred to article 
on ownership structure and agency relationship can be regarded as a landmark writing 
in the development of the positive theory of agency. The remainder of this section re-
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views literature on the positive theory of agency, which is developed by Michael Jensen 
and his collaborators. 
 
An important variable in Jensen & Mecklings (1976) analysis is how much of the eq-
uity is owned by inside managers and how much by outside owners. The analysis as-
sumes that capital markets are efficient and the equity-selling owner-manager will bear 
agency costs incurred by monitoring. From the owner-managers point of view the op-
timal share of outside financing to be obtained from equity for a given level of internal 
equity is that that results in minimum total agency costs. The managers utility is maxi-
mized by the optimum mix of various pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits. As the 
owner-managers fraction of the equity falls, he tends to appropriate larger amounts of 
corporate resources to his own use. This causes the outside-owners to monitor the man-
agers activities. When the managers share of the equity falls, his or her incentive to 
search new profitable opportunities also falls. If the equity market is efficient, the bene-
fits of monitoring and bonding activities are reflected in the value of equity. Jensen & 
Meckling argued that agency costs are unavoidable in the agency relationship. The use 
of outside equity is justified if the benefits of the agency relationship are greater than 
the agency costs.  
 
Contractual relations are the essence of the firm in the agency theory. Jensen & Meck-
lings (1976) emphasized that a firm is simply a legal fiction serving as a nexus for con-
tracting relationships. The firm behaves like a market, and its outcomes are 
determined by a complex equilibrium process. According to Fama & Jensen (1983b), 
written and unwritten contracts, or rules of the game, specify the rights, the perform-
ance criteria, and the payoff functions of the various agents. The central contracts in the 
organizations specify (1) the nature of residual claims, and (2) the decision process 
among agents. In addition to the nexus of contracts view, the positive theory of 
agency consists of a few fundamental building blocks (Jensen, 1998), including the 
nature of human behavior, the costs of transferring information, the agency costs of co-
operative behavior, and organizational rules of the game contributing to organiza-
tional success or failure.  
 
Jensen & Meckling (1994) proposed a multi-faceted model for human behavior. They 
claimed that their model of human nature included a minimum set of characteristics that 
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can be used to explain a wide range of social phenomena in economic organizations. 
The model is defined by four postulates suggesting that (1) every individual evaluates 
almost everything, and is ready for trade-offs, (2) each individuals wants are unlimited, 
(3) individuals are maximizers, but they are constrained in satisfying their wants, and 
(4) individuals are resourceful in creating new opportunities. Jensen & Meckling (1994) 
contrasted their model to other models of human behavior including the economic, the 
sociological, the psychological, and the political models. The Jensen & Meckling 
(1994) model of human behavior aims at incorporating some features and dismissing 
other features from the other models of human behavior. The economic model contrib-
utes the point that people are resourceful and self-interested maximizers. The social 
model contributes to the understanding how social change occurs. The psychological 
model recognizes that individuals have wants. The political model suggests that people 
have capacity for altruism. Jensen & Meckling distinguish between a perfect agent and 
an altruist, who behaves in a way that may be harmful to himself but beneficial to oth-
ers. The perfect agent is ready to serve a variety of principals, whereas the altruist is 
selective about what causes to serve.  
 
Jensen (1994) argued that self-interested and altruistic, i.e. having a concern for the well 
being of others, behavior are not inconsistent. People are self-interested and they have, 
at the same time, altruistic characteristics. For example, Jensen noted that people do 
help family and neighbors. Furthermore, people are not perfect agents. There is plenty 
of abuse in families, church, business, and government, for example. Jensen claimed 
that greater attention to self-interested or to rational behavior would be beneficial to 
everyone. Furthermore, Jensen (1994) noted that individuals do have non-rational, self-
damaging features in their behavior. Non-rational behavior may random or inexplicable 
but it is dysfunctional behavior that harms the individual.  
 
If parties in an agency relationship are utility maximizers then the agent will not always 
behave in the best interest of the principal, and agency costs will be incurred. Jensen & 
Meckling (1976) classified agency costs into three categories: monitoring expenditures, 
bonding expenditures, and residual loss. Monitoring costs are incurred by the principals 
monitoring designed to reduce the agents deviant activities. Bonding costs are created 
by the agent to protect the principals interests. Monitoring involves, for example, audit-
ing, formal control systems, budget restrictions, and incentive compensation systems. 
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Bonding activities include, for example, contractual limitations on the managers deci-
sion-making power. The residual loss arises when the agents decisions are not optimal 
from the principals point of view.  
 
Information processing and knowledge-related challenges contribute to forming agency 
relationships, which, in turn, cause agency problems. According to Jensen & Meckling 
(1998), individuals have limited knowledge on two levels. The first limitation is im-
posed by general technological feasibility reflecting the level of human knowledge of 
physical laws. The second limitation is specific to each individuals mental capabilities 
and it is often called bounded rationality (March & Simon, 1958). There are two means 
to colocate valuable knowledge and decision rights in decision making. One is to trans-
fer knowledge to those who have the decision rights. The other is to transfer the deci-
sion rights to those who have the knowledge. The second way of colocating knowledge 
and decision rights has gained much less attention than the first one. Jensen & Meckling 
(1998) claimed that control and knowledge are complements in organizational analysis. 
The more specific knowledge is, the more costly it is to transfer it. Transferring knowl-
edge is not merely communicating it, but communicating it in such a way that the mes-
sage is understood well enough for it to be acted upon. 
 
Jensen & Meckling (1998) compared how decision-making rights are assigned in mar-
kets and within firms, and the motivation of agents to make proper decisions. Specifi-
cally, the authors discuss the organizational implications of the costs of transferring 
information between agents. The use of specific knowledge, i.e. knowledge that is 
costly to transfer among agents, requires decentralizing many decision rights among 
agents. This decentralization leads rights assignment problem and the control problem. 
According to Jensen & Meckling (1998), the market system solves the rights assign-
ment and control problems by granting alienability of decision rights to decision agents. 
Alienable rights are specific rights associated with ownership: the right to sell the re-
source and the right to capture the proceeds of the sale. The rights assignment problem 
is solved by colocating knowledge and decision rights through voluntary purchase and 
sale. Alienability solves the control problem: first, it provides a measure of performance 
through market prices; second, it provides the reward or punishment as a result of using 
alienable decision rights.  
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Firms are different from markets concerning the alienable decision rights because they 
do not generally grant both decision rights and alienability of those rights to the agent in 
their decision structures (Jensen & Meckling, 1998). Assignment of decision rights in 
firms are a matter of policy and practice instead of a voluntary exchange of alienable 
decision rights. Since alienable decision rights are not generally granted to agents in 
firms, substitute mechanisms exist. According to Jensen & Meckling (1998), organiza-
tional problems are solved by devising a set of rules that (1) partition out the decision-
making rights to agents throughout the organization, and (2) create a control system that 
provides measures of performance and specifies the relationship between rewards and 
the measures of performance. 
 
Knowledge considerations are important in explaining the survival of firms. Jensen & 
Meckling (1998) emphasized the importance of colocation of knowledge and decision 
authority. They referred to Hayek (1945) who has argued that the distribution of knowl-
edge in society calls for decentralization. Hayek noted that the peculiar character of the 
problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowl-
edge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or 
integrated form, but solely as dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory 
knowledge which all the separate individuals possess (1945: 519) and that if we can 
agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes 
in particular circumstances of time and place...we cannot expect that this problem will 
be solved by first communicating all this knowledge to a central board which, after in-
tegrating all knowledge, issues the orders. We must solve it by some form of decentrali-
zation (1945: 524). Hayeks argument largely refutes the usefulness of heavy 
centralized planning. This view is also adopted by the agency theory. 
 
Jensen & Meckling (1998) argued that there is an optimal location of decision rights 
that minimizes the total organizational costs. Because of limited individual capabilities 
and knowledge, the chief executive cannot make personally every decision in the or-
ganization. The challenge is how to delegate the decision rights within the organization. 
In assigning decision rights, a second problem arises due to the self-interested nature of 
individuals. Individuals objectives diverge from each other causing conflicts of interest 
in cooperative behavior. Conflicts of interest create agency costs, as they are commonly 
called. Dispersion of valuable knowledge and conflicts of interest in delegation create a 
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trade-off challenge. Complete centralization creates high costs due to poor information 
whereas complete delegation creates high agency costs due to inconsistent objectives.  
 
In the positive theory of agency, the decision process is an important factor in explain-
ing the survival of organizations. Combination of decision control (ratifying and moni-
toring), decision management (initiation and implementation), and residual risk bearing 
usually happens in noncomplex organizations where specific knowledge important to 
the organization is in the hands of a few agents (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). It is common 
in classical entrepreneurial firms such as proprietorships, partnerships, and closed cor-
porations where major decision agents are also the major risk bearers. Also, these or-
ganizations may have residual claimants who are not decision agents. The combination 
of decision control, decision management, and residual risk bearing has disadvantages 
due to the restricted risk sharing of assets and limited specialization of decision func-
tions. On the other hand, most of the agency costs are avoided. Depending on circum-
stances, the optimal solution can be either combining or separating ownership and 
control.  
 
According to Fama & Jensen (1983b), separation of decision management, decision 
control, and residual risk bearing is most often observable in large, complex organiza-
tions. The residual claims in those companies are diffused to numerous residual claim-
ants who can diversify their risk (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). Decision rights tend to be 
delegated to agents with the best specific knowledge. This creates agency problems that 
are reduced by separating decision management and decision control. In open corpora-
tions, the residual claimants are not required to have any other role in the corporation, 
and their residual claims are freely alienable. In open corporations the decision man-
agement and residual risk bearing are separated and specialized functions. Being an ex-
pert in one area does not imply competence in the other area. The stock market 
functions as an external monitoring device. The stock prices summarize the expectations 
of current and future cash flows. The market for takeovers is made possible by the unre-
stricted nature of residual claims. Outside managers can try to get hold of decision con-
trol from the current board and management by a tender offer or a proxy fight. 
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3.2.2 Applications of agency theory 
 
Agency theory has been applied to a wide range of studies where cooperative behavior 
is an issue and an agency relationship can be identified. For example, agency theory has 
been applied in studies addressing accounting, economics, political science, organiza-
tional behavior, sociology, marketing, compensation, acquisition and diversification 
strategies, board relationships, ownership and financing structures, vertical integration, 
and innovation (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Øyvind, 1998). Earlier empirical applications of the 
agency theory related to finance and accounting, including, for example, studies on the 
selection of accounting methods in various contexts (Holthausen, 1981; Leftwich, 1981) 
and wealth effects of convertible calls (Mikkelson, 1981). The degree to which the 
agency theory is applied in empirical studies varies greatly. Some studies use agency 
theory only peripherally together with other theoretical approaches, while some other 
studies use it as the main theoretical framework.  
 
Studies on corporate governance have commonly applied agency theory as its main 
theoretical framework, probably because an agency relationship is easy to identify and 
where parties often have deviating interests, at least partly. Empirical research into cor-
porate governance, explicitly using the agency theory, has studied how board of direc-
tors balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command in situations where the 
same person holds both the chief executive officer and chairman positions (Finkelstein 
& DAveni, 1994), the effects of corporate control activities on internal control mecha-
nisms and innovation (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson & Moesel, 1996), how ownership struc-
ture affects productivity directly as well as when mediated by diversification, research 
and development expenditures, and capital intensity (Hill & Snell, 1989), top manage-
ment compensation and incentives (Jensen & Murphy, 1990), and the effects of internal 
governance mechanisms on agent decision making (Tosi et al., 1997). 
 
Many empirical studies have addressed the relationship between the ownership structure 
and firm performance. Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) studied how various mechanisms 
intended to control agency problems are related to firm performance, operationalized as 
Tobins Q, reflecting the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt divided 
by the book value of total assets. They found that management ownership is positively 
related to firm performance, while increased debt financing, more outsiders on the board 
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of directors, and greater corporate control activity were all negatively related to firm 
performance.  
 
Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1988) studied the relationship between management owner-
ship and market valuation, as measured by Tobins Q also. They found a non-monotonic 
relationship between the market valuation and the ownership by the board of directors. 
When the boards ownership of the equity increases from 0% to 5%, the market valua-
tion also increases, whereas the valuation declines when ownership increases from 5% 
to 25%. Above 25% ownership, the market value increases again as the ownership rises. 
Morck et al. explained the negative relationship between the ownership and valuation 
by entrenchment effects of the board members. Morck et al. (1988) also observed that 
older firms run by a member of the founding family are valued lower than firms that are 
run by an officer unrelated to the founder.  
 
Oswald & Jahera (1991) studied the relationship between inside ownership, measured in 
terms of stockholdings of both directors and officers, and firm performance, measured 
by excess stock returns. Their results showed a positive relationship between inside 
ownership and firm performance. Previous research on the relationship between inside 
ownership and firm performance has produced negative results also. For example, 
Oswald & Jahera (1991) found three previous studies indicating a negative relationship 
between inside ownership and performance (Kesner, 1987; Kim, Lee & Francis, 1988; 
Schellenger, Wood & Tashakori, 1989). In an international study, Han, Lee & Suk 
(1999) found no evidence that concentrated inside ownership and firm performance are 
related. 
 
Although empirical research on family business has seldom used agency theory as a 
theoretical framework, recent development indicates that its application is gaining in-
creasing interest among family business researchers. Empirical studies on family busi-
ness that were identified as using an agency theory framework focused on ownership 
structure in family and professionally managed firms (Daily & Dollinger, 1992), corpo-
rate ownership and its impact on performance, efficiency, and capital structure 
(McConaughy, 1994), efficiency, risk, and value of founding family controlled firms 
(McConaughy, Matthews & Fialko, 1997), ownership and growth of family businesses 
(Hufft, 1997), the shareholder role in the family business (Vilaseca, 1999), and family 
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chief executive officers versus non-family chief executive officers in the family con-
trolled firm (McConaughy, 2000), effects of family ties on principal-agent contracts 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001), types of agency problems within family firms (Schulze et 
al., 2001), and a survey of family business management issues related to agency theory 
(Chua, Chrisman & Sharma, 2001). 
 
 
3.2.3 Critique to agency theory 
 
Agency theory provides a robust theory to study organizations and it has been success-
fully applied in a variety of empirical studies. However, the agency theory is surrounded 
by controversy and it has been criticized by many authors, typically researchers in soci-
ology. For example, Perrow (1990) argued that human beings do not inherently behave 
in a self-interested manner, as agency theory assumes. Organizational settings best ex-
plain whether self-interested or other-regarding behaviors will dominate. Perrow also 
claimed that agency theory focuses on agent opportunism, excluding the potential mis-
behavior of principals.  
 
According to Uzzi (1997), agency theory, and also other theories of the firm rooted in 
neoclassical economics, does not explicitly recognize that social structure affects organ-
izational behavior, thus bypassing the issues central to organization theory. This was 
recognized earlier by Granovetter who noted that economic theories of organization 
have atomized, undersocialized conception of human action (1985: 483) because the 
impact of social relations and social structure are ignored. This undersocialized view 
emphasizes rational calculation of individual gain, while not taking into account social 
or kinship obligations. According to Granovetter, pure rational calculation may be ap-
plicable in competitive, idealized markets where buyers and sellers are anonymous to 
each other. However, Granovetter claimed actors do not behave or decide as atoms 
outside a social context...attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, 
ongoing systems of social relations (1985: 487).  
 
Some critics indicate that application of agency theory outside of dyadic principal-agent 
relationships may not be feasible. For example, evolution and functioning interfirm 
network governance cannot be easily explained by agency theory, as principal-agent 
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relationships are blurred, goals are often jointly set, and there is a lack of monitoring 
devices between firms (Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1997). Often, social control mechanisms, 
such as collective sanction and reputation, are claimed to offer more suitable control 
mechanisms than formal control in a network-type governance context (e.g. Jones, 
Hesterly & Borgatti, 1997). 
 
One source of criticisms on agency theory is the stakeholder theory, the development of 
which was greatly induced by Freeman (1984). Partly based on moral arguments, stake-
holder theory claims that all stakeholders have intrinsic value, i.e. stakeholders deserve 
consideration for their own sake (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Stakeholders refer to 
persons or groups who are identified by their interests in the corporation, whether the 
corporation has any corresponding functional interest in them (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995: 67). Proponents of stakeholder theory claim that agency theory is not valid be-
cause it only addresses economic responsibilities between principals and agents, while 
being silent on other responsibilities (Shankman, 1999). Stakeholder theory places the 
management as the central decision-making actor, because, according to stakeholder 
theory, it is up to management to justify the needs of various stakeholders and make de-
cisions concerning how to deal with these needs. Jensen has answered to these critics by 
noting that proponents of stakeholder theory offer no explanation of how conflicts be-
tween different stakeholders are to be resolved. This leaves managers with no principle 
on which to base decisions, making them accountable to no one but their own prefer-
ences (2000: 2). 
 
Regardless of a variety of critics, agency theory is a powerful theoretical framework in 
many research contexts. Eisenhardt has recommended using agency theory with com-
plementary theories. She concluded her review of agency theory by noting that agency 
theory presents a partial view of the world that, although it is valid, also ignores a good 
bit of the complexity of organizations. Additional perspectives can help to capture the 
greater complexity (1989a: 71). Following this recommendation, this dissertation com-
plements agency theory with social capital theory.  
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3.3 Social capital theory  
 
3.3.1 Introduction to social capital theory 
 
The concept of social capital has emerged from the description of certain types of re-
sources that are distinguishable from other forms of capital. Social capital can be 
broadly defined as an asset embedded in social relations and networks (e.g., Leana & 
Van Buren, 1999). Use of this concept focuses more on the positive consequences of 
sociability, and less on its potential negative effects (Portes, 1998). Social capital theory 
is not a unified, homogenous social theory. Rather, it is a set of related, but sometimes 
controversial, descriptions and propositions. The development of social capital theory 
has been affected by diverse streams of literature, such as that of the early social ex-
change theorists (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961), community studies addressing resources 
acquired through personal ties (e.g., Jacobs, 1965; Putnam, 1995), and critics of neo-
classical economics (e.g., Granovetter, 1985; Loury, 1981). The notion of social capital 
has gained an increasing interest in many fields because it is a productive asset that can 
be used to generate other forms of capital, including financial, physical, and human 
capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988). However, social capital differs from other 
forms capital in that it is owned jointly by the members of a social network, and cannot 
be traded easily (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  
 
The social capital theory is used to study a wide range of social, economic, and organ-
izational phenomena at various levels of analysis ranging from macro to micro levels. 
For example, it has been used to study nations (Fukuyama, 1995), communities (Put-
nam, 1993), family relations (Coleman, 1988), interfirm networks (Baker, 1990; Uzzi, 
1997; Walker, Kogut & Shan, 1997), value creation by firms (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998), intrafirm networks (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998) and entrepreneurship (Larson, 1992).  
 
Bourdieu, a French sociologist, was the first person to provide a systematic analysis of 
social capital (Portes, 1998). Bourdieu defined social capital as the aggregate of the 
actual or potential resources which are linked to a possession of a durable network of 
more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition 
(1986: 248). According to Bourdieu, social capital has instrumental value because it 
helps to secure material and symbolic profits accruing from membership to a group. 
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These profits do not come without costs. Social capital is not a natural given, and it de-
creases over time if no conscious efforts are made. Bourdieu noted that the network of 
relationships is the product of investment strategies...aimed at establishing or reproduc-
ing social relationships that are directly usable in the short or long term (1986: 249). 
Bourdieus analysis suggests that the amount of social capital an individual possesses 
depends on the size of the network she or he has, and on the amount and quality of dif-
ferent resources available through the relationships in the network.  
 
Coleman is another sociologist who has advanced the social capital concept, especially 
in the American context. Following Granovetter (1985), Coleman (1988) criticized both 
the undersocialized view of human actors as utility maximizing, independent indi-
viduals depicted by neoclassical economic theory, and the oversocialized conception 
in which man has no engine of action, as portrayed in earlier sociological literature. 
Colemans social theory (1990) imports principles from economics to sociology. Ra-
tional action and self-interested orientation are accepted as elements of human nature, 
but they are affected by the social structure. In Colemans analysis, social capital is seen 
much as a mechanism to create human and physical capital. 
 
Coleman defined social capital by its function. According to Coleman, social capital is 
not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in com-
mon: They all consist of some aspect of social structure and they facilitate certain ac-
tions of individuals who are within the structure (1990: 302). Coleman (1988) 
identified three forms of social capital: (1) reciprocity expectations and obligations be-
tween two persons to whom earlier transfers of some resources will be repaid in some 
form in the future, (2) potentially useful information inhering in social relations, and (3) 
norms and sanctions to promote functional, and to inhibit dysfunctional behavior, within 
the network of social relationships.  
 
After Bourdieu and Coleman, several definitions of social capital have been provided, 
both in theoretical analyses and empirical applications. Different contemporary defini-
tions convey similar ideas. For example, Baker defined the concept as a resource that 
actors derive from specific social structures and then use to pursue their interests; it is 
created by changes in the relations among actors (1990: 619). Nahapiet & Ghoshal see 
social capital as the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, avail-
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able through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual 
or social unit (1998: 243). Putnam referred to social capital as features of social or-
ganization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and co-
operation for mutual benefit (1995: 67). Portes defined it briefly as an ability of actors 
to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures 
(1998: 6).  
 
Consequences generated by social capital bearing upon individuals or larger social units 
are mediated by social structures and originated by the other members of the network 
(Portes, 1998). Although the extant literature does not always distinguish between the 
sources, mediating mechanisms, and consequences of social capital, there seems to be a 
consensus that the social capital includes both the social network and the resources ob-
tained through that network.  
 
Depending on who receives the benefits, social capital has been considered either as a 
public good or as a private good (Leana & Van Buren, 1999). Coleman (1988) consid-
ered social capital mainly as a public good, meaning that benefits due to social capital 
are distributed to all members in a social structure. In the public good view, the social 
capital is an attribute of a social unit and individual benefits are considered only as a 
secondary outcome (e.g., Putnam, 1995). Social capital as a private good implies that 
benefits accrue directly to individuals. For example, Belliveau, OReilly & Wade 
(1996) studied how social capital affects a firms chief executive officers compensa-
tion.  
 
Authors on social capital suggest that the concept is multidimensional. Granovetter 
(1992) distinguished two types of embeddedness affecting economic action. The 
structural aspect of embeddedness refers to properties of social networks as a whole, 
whereas relational embeddedness is concerned with actors dyadic (pair-wise) relations. 
Granovetter emphasized that the analysis of relations within a network cannot be re-
duced to an analysis of dyadic relations, because the network itself has properties that 
cannot be explained at dyadic level.  
 
Drawing on and extending Granovetters work, Nahapiet & Ghoshal (1998) suggested 
that the concept of the social capital has structural, relational, and cognitive dimensions. 
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The structural dimension describes the impersonal pattern of connections between ac-
tors within the social network. The structural dimension itself contains many facets, in-
cluding the presence of network ties and overall network configuration in terms of 
density, connectivity, and hierarchy. The relational dimension addresses the quality of 
personal relationships among people as shaped by a history of interactions. As an asset, 
the relational dimension of social capital helps to create and leverage resources through 
personal relationships. Among the key elements of this dimension are norms and sanc-
tions, trust and trustworthiness, obligations and expectations, and identity and identifi-
cation. The cognitive dimension of social capital refers to resources providing shared 
presentations, interpretations, and systems of meaning among parties (1998: 244). Ac-
cording to Nahapiet & Ghoshal, this dimension has been substantially addressed in 
strategy literature (e.g., Conner & Prahalad, 1996), but it has not been addressed in the 
mainstream social capital literature. The three dimensions of the social capital suggested 
by Nahapiet & Ghoshal (1998) are closely related. For example, Tsai & Ghoshal (1998) 
found that the cognitive dimension of social capital, conceptualized as shared vision, 
and the structural dimension, conceptualized as social interaction ties, have significant 
effects on trust and trustworthiness, which represent the relational dimension of social 
capital.  
 
Leana & Van Buren (1999) divided organizational social capital into two primary com-
ponents. The first component is associability, which refers to individuals willingness to 
subordinate their own goals and actions to the collective goals and actions of an organi-
zation. The second component of organizational social capital is trust, which enables 
people to work together. Leana & Van Buren elaborated the concept of trust in terms its 
strength and the level of analysis. Leana & Van Burens classification of organizational 
social capital into associability and trust is consistent with Nahapiet & Ghoshals (1998) 
cognitive and relational dimensions.  
 
For Coleman (1988, 1990), closure of social networks is an important determinant to 
the formation of social capital. Closure basically means that the ties among people are 
strong enough to guarantee the effectiveness of norms that contribute to achieving posi-
tive effects of social capital and to constraining undesired behavior. According to 
Granovetter (1973), tie strength between actors is a combination of the time commit-
ment, the amount of reciprocal services, and the level of friendship in terms intimacy 
 53
and emotions in the relationship. Like Coleman, many authors have emphasized the im-
portance of tie strength: the stronger the ties among the members in the social network, 
the higher the level of social capital within that group. For example, Putnam (1995) has 
pointed out how social capital within American families and communities help them to 
survive and prosper, and how the declining social capital in these units is associated 
with social and economic problems. Nelson (1989) found from an empirical study that 
strong ties between organizational units are associated with low levels of disruptive 
conflict.  
 
Arguments that favor weak ties between groups have also been proposed in the litera-
ture. Weak ties can increase information flows between otherwise disconnected social 
groups (Granovetter, 1973). Burt (1992) extended Granovetters idea of weak ties to the 
social structure of competition. Burt showed how structural holes can be used create 
information and control benefits in competition. A structural hole indicates non-
redundant contacts, i.e. contacts having weak ties and high new information potential. 
Walker et al. (1997) studied empirically whether strong tie or weak tie arguments better 
explain the formation of an industry network. They found evidence that dense social 
capital has more positive effects on new cooperation for creating information benefits, 
than the use of weak ties. In sum, the extant literature suggests different functions for 
strong and weak ties: strong ties are more associated with enhancing the cohesiveness 
and voluntary cooperation within a social unit, whereas the utilization of weak ties is 
associated with entrepreneurial activities.  
 
 
3.3.2 Social capital in corporate governance and family business research 
 
The application of social capital theory and related approaches to corporate governance 
research has been scarce. The absence of the social capital theory is visible, for exam-
ple, in two past reviews on research on boards of directors (Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 
1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). However, some recent corporate governance studies have 
used social capital theory as their theoretical framework. Huse (1993; 1994) conducted 
some pioneering research on combining economic and social approaches to the study of 
the relationship between boards of directors and management. By complementing 
agency theory with relational norms (Macneil, 1980), Huse developed and tested hy-
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potheses explaining how boards of directors may remain independent from management 
while retaining a close relationship with it. As mentioned earlier, Belliveau, et al. (1996) 
studied the effects of social capital on a firms chief executive officers compensation. 
They found a positive relationship between the compensation and CEOs social re-
sources. In the received corporate governance literature, the relationship between the 
board of directors and the firms top management is considered more formal and imper-
sonal, rather than socially embedded. Low sociability between board and management 
is often seen as necessary to guarantee the boards independence. Challenging this view, 
Westphal (1999) found that social ties between board and chief executive officer could 
contribute to board effectiveness without reducing its control over the management. Gu-
lati & Westphal (1999) studied how social networks based on the board interlocks influ-
ence strategic alliance formation. Their results indicated that the likelihood of alliance 
formation is increased when top managers of corporations are linked through interlock-
ing directorates, thereby enhancing trust. 
 
A stream of social psychological literature, the procedural justice theory, addresses the  
question of the fairness of various social processes and procedures (Lind & Tyler, 
1988). Although social capital theory and procedural justice theory are not explicitly 
linked, they can be considered as closely related. Procedural justice in the decision-
making process is concerned about how the people who are most affected by decisions 
being made are involved in the process. Korsgaard, Schweiger & Sapienza (1995) found 
that involvement of decision-making teams in the strategic decision-making process is 
related to their trust in ultimate decision makers. Sapienza & Korsgaard (1996) applied 
a similar framework to entrepreneur-investor relations. They found that procedural jus-
tice in decision making is related to investors trust in entrepreneurs, representing the 
relational dimension of social capital among the investors and entrepreneurs.  
 
Social capital based research has attracted more attention in interfirm governance than 
in corporate governance studies. Corporate governance and interfirm governance share 
similar interorganizational challenges, because they both address how value is created 
and appropriated among different organizational units. Thus, ideas about how the social 
capital framework has been applied to interfirm governance should generally be appli-
cable to corporate governance. As discussed earlier, transaction cost economics has 
dominated the area of interfirm governance. However, transaction cost economics has 
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been criticized in not offering a good framework for longer-term cooperative arrange-
ments between firms because it does not address social control aspects inherent in those 
relationships (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). Consequently, approaches related to social 
capital theory have gained increasing interest in interorganizational and network gov-
ernance research (Das & Teng, 1998; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Jones et al., 1997; Gulati, 
1995; Kale, Singh & Perlmutter, 2000; Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven, 1997; 
Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 
1998; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). All these studies criticize transaction cost eco-
nomics and propose alternative forms of governance based on some social mechanism, 
such as trust, reputation, and norms of reciprocity. 
 
Ouchi (1980) argued that transaction cost theory falls short in explaining certain forms 
of governance. In addition to markets and bureaucracies, which are alternative mecha-
nisms for mediating transactions, he proposed a third form of governance. He termed 
the third governance mechanism clan form. Whereas bureaucratic organization relies 
on hierarchical control and evaluation, clan control is based on creating goal congruence 
by means of a variety of social mechanisms and strong community. The greater goal 
congruence is expected to reduce opportunistic behavior and lower transaction costs. 
Moores & Mula (2000) applied Ouchis (1980) market, bureaucratic, and clan controls 
framework to Australian family companies. Results of their empirical study indicated 
that family businesses in their earlier life cycle stages were more likely to employ clan-
based controls than bureaucratic controls. Clan-based social controls are rooted in tradi-
tions rather than in rules or prices.  
 
Interorganizational governance lies somewhere between the two extremes of market and 
hierarchy controls. Ring & Van de Ven (1992) have argued that transaction cost eco-
nomics yields poor explanations of interfirm governance because it is based on cost ef-
ficiency considerations only, and does not address the effects of social relations in 
repeated transactions between firms. They proposed that trust, i.e. confidence in 
others goodwill (1992: 488), is the key element in interfirm governance because it is 
related to reduced risk of opportunistic behavior in repeated transactions. Drawing from 
social capital related literature, Ring & Van de Ven (1994) further developed their 
framework for interorganizational relationships. They addressed formal, legal, and in-
formal social aspects of the relationship over time.  
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The social capital theory has not rigorously been applied in family business research. 
This is surprising, considering that family businesses are characterized by overlapping 
and dense relationships among the owners and management. During the literature re-
view on family business, only one article explicitly using social capital theory as the 
framework was found. It was a paper by Green (1996), who proposed a social capital 
theory driven research agenda linking family businesses and rural communities. Other-
wise, family business literature has only implicitly used some facets of the social capital 
theory, usually as part of a descriptive or qualitative analysis, and sometimes as part of a 
quantitative analysis. 
  
For example, Miller & Rice (1967) noted that strong personal ties among family mem-
bers can reinforce and support leadership of a family company, but they also noted that 
these strong ties can be disastrous during times of rapid change within the business. In 
an empirical study, Lansberg & Astrachan (1994) found that family relationships influ-
ence management succession. Their regression analyses showed that owner-manager 
and successor relationship mediates the effects of family cohesion on succession plan-
ning and training. 
 
As a form social capital, trust can be a powerful force in family business. LaShapelle & 
Barnes suggested that trust, defined as positive expectations of another persons behav-
ior (1998: 2), within the family can act as an integrative mechanism for succeeding 
generations of the family business. Trust is created and maintained within and beyond 
the family by trust catalysts, persons that mainly come from the family.  
 
 
3.3.3 Critique to social capital theory 
 
Social capital theory has been criticized for not offering any new social theory, but 
rather the processes addressed by social capital theory have been previously studied un-
der other labels (Portes, 1998). Also, definitions of social capital are often vague and 
even contradictory. Portes observed that Coleman started definitional proliferation by 
including under the term some of the mechanisms that generate social capital...the con-
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sequences of its possession..., and the appropriable social organization that provided 
the context for both sources and effects to materialize (1998: 5). 
 
Social capital theory focuses on positive consequences of sociability while it seems to 
largely ignore the negative effects to individuals and groups. Portes (1998) identified 
four negative consequences of social capital. First, access to social networks by outsid-
ers may be impossible due to insiders tight control. This kind of bounded solidarity is 
common among ethnic groups. Second, a free-riding problem may occur if less diligent 
group members enforce all kinds of demands backed by shared norms. Third, social 
control aiming at greater conformity in a community or group may reduce individual 
autonomy excessively. Fourth, downward leveling norms may result in groups that are 
in some way in opposition to mainstream society. High social capital can involve high 
risks. Granovetter (1985) noted that trust, following from personal relationships, creates 
a potential for enormous malfeasance. The higher the trust, the greater is the potential 
benefit from malfeasance.  
 
Also, groups with strong social capital may have created rigidities that inhibit survival 
and performance of those groups. For example, Janis (1982) argued that groupthink in 
convergent groups might lead to poor decision making. Leana & Van Buren (1999) 
noted  that groupthink is related dysfunctionally stable power structures because prefer-
ences of those who are in power are favored. Negative effects of strong, convergent 
groups may be reduced by norms of interaction, such as openness to criticism and in-
formation sharing (Leonard-Barton, 1995). 
 
Finally, one potential downside of high social capital in organizations is the resistance 
to change and a reduced level of innovation. Although social capital can be seen to in-
duce innovation due to an increased level of risk taking and cooperation through trust-
ing relations (e.g., Jones & George, 1988), it can also hamper innovation (Leana & Van 
Buren, 1999). Flows of new information entering the organization tend to become less 
as the relationships become denser and more stable (Staw, Sandelans & Dutton, 1981). 
Also, innovation may be reduced in closed industrial communities due to strong norms 
of keeping trade secrets (Coleman, 1990). 
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Social capital literature does not discuss the costs of achieving social capital as much as 
the benefits. Although some forms of social capital may be obtained as a byproduct of 
social processes, the development of social capital requires intentional investments. For 
example, Leana & Van Buren (1999) have argued that maintaining organizational social 
capital calls for keeping slack human resources, providing job security, and maintaining 
good ongoing relationships. Bourdieu emphasized that reproduction of social capital 
presupposes an unceasing effort of sociability, a continuous series of exchanges in 
which recognition is endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed (1986: 250). These views im-
ply that in order to obtain benefits through social capital, investments based on both 
managerial and individual initiatives are needed.  
 
 
3.4 Overview of literature on strategic decision making  
 
Decision making is a central topic in strategic management, organization theory, and 
economics. Frameworks relating to decision making are diverse, ranging from mathe-
matical formulations to behavioral approaches. This chapter reviews decision making 
literature relevant to governance and strategic management.  
 
Human beings do not have unlimited cognitive capabilities as decisions makers. This 
was pointed out by Simon (1955; 1976) who criticized the assumptions of rational 
economic man. Simon noted that people have limited capabilities of accessing and 
processing information. Decision alternatives are examined in a sequential fashion and 
an alternative, which is satisfactory as defined by the aspiration level, will be selected. 
Knowledge of consequences of decision alternatives is always incomplete and only few 
of all the alternatives ever come to mind. According to Simon, human behavior can be 
intendedly rational to the extent that an organizational actor is able to pursue a par-
ticular course of action, he has a correct concept of the goal of the action, and he is cor-
rectly informed about the conditions surrounding his action (1976: 241). Because of 
the bounded rationality of human beings, attainment of goals are only satisfied, 
rather than maximized (Simon, 1976).  
 
Building on Simons work, Cyert & March (1963) presented a behavioral theory of the 
firm as an attempt to address some issues related to economic decision making that 
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neoclassical economic theories did not handle. Analysis of Cyert & March was based on 
observations of decision-making behavior on economic decisions like price, output, and 
product mix. Assumptions of profit maximization as the firms goal and existence of 
perfect knowledge were challenged by Cyert & March. According to Cyert & March, 
there are two classical solutions to goal conflict. The first solution posits that the goals 
of an entrepreneur are also the goals of the whole organization. People are hired, paid, 
and controlled to attain the goals. The second solution is that goal conflict is eliminated 
through consensus. The authors were not content with either solution. They suggested 
that organizations do not have goals, but that individuals do. Furthermore, these goals 
are often in conflict, they are never fully resolved and they are formed by bargaining 
processes occurring within a coalition of diverse individuals and groups.  
 
In the introductory chapter to Barnards seminal book ([1938] 1968), Andrews noted 
that, although Barnard, and later Cyert & March (1963) discussed some characteristics 
of the goal formation processes of well specified economic issues, they seem not to 
have addressed the broader policy-making processes and how the organizational pur-
pose and goals come into existence. Later, strategic management literature extensively 
addressed both goal formulation processes and the means of achieving organizational 
goals. Approaches to the strategic ends-means issue are diverse (Bourgeois, 1980; 
Mintzberg, 1973). One dominant approach has been sequential, planned strategy formu-
lation: the organizational goals are decided first and then strategies to pursue the goals 
are developed (e.g., Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965; Lorange & Vancil, 1977; Porter, 
1980). Another stream of literature has emphasized the adaptive or incremental nature 
of strategy formulation, where ends and means may evolve as a parallel process (e.g., 
Quinn, 1980; Wrapp, 1967). The adaptive view may involve political elements in the 
form of conflicting goals and coalition formation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Goal am-
biguity may have adaptive value when it allows managers better to take into account the 
local conditions and constraints of decision making (Bourgeois, 1980). How well the 
goals and strategies reflect a companys ever changing external and internal realities 
seems to be an important determinant of the companys survival and success (Aldrich, 
1999). This implies that goal setting and strategy selection is a dynamic process, and 
that this may require the use of different renewal processes in different situations, de-
pending on how dynamic the business environment is (Baden-Fuller & Volberda, 1997; 
Burgelman & Grove, 1996). 
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How much can managers, and people in organizations generally, affect decision making 
and the outcomes of decisions made? The strategic choice perspective emphasizes the 
effects that executives can have on strategic decisions (Child, 1972). At the other end of 
continuum is the external control view that emphasizes the role of the environment in 
determining strategic decision making (e.g., Hitt & Tyler, 1991). According to the stra-
tegic choice view, the dominant coalition of an organization makes strategic choices 
based on its evaluation of the organizations position in terms of stakeholder expecta-
tions, environmental trends, and various internal conditions (Child, 1972). The contribu-
tion of the strategic choice perspective to organization theory is its explicit recognition 
that formal decision-making structures affect an organizations decision-making effec-
tiveness. According to Child, the earlier behavioral decision theory (Cyert & March, 
1963) did not address this structural dimension in its analysis decision processes. The 
strategic choice perspective has been elaborated by the upper echelon view proposed 
by Hambrick & Mason (1984). This view addresses effects of various individual and 
group characteristics of executives on strategic decision making and organizational per-
formance. The strategic choice and upper echelon views have influenced research on 
strategic decision making teams. This stream of research has addressed, for example, 
power in top management teams (Finkelstein, 1992), top management team heterogene-
ity and competitive moves (Hambrick, Cho & Chen, 1996), and executives cognitive 
diversity and strategic decision processes (Miller, Burke & Glick, 1998). 
 
The external control view claims that external environment largely constrain managers 
decision making (Romanelli & Tushman, 1986). The proponents of this deterministic 
perspective come from diverse perspectives (Hitt & Tyler, 1991). Organizational ecolo-
gists (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1977) and resource dependence theorists (e.g., Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) suggest that organizational design and strategic choices are determined 
by environmental complexity. Industrial economists (e.g., Porter, 1980) claim that an 
industrys competitive forces largely determine feasible strategic alternatives available 
to a firm. Much of strategic decision making literature seems to settle somewhere be-
tween the strategic choice and external control perspectives, implying that both manage-
rial and external contingencies are important determinants of strategic decision making.  
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Several authors have suggested categorizations for decision making models (Allison, 
1988; Eisenhardt & Zbarachi, 1992; Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Nutt, 1976; Pfeffer, 1987). 
Three such partly similar categorizations are briefly reviewed below. Using decision 
making in the Cuban missile crisis as a case, Allison (1988) and Allison & Zelikow 
(1999) categorized decision making into three conceptual models: rational actor, organ-
izational process, and bureaucratic politics. The rational actor concept features a se-
quential decision process including four distinctive areas: (1) existence of goals and 
objectives, (2) generation of options for solving the strategic problem, (3) analysis of 
likely consequences, both benefits and costs, in terms of goals and objectives, (4) mak-
ing a rational choice that maximizes the value as compared to the organizational goals 
and objectives. The rational actor portrays a simplistic picture of decision making in or-
ganizations because it assumes a completely informed, centrally controlled, value- 
maximizing decision maker. The organizational process model is, according to Allison 
(1988), a more realistic decision making model because it views decision making more 
as outputs of organizational behavior, and less as deliberate choices of leaders. Manage-
rial decision making is greatly influenced by standard operating procedures, which 
help to coordinate complex routines. Organizational goals are seen as constraints defin-
ing acceptable performance. Rather than maximizing value in terms of goals, uncer-
tainty avoidance is characterized in this mode. The bureaucratic politics model regards 
the decision-making process as a competitive game, and decisions as outcomes of bar-
gaining games (Allison, 1988: 320). A decision is not chosen as the best alternative, 
but it results from coalitions and competition among organizational decision makers. 
 
Pfeffer (1987) described and compared four organizational decision making models that 
he calls rational choice model, bureaucratic model, decision process model, and political 
model. The rational choice model is similar to Allisons rational actor concept. Rational 
choice models relies heavily on information processing, whereas choices in bureaucratic 
decision making are made according to rules and procedures that have been effective in 
the past. Similarly, as in Allisons organizational process model, in Pfeffers bureau-
cratic model, goals are seen as constraints defining acceptable performance. Decisions 
evolve during a limited search guided by organizational policies, procedures, and rules 
until an accepted compromise is achieved. In this model, procedural rationality is 
substituted for substantive rationality. Pfeffers bureaucratic model is influenced by 
Simons (e.g., 1976) notion of bounded rationality. The decision process model is even 
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more random in goal setting and functioning than bureaucratic models. Political models 
of organization recognize that there is a diversity of interests and goals within organiza-
tions. Relative power and preferences of each actor determine outcomes of decisions 
processes. 
 
Eisenhardt & Zbarachi (1992) categorized approaches to strategic decision making un-
der three dominant paradigms: rationality and bounded rationality, politics and power, 
and garbage can. Rationality and bounded rationality perspective builds on the rational 
choice model, but elaborates different forms of human cognitive limits. The politics and 
power perspective of decision making originates from political science literature. This 
stream of literature emphasizes that people have different goals, they form coalitions, 
and that preferences of powerful actors win. The garbage can model describes decision 
making in ambiguous, complex, and unstable organizational settings where goals are ill 
defined, people have only a loose understanding of the ends and means, and participa-
tion in decision making is fluid. According to Eisenhardt & Zbarachi, the term garbage 
can model was introduced by Cohen, March & Olsen (1972). In this model, decisions 
are regarded as results of random confluence of events, rather than choices of 
bounded rational actors or the bargaining of people in a coalition. Eisenhardt & Zbara-
chi argue that rationality and bounded rationality, and politics and power perspectives 
portray strategic decision making behavior well, whereas the garbage can perspective is 
less relevant.  
 
The extant literature indicates that the effectiveness of a decision process can be ana-
lyzed according to several criteria. The decision process can be evaluated according to 
the qualities of the decision process itself and the characteristics of decision outcomes. 
The decision process can be assessed on the basis of how rational it is. Rationality can 
be measured by decision comprehensiveness, which is defined by Fredrickson & 
Mitchell as the extent to which an organization attempts to be exhaustive or inclusive 
in making and integrating strategic decisions (1984: 402). Phases of the decision proc-
ess, providing the basis on which to evaluate decision comprehensiveness, have been 
described in the extant literature in many different ways. For example, Janis (1989) 
broke down the decision process into seven areas: (1) surveying a range of objectives, 
(2) canvassing a wide range of alternative courses of action, (3) intensively searching 
for new information, (4) assimilating and taking into account new information, (5) re-
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considering the negative and positive consequences of alternatives before the final 
choice, (6) carefully weighing the costs and risks of various consequences, and (7) mak-
ing detailed implementation plans. Mintzberg et al. (1979) described the strategic deci-
sion process using a framework of three broad phases, consisting of identification, 
development, and selection processes. Previous research has yielded conflicting results 
about the relationship between the strategic decision making process rationality and 
firm performance (e.g., Priem, Rasheed & Kotulic 1995). The effectiveness of the deci-
sion process can be assessed by analyzing the direct consequences of the decision proc-
ess, that is, the decision itself.  
 
To assess the outputs of the decision process, three broad criteria can be identified from 
the literature (Dooley & Fryxell, 1999; Eisenhardt, 1989b; Janis, 1989; Johnson & 
Scholes, 1999; Korsgaard et al., 1995; Mintzberg, 1995; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). First, 
the decision process can be judged on the basis of qualities of a decision made, i.e. its 
potential to solve a specific problem or its potential to contribute to attaining organiza-
tional goals. Second, the decision process can be assessed on the basis of how well the 
selected decision alternative is being executed. The third criterion pertains to the time 
dimension of a decision process. Good decision process can deal with time pressures 
both in the planning phase and in the implementation phase. The decision process and 
outcomes are further elaborated in Chapter 4, which develops the studys theoretical 
models and hypotheses. 
 
 
3.5 Literature related to family firm governance  
 
3.5.1 Unique characteristics of family business 
 
The question about what are the unique, defining characteristics of family businesses 
have been under debate since the early writings on the field (e.g., Donnelley, 1964). Al-
though there is no generally accepted description of what constitutes a family business, 
several unique characteristics have emerged in the extant literature. The following un-
derlying unique characteristics of family businesses can be identified from the literature: 
(1) the controlling ownership lies in the hands of a given family, (2) the family has an 
influence on the firms decision making, and (3) the members of the controlling block-
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holder, i.e. the family members, are bonded by family ties (Gersick et al., 1997; Hoy & 
Verser, 1994; Landsberg, 1999; Tagiuri & Davis, 1982). Although there are large varia-
tions in ownership patterns, in family members participation in the business, and in the 
quality and structure of familial ties, these three characteristics seem to capture the es-
sence of family businesses. Tagiuri & Davis (1982) depicted in their three-circle 
model the family business as a system consisting of three overlapping but distinctive 
groups, as shown in figure 3.1. The figure indicates that an individual can be in one or 
more different roles in the family business.  
Owners
Family
members
Managers
1
2
3
1&2 2&3
1&3
1&2&3
 
Figure 3.1 Family business system (Tagiuri & Davis, 1982) 
 
While the systemic approach is widespread and useful in describing family businesses, 
it emphasizes the macro level (Hollander & Elman, 1988). Thus, the systemic approach 
may ignore micro level phenomena like interaction between family members. To com-
plement the systemic view of family business, the dissertation addresses additional 
unique characteristics that are organized under the following five headings: (1) enduring 
exchanges, (2) emotional dimension of the family business, (3) high amount of conflict, 
(4) low mobility of shares, and (5) mixed self-interested and altruistic behaviors. 
 
 
Enduring exchanges 
 
In family business exchanges are inherently enduring because the patterns of ownership 
and family ties tend to change slowly. However, changes do inevitably occur, some-
times abruptly. The family is tied together by the interpersonal relationships among 
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family members both horizontally across the family and vertically over succeeding gen-
erations (Harvey, 1999a). Relationships are intensified further because the family mem-
bers participate in the family business system via multiple roles, both within the family 
and in the business. The cohesiveness is perhaps the most fundamental measure of the 
effectiveness of the family shareholder group (Davis & Herrera, 1998; Walsh, 1994). 
Cohesiveness reflects the amount of mutual support and how tightly connected the 
members in the group are, thus influencing the quality of exchange relationships within 
the family firm. Although there are many hurdles that threaten the continuation family 
businesses (Ward, 1987), the owners of family firms have an insatiable desire to en-
able their businesses to exist and prosper over the long run (Hoy & Verser, 1994).  
 
The chain of relationships in a family firm can extend through multiple generations. 
Over time, behavior becomes more institutionalized by the organizational culture, in-
volving shared assumptions, values, and norms helping to cope with problems of exter-
nal adaptation and internal integration (Schein, 1983). Culture of the family business is 
reflected in behaviors, language, and symbols expressing those assumptions and values, 
providing identity and meaning for the individuals involved (McCollom, 1988). Dyer 
(1988) has suggested that the family business culture is an important factor determining 
the success of the family business beyond the first generation. The strength of the cul-
ture and familial norms determine how the family contributes to the success of the busi-
ness (Harvey, 1999a). 
 
 
Emotional dimension of the family business 
 
It has been suggested by many authors that family businesses have an emotional dimen-
sion due to the familys connection to their business (e.g., Davis & Herrera, 1998; Davis 
& Stern, 1980). Emotions, as individuals subjective experiences, are likely to affect 
relationships within the family firm. Extant literature has often labeled the family as the 
emotional arena and the business as the rational arena (Danes et al., 1999). Whiteside & 
Brown offered a more realistic view by noting that no business is totally task-oriented 
and no family is totally emotional (1991: 386). Mainstream management and organiza-
tion literature may have exaggerated the virtues of rational thinking at the cost of non-
rational thinking. Dyer has noted that family dynamics in business settings has his-
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torically been assumed to be irrational and unproductive, and therefore not worthy of 
serious study (1994: 110). Dyer & Handler (1994) have suggested that the family-
business connection may be a source of sustained competitive advantage. Also, research 
on strategic decision making has recognized the potential value of emotion to cognitive 
processes, and thus, to the quality of decisions (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). To sum-
marize, emotion-based family dynamics can be a strong force in family businesses. 
Both positive and negative effects of family dynamics to family businesses have been 
reported (Kets De Vries, 1996). 
 
 
High amount of conflict 
 
Family businesses are fertile ground for conflict. Types of conflicts in family businesses 
are numerous, including, for example, justice conflicts, role conflicts, work-family con-
flicts, identity conflicts, and succession conflicts (Danes et al., 1999), struggles regard-
ing power and control (Cosier & Harvey, 1998), role ambiguity, sibling rivalries, 
conflicts between family members and non-family employees (Dyer, 1994), communi-
cation difficulties, business decisions that negatively affect the family (Harvey & Evans, 
1994), and long-standing family feuds (LaShapelle & Barnes, 1998).  
 
One source of conflict in family businesses is the interaction of two qualitatively differ-
ent social institutions, the family and the business. The task of the family is to provide 
care for and secure the development of its members, whereas the purpose the business is 
to produce goods and services at a profit (Kepner, 1983; Lansberg, 1983). It is often ar-
gued in family business literature that conflicts in family businesses have an emotional 
origin (Cosier & Harvey, 1998; Kets De Vries, 1996), or that conflicts are functions of 
the psychodynamics of the family (Dyer, 1994: 118). Interpersonal, emotion-based af-
fective conflict is generally considered as disruptive, and thus, it should be avoided 
(Amason, 1996).  
 
Contrary to the majority of conflict-related family business literature, not all the con-
flicts in family firms need to be dysfunctional or disruptive. Indeed, management theo-
rists claim that certain types of conflicts may help organizations survive due to the 
broader cognitive perspectives they induce (e.g., Amason, 1996). Cosier & Harvey em-
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phasized the potentiality of healthy conflict by noting that if mutual trust can be estab-
lished and maintained, there is an opportunity for more effective collaboration between 
family business members by encouraging and using constructive conflict to identify 
win-win outcomes (1998: 77). 
 
 
Low mobility of shares 
 
Because of the very nature of the ownership of family businesses, the shares of family 
firms are relatively illiquid. Often the shares are transferred through inheritance and 
other transfers within the family. Also, family firms generally have limited capital re-
sources. After the initial equity capital has been injected into the business, new financ-
ing can be obtained from multiple sources, including retained earnings, new equity 
capital from current and new shareholders, selling parts of the business, and through 
loans (Neubauer & Lank, 1998). Some family firms have opted to go public by allowing 
a certain number of its existing shares to be traded on a stock exchange or by issuing 
new shares. While going public can improve the poor liquidity of shares and provide a 
new source of capital, it also requires more formal governance structures, reduces com-
pany privacy, and incurs additional administrative costs (Neubauer & Lank, 1998; 
Wagen, 1996). 
 
There is a trade-off between the familys ownership control and access to new equity 
capital. Dreux (1990) has noted that the competing needs of ownership control, capital 
needed in business, and liquidity of ownership constitute a special challenge to family 
firms. Consequently, conflicts over payout and investment policies are common in fam-
ily firms, and the limited availability of capital may hamper making optimal investment 
decisions and constrain company growth (Fama & Jensen, 1985).  
 
In large publicly traded corporations, the shareholders return on investment comes 
from the combination of the share price appreciation and dividends. When the shares of 
family firms are not easily traded, the share price appreciation is not part of the expected 
return. Thus, in family firms, the owners financial return comes largely from the divi-
dends (Thomas, 2001). This places additional pressures on otherwise scarce financial 
resources of family firms. 
 68
 
Owners of the family firm resemble one type of institutional investor that Brancato 
(1997) labeled as a relationship investor. The relationship investor takes large posi-
tions in a relatively few number of stocks, holds them for long period of time, and ac-
tively monitors the investment. The relationship investor seeks to build in-depth 
relationships with the companies in the portfolio and to influence long-term shareholder 
value by participation in corporate governance. However, share-owning family mem-
bers and institutional relationship investors differ markedly in the degree of profession-
alism. While the capabilities and approaches to effective ownership seem to greatly vary 
among family businesses (Gnan & Montemerlo, 2001), the institutional investors man-
age shareholdings on a professional basis. 
 
 
Mixed self-interested and altruistic behaviors 
 
Agency theory assumes that individuals are self-interested and aim at maximizing their 
own utility. As discussed earlier, the adoption of self-interested behavior is not inconsis-
tent with altruistic behavior (Jensen, 1994). Also, Jensen argued that there are no per-
fect agents who will exclude their own preferences when they act in the interests of 
others. In diffusely-owned, publicly traded corporations, agency problems caused by 
managerial self-interested behavior are accepted as being part of the game and this un-
wanted behavior is controlled by external and internal governance mechanisms as well 
as by norms of professional management.  
 
In family firms, the incidence of self-interested or altruistic behaviors, and the way they 
affect the business, are not well known. Different interests in a family business may be-
come blurred because of the interaction of the two qualitatively different social institu-
tions of the family and the business (Lansberg, 1983). On the one hand, altruistic 
behavior is one of the defining elements of family institutions. Lansberg has noted that 
the familys primary function is...to assure the care and nurturance of its members 
(1983: 40). On the other hand, the purpose of a business is to profitably serve its prod-
uct markets through organized action. Because of the institutional overlap between 
the family and the business, those family members who are employed in the business, 
may be favored in terms of employee selection, compensation, appraisal, and training 
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(Lansberg, 1983). Kets De Vries argued that nepotism, i.e. blatant imbalance between 
contribution and credit, (1996: 19) leads to a loss of trust among non-family employees 
that influences their job satisfaction, motivation, and performance. 
 
Compared to large publicly traded corporations, family firms have fewer agency prob-
lems when residual claims are restricted to important decision agents, i.e. managers who 
are also family members (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). In addition, self-interested behavior 
may be reduced by managements familial ties because between close friends and fam-
ily members altruistic motivations assume an importance not found in dealings between 
strangers (Demsetz, 1997a: 5). However, family firms may experience owner oppor-
tunism (Schulze et al., 2001). According to this view, agency hazards in family firms 
may be caused by a lack of a market for corporate control, self-control problems, ad-
verse selection, and biased incentive structures due to altruism. 
 
Self-interested and altruistic behaviors are considered as rational behaviors (Jensen, 
1994). Family businesses seem to experience also non-rational or dysfunctional behav-
iors. Family business literature is full of evidence of such behaviors associated with 
family dynamics (e.g., Harvey & Evans, 1994; Kets De Vries, 1996). 
 
 
3.5.2  Research on family firm governance 
 
Research on family business governance is scarce, as noted earlier. So far, the most 
comprehensive overview on family business governance has been provided by 
Neubauer & Lank (1998). They define corporate governance as a system of structures 
and processes to direct and control corporations and to account for them (1998: 60). In 
this definition, controlling refers to oversight of management, whereas accounting for 
refers to responsibility towards the stakeholders. They apply this quite broad definition 
to the governance of family firms, taking into account the distinctive nature of family 
businesses. Figure 3.2 summarizes the key elements of family business governance pre-
sented in Neubauer & Lanks book. 
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Figure 3.2 Key elements of family business governance (summarized from 
Neubauer & Lank, 1998) 
 
The system of family business governance, as depicted in Figure 3.2, reflects the unique 
characteristics of family businesses. For example, management succession, special chal-
lenges of financial issues, and the familys internal structures and processes present all 
specific family business governance issues. The systemic nature of family business, ad-
dressing the overlapping domains of the family, ownership, and management, is evident 
in the Neubauer & Lanks book. 
 
Roles, characteristics and activities of the boards of directors, as well as their causes and 
consequences, have been central issues in corporate governance in both scholarly re-
search and in the business press. At least five reviews of research on boards of directors 
have been conducted in the recent past. They are in chronological order: Zahra & Pearce 
(1989), Pettigrew (1992), Johnson et al. (1996), Forbes & Milliken (1999), and Huse 
(2000). It is noteworthy that these reviews do not specifically address family firm gov-
ernance. However, research on boards of family firms benefit from these reviews. Zahra 
& Pearce (1989) analyzed boards of directors from four theoretical perspectives, includ-
ing legalistic, resource dependence, class hegemony, and agency theory perspectives, 
from which they described how various roles of boards of directors, such as control and 
service, are linked to strategic outcomes and firm performance. They also identified a 
number of contingencies (e.g. company size) and board attributes (e.g. composition) 
that influence how the boards act in their various roles. Pettigrew (1992) reviewed a 
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number of earlier studies on boards of directors addressing a variety of theoretical, 
methodological, and practical issues. In particular, he called for more research on how 
the boards actually function, in addition to easily observed attributes such as composi-
tion. Johnson et al. (1996) analyzed past research by classifying directors responsibili-
ties into three roles, i.e. control, service, and resource dependence. They concluded that 
research on boards of directors has not been able to produce unified results. Forbes & 
Milliken (1999) focused more on the board level processes, and how these impact board 
effectiveness in terms of fulfilling the control and service tasks of boards of directors. 
To better understand how board processes are linked to board effectiveness, Forbes & 
Milliken developed a model that specifically focuses on the boards cognitive capabili-
ties contributing to board effectiveness. Forbes & Milliken also recognized that govern-
ance of small firms is distinct from that of large firms. The review of Huse (2000) is the 
only one among the five reviews that focuses specifically on the boards of directors of 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
 
Huses (2000) review, in addition to addressing SMEs specifically, can be seen as a 
critical evaluation of past research on boards of directors and a proposal for future re-
search directions. Huse argued that (1) past research on boards of directors has largely 
studied large U.S. corporations, often using secondary archival data, (2) methodologi-
cally, research has focused on multivariate techniques in cross-sectional settings, (3) 
research questions have rarely addressed phenomena other than links between board 
composition and firm performance. According to Huse, few significant findings have 
been found (1993: 274) by this mainstream research. To gain a better understanding 
about what is happening in and around boards of directors, Huse urged researchers to 
open the black box by employing alternative samples, alternative concepts and rela-
tionships, and alternative methods. Samples should also include small firms, in addition 
to large firms, and in the European context too. Based on received governance literature, 
Huse developed an integrative framework for researching boards of directors. The 
framework emphasizes an open system approach to the study of board-stakeholder dy-
namics. Concerning methodology, Huse recommended the use of more longitudinal re-
search settings to improve the understanding of the causal relationships between the 
phenomena under study. In sum: most of the literature on the boards of directors has 
focused on large corporations, as discussed above, while research on the boards of small 
and medium-sized enterprises is gaining increased attention (Huse, 2000).  
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Literature specifically addressing the boards of directors of family firms is still scarce. 
Broadly, the extant literature has identified two important roles for the boards of direc-
tors: oversight of management and counsel in the strategy process (e.g., Mace, 1972; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Boards of family firms may have specific roles in linking the 
family and the company (Corbetta & Tomaselli, 1996). Mueller (1988) and Whisler 
(1988) have noted the board can act as a mediator in solving family conflicts. On the 
other hand, some authors have suggested that the board should not be involved in fam-
ily-related matters (e.g., Schwartz & Barnes, 1991). Variation in the board roles in fam-
ily firms can be large, varying from the most passive to a very active (Neubauer & 
Lank, 1998). 
 
Researcher and practitioners often argue that outside representation on the board is de-
sired. Outside members are expected to bring expertise, independence, and objective 
views to the board of directors. In the family firm context, outside members usually re-
fers to those board members who are not part of the owner family or of the management 
(Ward & Handy, 1988). Ward (1991) has given a comprehensive picture of the role and 
operations of the boards in family corporations. He emphasized the value of boards with 
outside influence in multiple roles, addressing both business issues and the needs and 
interests of the owner family members. Schwartz & Barnes (1991) concluded in their 
research that outside members could improve the quality of decision-making processes. 
Schwartz & Barnes claimed that to obtain useful contributions from outside members, 
three conditions must be satisfied: an honest desire for an outside board, proper process 
to select the outside members, and realistic expectations about the contribution that out-
side members can provide. Also, Johannisson & Huse (2000) have stressed the impor-
tance of the selection process of outside members. They proposed that entrepreneurial, 
managerial, and familial aspects need to be considered in the selection process. Outside 
board member representation is likely to change during the companys different life cy-
cle phases. As the company grows and the ownership disperses, the amount of outside 
members is likely to increase (Gersick et al., 1997). Although the value of outside direc-
tors is widely accepted, they are still an underutilized resource in the family firm board 
(Brunninge & Nordqvist, 2001; Corbetta & Tomaselli, 1996). 
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Some authors are skeptical of the value of outside members. Ford (1988; 1989) criti-
cized the normative recommendations that outside directors should be used in privately 
owned firms. Improving internal management would, in many cases, be a more effec-
tive way to improve the business than using outside boards. On the basis of a survey and 
subsequent interviews, Ford concluded that outside directors seem to have less value 
because of their lack of specific knowledge of the firm and their lack of availability to 
the firm. Jonovic (1989) claimed that the classic outside board does not provide the 
best governance structure to the majority of family businesses due to their unique gov-
ernance challenges. There might be an optimal ratio of independent, outside directors in 
the board of a family company. While outside members may provide independent ex-
pert opinions, inside members may provide deeper understanding of the family culture. 
Lansberg (1999) have suggested that there should be a balanced mixture of external and 
internal members in the board in order to guarantee that all relevant views are repre-
sented. Internal members can include both family members and non-family manage-
ment team members. However, Lansberg suggested that the majority of directors should 
come outside from the company and family, at least in larger family firms.   
 
The unique characteristics of family firms, as discussed in chapter 3.5.1, call for special-
ized governance structures. The systemic views on family business provide a foundation 
to family business governance, because the key sub-systems and their relations are iden-
tified (e.g., Tagiuri & Davis, 1982). While the mainstream corporate governance of 
large corporations focuses on the ownership-management dimension, family business 
governance additionally addresses the familys relationship to ownership and manage-
ment. In a sense, a lot of family business literature has implicitly dealt with family busi-
ness governance issues, because many writings have addressed aspects of relationships 
among the important stakeholders within the family business. For example, Donnelley 
(1964) observed in his classic article a potential conflict of interest between the family 
and the company, and how their respective interests can be balanced by constraining the 
family members privilegies and by building on traditions. 
 
Consequently, authors have emphasized that governance structures in family firms 
should cover both the business and the family in order to safeguard the long-term inter-
ests of shareholders (e.g., Lansberg, 1999). The governance of the business is normally 
accomplished by the board of directors, if at all. Families may organize themselves in 
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order to promote communication and enlightened ownership (Neubauer & Lank, 
1998). The structures within families have no specific format because they are not re-
quired to by law, but they are set up voluntarily by the family shareholders. One com-
mon structure within a family is the family council, which consists of a group of family 
members, and perhaps some members outside of the family, and which periodically 
comes together to discuss the familys relation to the business. Gersick et al. (1997) 
have given four important reasons to set up a family council: (1) educating family 
members about the rights and responsibilities associated with ownership and manage-
ment, (2) helping to clarify the boundary between the business and the family, (3) pro-
viding the relatives means to focus on family business matters, and (4) helping to create 
a common understanding about the future of the family business. Success of family 
business governance is dependent on how well the work of different governance bodies, 
like the board of directors and the family council, is coordinated. This coordination is 
primarily brought about by senior leadership, overlapping membership, and structured 
communication (Gersick et al., 1997). 
 
Governance of a family firm change over time. The family, business, and ownership all 
have their own lifecycle patterns, which are separate but linked. Building on Tagiuri & 
Davis (1982) static family business system model and on various life-cycle models, 
Gersick et al. (1997) have presented a dynamic family business model that takes into 
account the different lifecycles of the family, business, and ownership dimensions as 
shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
Each dimension of the developmental model has several stages. The business develop-
ment dimension follows stages similar to those proposed earlier by Adizes (1979), who 
claimed that organizational development follows a bell shaped life-cycle from its birth 
to death, each passage having a different mix of success factors. The model by Gersick 
et al. is consistent with Greiners (1972) growth model, which claimed that a companys 
development over time is not linear and smooth but is a process consisting of more sta-
ble evolutionary phases, followed by revolutionary transition periods between 
them. The ownership development dimension in the Gersick et al. model is very similar 
to Wards (1991) earlier classification of family ownership into three subsequent stages, 
which he labeled as the founder(s), the sibling partnership, and the family dynasty stage. 
The family dimension of the Gersick et al. model addresses the individual and interper-
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sonal developments within the family. The four stages describe how the roles and rela-
tionships among the senior and junior generations evolve as time passes. This dimen-
sion of the model applies work of Levinson, Darrow, Klein, Levinson & McKnee 
(1978) on the eras of the human life-cycle in a business family context.  
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Figure 3.3  Developmental model of the family business (Gersick et al., 1997: 17) 
 
 
Management succession can be considered as part of family business governance. For 
family business success and continuity, it is critical how management succession proc-
esses are planned and implemented. Literature on management succession is abundant. 
The following examples from literature characterize different facets of the succession 
process: model for succession planning in small businesses (McGivern, 1978), a re-
search framework that has transfer of control as its anchor (Churchill & Hatten, 1987), 
lack of succession planning reduces survivability of family firms (Lansberg, 1988), ef-
fects of sibling attachment and rivalry on intergenerational succession (Friedman, 
1991), quality of succession experience of next generation (Handler, 1989a), quality of 
work relationship between owner-manager and successor (Seymour, 1993), links be-
tween management succession and human resource policies (Welsch, 1993), role of 
human resource and governance practices in succession (Astrachan & Kolenko, 1994), 
family and non-family firms differ in successor development (Fiegener, Brown, Prince 
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& File, 1994), factors that differentiate effective successors from less effective (Gold-
berg, 1996), characterization of successors (Chrisman, Chua & Sharma, 1998), multi-
level process model of family influences on succession (Davis & Harveston, 1998), and 
family relationship dynamics during ownership transitions (Dunn, 1999). Although 
management succession planning has been considered as critical to family business con-
tinuity, it may not address all the important aspects involved in succession. Aronoff 
(1998) has suggested that generational transition is replacing succession planning be-
cause it addresses a broader set of issues, including executive leadership and family 
leadership in a multigenerational context.  
 
 
3.6 Conclusions of the literature review  
 
This section presents conclusions of the literature review, focusing on three aspects. 
First, the distinctive challenge of the governance of family firms is discussed. Second, 
the two theoretical frameworks are contrasted to provide a better understanding of their 
special characteristics. And third, the question of how the two theoretical frameworks 
can be applied in the family business context is addressed. Literature on strategic deci-
sion making contributes to the modeling of the relationships between various govern-
ance mechanisms and strategic decision-making quality, and it is not further discussed 
in this concluding chapter. 
 
 
3.6.1 Distinctive challenge of family firm governance 
 
A major underlying assumption in this study is that effective family firm governance is 
founded on the unique characteristics of family business. Chapter 3.5.1 discussed the 
unique characteristics under five categories: (1) enduring exchanges among the family 
agents, (2) family members emotional attachment to their company, (3) potentially high 
level of conflict, (4) low mobility of shares, and (5) mixed self-interested and altruistic 
behaviors. These unique characteristics can be seen as manifestations of the systemic 
nature of family business, i.e. the overlapping domains of the family, ownership, and 
business. 
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Ultimately, family firm governance is concerned about the survival and success of a 
family business system over time. In essence, there are two conditions that need to be 
met in order to achieve this. First, the company must be managed so that it can compete 
in the ever-changing product markets of its chosen business. Second, the ownership 
control must remain in the hands of a given ownership group, i.e. the family. This dual 
governance goal distinguishes family firm governance from that of widely held public 
corporations, where the owners can easily sell their ownership stake and where they 
have no other role in the corporation.  
 
It is not argued in this paper that family firms are generally more successful than non-
family firms. Rather, the view presented here holds that the unique characteristics of 
family business can be the basis of its success as well as its failure. It is argued here that 
whether the unique characteristics lead to success or failure is largely determined by 
how the family firm is governed. Some unique characteristics may at the same time con-
tribute both positively and negatively to firm outcomes. For example, low liquidity of 
shares is likely to lower the risk of a hostile takeover, thus contributing to longevity of a 
family firm. However, it also makes managements entrenchment easier, allowing 
agency problems to arise and continue without interruption. Long CEO tenures have 
indeed been observed in family companies (Beckhard & Dyer, 1983).  
 
Table 3.3 provides examples of factors associated with success and failure in family 
firms. The table is not an exhaustive listing of all factors contributing to success or fail-
ure, but it aims at providing a good sample of issues found in the extant literature. As 
can be observed from Table 3.3, few factors explicitly address governance of family 
firms. However, several issues related, at least indirectly, to both relational and contrac-
tual governance can be identified. For example, the Table 3.3 indicates that fast verbal 
and nonverbal communication, together with shared identity and common languages, 
are related to success, while conflicts between key stakeholders and poorly defined roles 
and decision rights are associated with failure. The lack of factors explicitly addressing 
family firm governance and firm performance may reflect the fact that this research 
domain is still in its early phase. 
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Table 3.3 Factors associated with success and failure in family firmsa 
Factors associated with success 
Family members in-depth business knowledge 
Family members high commitment to business 
Remaining innovative and entrepreneurial 
Introducing excellent management training systems 
Training family members in ownership rights and 
responsibilities  
Treating employees fairly and with loyalty is usu-
ally reciprocated  
Having a strong sense of responsibility to society  
Emphasizing value for money and quality  
Taking decisions quickly as everybody knows 
where the locus of power is  
Less bureaucracy and quicker decision making 
Verbal and nonverbal communication can be 
greatly speeded up in families 
Taking a long-term strategic perspective  
The long-term perspective; the company and its 
products affect the very identity of family members 
The long-term perspective; quarterly results are not 
driving the business 
The family culture and spirit determine the prevail-
ing attitudes, norms, and values in the company  
Special strength from shared history, identity, and 
common language of families  
 
 
 
Factors associated with failure 
Shortage of financing opportunities  
Lack of management capabilities  
The familys growing financial demands tempt 
owners to harvest the companys profits rather than 
reinvest them in additional growth  
Tendency toward autocracy  
Reluctance to change  
Unwillingness on the part of the older generation to 
let go of ownership and management power at an 
appropriate moment  
Fit between the senior executives leadership style 
and companys stage of development  
Inability to attract and retain competent and moti-
vated family successors and non-family managers 
Sibling rivalry or competition between the genera-
tions 
Family members employment without compe-
tence; question of nepotism  
Unmanaged conflict between the cultures of the 
family, the board, and the business  
Human emotions such as pride or jealousy may 
become enlarged when home and work are inter-
twined  
Authority and responsibility may not be clearly 
defined; roles in the family and in the business may 
become confused  
Decision making hierarchy is bypassed 
Family tragedies that can accompany business dis-
aster 
a Factors are drawn and modified from four sources: Gersick et al. (1997), Kets De Vries (1996), 
Neubauer & Lank (1998), and Ward (1987). 
 
 
Figure 3.4 summarizes the above discussion on the distinctive challenge of family firm 
governance. Factors contributing to success and failure are any factors that mediate the 
unique characteristics of family firm to governance outcomes in terms of some firm per-
formance criteria and ownership control. It should be noted that desired levels of firm 
performance and ownership control are set by the owners and management, more or less 
explicitly, and that aspiration levels of the firms performance are likely to vary from 
firm to firm. 
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Figure 3.4  Distinctive challenge of family firm governance 
 
 
The family firm governance framework, as depicted in figure 3.4, implies that family 
firm governance entails three broad sets of activities. It is proposed here that effective 
family firm governance is based on (1) a thorough understanding of the unique charac-
teristics of the family firm under consideration, (2) targeting governance decisions and 
actions in such a way that strengthens factors contributing to success and alleviates fac-
tors having negative effects, and (3) defining the firm performance criteria and owner-
ship control needs explicitly to provide follow-up criteria. In the light of the overall 
governance framework presented above, the purpose of the theoretical models, and the 
accompanied hypotheses, is to increase our current knowledge as to how various gov-
ernance mechanisms, both formal and informal, can increase the chances of family firm 
success and survival.  
 
 
3.6.2 Comparison of the agency theory and the social capital theory in the study  
 of corporate governance 
 
Agency theory and social capital theory have very different origins, assumptions, and 
prescriptions. Table 3.4 compares the basic elements and main critique of both frame-
works.  
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Table 3.4 Comparison of the basic elements and main critique of the agency 
theory and the social capital theory  
 Agency theory Social capital theory 
Theoretical origin Neoclassical economics Sociology 
Concept of the firm Nexus of contracts Network of social relationships 
with strong ties  
Behavioral assumptions Self-interested, limitedly rational, and 
resourceful individuals 
Norms of reciprocity and equity 
Main critique Atomized view of relationships; ig-
nores ongoing systems of social rela-
tions 
Emphasizes the positive effects 
of personal ties, while under-
states the negative consequences 
 
Both the frameworks have been applied in a number of organizational studies. The 
agency theory has mainly focused on various governance studies while the social capital 
theory has addressed a broader range of research contexts. Table 3.5 compares the char-
acteristics of the frameworks to the study of corporate governance. Agency theory is a 
well-established theoretical governance framework aiming at explaining how different 
forms of organizations survive by managing the trade-off between minimizing various 
agency costs and maximizing benefits of decentralized decision making. Social capital 
theory studies resources embedded in social relationships, focusing on how social re-
sources are created, and subsequently converted, into other forms of capital, such as 
human and physical capital. 
 
Table 3.5 Comparison of the agency theory and the social capital theory in the 
study of corporate governance 
 Agency theory Social capital theory 
Nature of governance 
relationship 
Asymmetric principal-agent relation-
ship 
Symmetric network or dyadic 
relationships 
Goals of governance Minimization of agency costs, while 
maximizing the benefits of decentral-
ized decision making 
Generation and acquisition of 
resources through social relation-
ships 
Nature of governance 
mechanisms 
Contractual, formal control Relational, informal control 
Potential risk in governance Focuses attention excessively to 
agency cost minimization, while 
ignoring value creation aspects 
Group cohesion may cause in-
ability to change 
Position in corporate gov-
ernance research 
Well established framework Emerging framework 
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3.6.3 Applicability of the agency theory and the social capital theory to the 
study of family firm governance  
 
Agency theory perspective has been used in an increasing number of organizational 
studies and it has become a widely accepted theoretical framework. Finkelstein & 
DAveni (1994) argued that combining and contrasting agency theory with other 
frameworks rooted in sociology and psychology may provide new insights into organ-
izational research. Because of its unique characteristics, a family business context seems 
to be a fruitful research context to combine aspects of agency theory and social capital 
theory. Both theories can potentially contribute to the understanding of the complex 
phenomenon of family firm governance, the agency theory shedding light on formal 
control, and the social capital theory contributing to the understanding of informal so-
cial control.  
 
The agency theory provides a framework to analyze the effects of separation of owner-
ship from managerial decision making. Although most governance research has been 
conducted in large public companies where ownership is almost completely separated 
from the firms management, and owners have little connection to the firm (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2001), separation of ownership and management do also occur in family 
firms. When family companies grow larger, they start to resemble large public compa-
nies in some respects. The number of shareholders may increase, they may have hired, 
professional management, and they may have vigilant boards of directors overseeing the 
management (Lansberg, 1999). The separation processes are not necessary linear in 
family firms. For example, the ownership may consolidate again if some family mem-
bers of the extended family buy out the other members from the company. However, 
growth of the family and ownership base, and the owners decreasing participation in 
the firms management, are natural tendencies in family businesses as they become 
older and larger. Consequently, the number of principal-agent relationships grows, and 
the risk of related agency problem increases. 
 
Some researchers have claimed that the agency theory may not be directly applicable in 
a family business context, or that it may not provide full understanding about how fam-
ily firms are governed. Large publicly held corporations have many safeguards to help 
preventing dysfunctional managerial behavior, while family firms do not necessarily 
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have those safeguard in place (Kets De Vries, 1996). Dyer has even noted that the as-
sumptions underpinning agency theory may not be valid in family firms because rela-
tionships are based on familial bonds (1994: 125). Aronoff & Ward (1995) have 
proposed that family firms may lack the advantages seen in publicly traded, large corpo-
rations, but on the other hand, they are not likely to have similar weaknesses. Also, Litz 
has noted that while publicly traded firms have been noted to suffer from maladies of 
professional management..., little, if any, attention has been devoted to the unique dys-
functionalities experienced by firms influenced by a family agenda (1997: 65). Finally, 
Schulze et al. (2001) suggested that family businesses might suffer from owner oppor-
tunism, which cannot be explained by the agency theory. However, this dissertation 
claims that the agency theory is valid in the family business context, but it needs to be 
complemented with other theories. This is consistent with Fama & Jensen (1983b), who 
showed how the principles of the agency theory applies both in open corporations and 
closed corporations, leading, however, to different behavioral implications. 
 
Rooted in social capital, a relational perspective should be especially relevant in family 
business governance because the relationships have strong social component. For ex-
ample, trust among the family members and management has been considered as a fac-
tor important to family business success (Aronoff & Ward, 1995; Davis & Harveston, 
1998; Dyer & Handler, 1994; Lansberg, 1999; Walsh, 1994). On the other hand, lack of 
trust within the family and family firm tend to destroy cooperation, and ultimately the 
viability of the family business (Cosier & Harvey, 1998; Kets De Vries 1996; 
LaShapelle & Barnes, 1998). Donnelley (1964) has suggested that a family firms suc-
cess or failure is more a function of the family members relationships than the family 
participation as such. Although the familys commitment to the prosperity of the busi-
ness can be a very positive force (Dyer & Handler, 1994), several authors have noted 
that there is a lack of research of influences of family and familial ties on the perform-
ance and survival of firms (Harvey, 1999a; Litz, 1997; Davis & Herrera, 1998). Litz has 
pointed out that management researchers have committed the error of overlooking the 
role of tribal, and, more specifically, the familial, factors that characterize the vast ma-
jority of firms...and the apparent trust-based advantages...that appear more readily at-
tainable by family firms (1997: 66). Traditions, bonding relationships, loyalty, and 
norms of equality and altruism inherent within families will lengthen the perspective of 
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the family business and define considerations as to how family resources are to be util-
ized (Harvey, 1999b). 
 
In summary: the present dissertation applies both the agency theory and the social capi-
tal theory to its task of explaining the relationships between the owners and manage-
ment of family firms. The two views are considered complementary approaches to 
family firm governance because they deal with different dimensions of the phenome-
non. The agency theory addresses formal aspects of governance to control owner-
manager relations, while the social capital theory addresses social resources generated 
through a network of social relationships among the family and management. By apply-
ing two different theoretical frameworks, the dissertation aims at obtaining a richer un-
derstanding about family firm governance. 
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4 THEORETICAL MODELS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The studys theoretical models and related hypotheses are developed in this section. 
First, an overview of the theoretical models is provided with an introduction to the stra-
tegic decision-making constructs used in models. Then, two models of family business 
governance, referred to in the study as the contractual governance model and the re-
lational governance model, respectively, are developed, and a hypothesis on the joint 
effects of the models is proposed. Next, the hypotheses on the relationships between the 
strategic decision-making constructs and firm performance are developed. The section 
concludes by summarizing the hypotheses. 
 
 
4.1  Family firm governance framework 
 
This study adopts the view that successful family firm governance addresses both gov-
ernance of the business as well as governance of the family (e.g., Gersick et al., 1997; 
Lansberg, 1999). Inclusion of the family in the governance domain is important because 
family members may have multiple roles within the family business; familial ties are 
likely to affect exchange relationships between the owners and the company. Also, the 
owners rather illiquid ownership stakes effectively prevent exit-based ownership 
strategies, and promote voice-based corporate control (Nooteboom, 1999). In exit-
based control, owners have a short-term, market oriented relationship with the corpora-
tion, whereas voice-based corporate control features socially embedded, ongoing 
relationships between the owners and the firm, as is the case in family firms.  
 
It was concluded earlier that agency theory largely ignores the effects of good social 
relationships that might exist among the key stakeholders in the family firm. The close 
social interactions between family members may be a source of competitive advantage, 
partly because informal, self-reinforcing governance mechanisms may complement the 
formal systems emphasized in agency theory. The theoretical models developed in this 
study are based on the assumptions that the agency theory is applicable in the family 
firm context, but better explanations can be reached if governance mechanisms directly 
addressing social forces also are included in theoretical models. Thus, the research 
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models of this study comprise both contractual and relational governance mechanisms, 
mirroring descriptions of the agency theory and the social capital theory.  
 
Contractual governance refers here to the characteristics and operations of the board of 
directors, which is at the top of the decision systems of organizations. Contractual gov-
ernance systems can align the interests of owners and managers, promoting effective 
strategic decision making (Pearce & Zahra, 1991). The contractual governance model 
addresses how the ownership structure influences the membership composition of the 
board, and how this composition, in turn, affects two vital board functions: the boards 
oversight of management and its advice and counsel to management. Relational gov-
ernance refers here to the creation and usage of social capital embedded in social rela-
tionships among the owner family members and management. The relational 
governance model benefits from several types of social capital. The central element in 
the relational model is social interaction, and its antecedents and consequences. 
 
Corporate governance and strategic decision-making processes are closely related. Ac-
cording to the strategic choice perspective, a firms top management has a decisive role 
in determining what strategic choices will be made (Child, 1972). Corporate governance 
is concerned with how different organizational forms and governance systems affect 
managerial decision making (Fama & Jensen, 1985). Decisions made by management 
do not always have desirable consequences for owners because interests of the owners 
and the management may differ. This can be expected to be the case in family firms too, 
depending on the degree to which the residuals claimants are also important decision 
agents, i.e. on the degree to which there is an overlap between ownership and manage-
ment.  
 
Both contractual and relational governance models employ the same set of dependent 
strategic decision-making variables. Because a strategic decision has important conse-
quences and resource demands for the organization (Nutt, 1998: 198), the organiza-
tional performance depends on the quality of strategic decisions and how well these 
decisions are implemented (Dooley & Fryxell, 1999). Decision quality refers to the ex-
tent to which a decision contributes to the achievement of organizational goals. Effec-
tively implementing decisions depends on a decision-making teams commitment to 
these decisions (Korsgaard et al., 1995). Decision commitment indicates the extent to 
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which team members accept and commit to the strategic decisions reached (Korsgaard 
et al., 1995: 61). Extant family business literature has shown that success of family 
firms can greatly be affected, both negatively and positively, by the motivations and be-
haviors of the owner family members. Family members can, thus, greatly influence the 
strategic decision-making process in terms of its outcomes and implementation of deci-
sions. Because of the familys potentially large impact, decision commitment will ex-
plicitly be modeled from both the managements perspective and the familys 
perspective. Collectively, decision quality and decision commitment are termed in this 
study decision-making quality. 
 
Ultimately, strategy research is concerned with the link between the firm survival and 
strategic choices the firm makes, including for example, the selection of goals, the 
choice of products the firm offers, decisions as to how to compete, and choices on the 
scope of the firms businesses. It is the integration of the strategic choices that makes a 
strategy (Teece et al., 1995). This study addresses the link between the strategy and sur-
vival by studying relationships between strategic decision-making quality and the over-
all firm performance, defined in terms of the firms profitability and growth. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the theoretical models integrated and simplified. The contractual gov-
ernance model addresses relationships between contractual governance and strategic 
decision-making quality constructs. Similarly, the relational governance model studies 
relationships among relational governance and strategic decision-making quality con-
structs. As suggested in Figure 4.1, and consistent with Granovetter (1985), the disserta-
tion argues that relational governance complements contractual governance of family 
firms. In contractual and relational governance models, the strategic decision-making 
quality constructs act as dependent variables, while they are independent variables in 
the model focusing on the links between strategic decision-making quality and the 
firms overall performance. The constructs shown in the Figure 4.1, and their hypothe-
sized relationships, are elaborated in the subsequent chapters.  
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constructs:
Inside ownership, board
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monitoring, and board counsel
Relational governance
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Overall  firm performance
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Profitability and growth
 
Figure 4.1 Overview of theoretical models 
 
 
4.2 Contractual governance model  
 
Governance research addresses the potential divergence of interests between owners and 
management because of the separation of ownership from control. Given individuals 
bounded rationality, decision rights within an organization are delegated to the levels 
where they are best handled (Hayek, 1945; Simon, 1976). This process, however, cre-
ates agency problems because of managers self-interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Governance theorists, therefore, have identified several external and internal govern-
ance mechanisms that can protect shareholders against managements opportunism 
(Walsh & Seward, 1990). However, compared to large publicly held corporations, fam-
ily-controlled corporations have different contractual characteristics. Their distinctive 
contractual nature has implications for contractually based governance mechanisms 
found in family firms. Accordingly, this section is divided into two parts. First, the con-
tractual nature of family firms is discussed, and then the contractual governance model 
and associated hypotheses are developed.   
 
 
4.2.1 Contractual nature of family firms  
 
Different organizational forms have their special characteristics concerning how they 
delegate decision rights within the organization, and, consequently, incur agency prob-
lems. Agency theory posits that different organizational forms can survive in competi-
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tion based on different sets of success factors; survival of a given organizational form 
depends on how specific advantages and disadvantages are governed (Fama & Jensen, 
1983a). From an agency theory perspective, a typical family firm has concentrated 
ownership, considerable overlap between ownership and managerial control, and a lack 
of external control mechanisms such as a market for corporate control. However, these 
characteristics are not constant in family firms; they can, in fact, vary considerably. 
Consequently, effective modes of governance can be expected to vary among family 
firms.  
 
As noted in the literature review, agency theory views a corporation as a nexus of con-
tracts, where a set of written and unwritten contracts are coordinated with its exchange 
partners (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). These contracts also 
specify rights and performance criteria of each agent in the organization. The central 
contracts in an organization specify the nature of residual claims, i.e. rights in net cash 
flows, and the allocation of decision rights (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). Residual claim-
ants, who are the shareholders in a corporation, bear the financial risk of owning the 
stock in the hope of receiving the difference between the firms stochastic cash inflows 
and outflows. Fama & Jensen describe two types of corporations, open corporation 
and closed corporation, which both have distinctive contractual characteristics. Open 
corporations are typically large complex organizations, while closed corporations are 
smaller and less complex. Family firms fall somewhere between these two types. Table 
4.1 compares characteristics of open and closed corporations, which can be thought of 
as serving the conceptual ends of a spectrum of family firms. 
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Table 4.1 Comparison of characteristics of open and closed corporations (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983a; 1983b) 
Characteristic Open corporation Closed corporation 
Nature of residual 
claims 
Stockholders are not expected to have 
any other role in the company 
Residual claims are freely alienable  
One or few residual claimants  
Alienability of residual claims is re-
stricted  
Factors contribut-
ing to organiza-
tional success 
Residual risk is spread over many re-
sidual claimants 
Residual risk bearing and management 
are specialized functions 
Delegation of decision authority to 
agents who have relevant specific 
knowledge throughout the organization 
Capability to purchase large amounts of 
organization-specific risky assets 
Investment decisions are based on 
weighing current and future net cash 
flows according to opportunity cost 
Residual claims are largely restricted to 
important decision agents; this has two 
beneficial implications: 
1 Avoidance of agency problems be-
cause residual risk bearing is not sepa-
rated from decision functions 
2 Efficiency gains in decision processes 
due to simpler decision-making struc-
ture 
General disadvan-
tages 
Agency problems caused by the separa-
tion of residual risk bearing from deci-
sion functions (i.e. separation of 
ownership from control) 
Costs of controlling agency problems; 
several external and internal governance 
mechanisms protect shareholders inter-
ests 
Efficiency losses because of non-
specialized risk bearing and manage-
ment functions 
Foregone diversification and limited 
alienability of stock lower the value of 
residual claims, raise the cost of capital, 
and lead to lower than optimal invest-
ment level 
 
 
In Fama & Jensens categorization, the majority of family firms appear to be closer to 
the definition of the closed corporation. However, many family firms are large and 
complex organizations, having, at least in part, freely alienable residual claims. Thus, 
some family firms resemble open corporations. This is exemplified by an estimate that 
40% of the Fortune 500 companies are family controlled with a minimum of 10% own-
ership stake (Zeitling, 1976).   
 
From a purely economic utility maximization point of view, agency problems are 
avoided when residual claimants act also as important decision agents. This situation 
aligns the interests of self-interested owners and managers, because they are same indi-
viduals. In addition to the pure economic-rational cause of agency problems, Jensen has 
identified a second major source of agency costs, the costs incurred as a result the self-
control problems (emphasis added)...that is, the actions that people take that harm them-
selves as well as those around  them (1998: 48). Jensen gave several examples of non-
rational self-control problems. For example, people have a common reluctance to 
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welcome feedback on their errors. Jensen argues that clinical psychological records as 
well as everyday observations of family, organizational, and social action abound with 
examples of nonrational behavior (1998: 45), and that this behavior should also be 
taken into account when analyzing agency problems.  
 
As discussed earlier, family business literature is filled with anecdotal evidence of con-
flicts that plague them. Evidence also suggests that conflicts having an emotional origin 
are common in family businesses. This type of affective conflict is generally considered 
nonproductive (e.g., Amason, 1996). Recently, some authors have begun to explore 
more explicitly the qualities of agency relationships and their organizational conse-
quences in a family firm context (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Ling, 2001; Schulze et al., 
2001). These studies argue that family firms do not fit well into the standard agency 
theory because of several family business specific nonrational characteristics. To 
summarize the above discussion concerning the nature of agency problems, it is as-
sumed in this study that there are two broad types of agency problems in family firms: 
(1) agency problems related to stakeholders deviating interests due to separation of 
ownership and control, and (2) agency problems related to nonrational or seemingly 
nonrational behaviors.  
 
Large publicly held corporations (open corporations) are controlled against managerial 
malfeasance by several external and internal mechanisms, whereas family firms rely 
mostly on internal governance mechanisms, if any, and only marginally on external 
control. Market for corporate control, i.e. the transferring of managerial control to new 
shareholders through acquisitions and divestitures (Hitt et al., 1996), is generally not 
available to family firms because the ownership of shares is restricted largely to the 
family and its close allies. By employing external entrenchment practices (Walsh & 
Seward, 1990), family firms may effectively influence the structure ownership and keep 
the ownership control in the hands of the family. The inefficient market for corporate 
control among family firms increases the shareholders risk and lowers the value of 
their assets, because the market for corporate control is considered as the shareholders 
last resort against bad managerial decision making and failing internal control systems 
(Fama, 1980). The stock market can also act as an external device monitoring large pub-
licly held corporations, because stock prices reflect the implications of managerial deci-
sion making (Fama & Jensen, 1983b) for current and future cash flows. Although some 
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family-controlled firms are publicly listed, the stock market is not a common external 
governance mechanism for family businesses.  
 
However, large blockholders, like families, may act as a substitute control for the exter-
nal market for corporate control and other external control mechanisms. Large block-
holders usually have both the motivation and capability to monitor managerial decision 
making, which should decrease agency costs (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Byrd, Parrino 
& Pritsch, 1998). However, the owner familys monitoring capabilities are likely to 
have more variation than those of other types of large blockholders.  
 
Moreover, Cubbin & Leech (1983) argued that the separation of ownership and control 
affects in two related ways the possibilities of outside owners controlling managerial 
behavior. First, the location of control, i.e. owner control versus managerial control, is 
determined by the extent that managers own shares. Second, the degree of control the 
outside owners (owners that are not managers) have over managers depends on how 
dispersed the outside ownership is, which, in turn, affects the probability of their win-
ning votes and gaining voting power. Thus, large dispersion of outside ownership is re-
lated to weak owner control, whereas concentrated outside ownership contributes to 
strong control. In the light of the Cubbin & Leech model, family firms have potentially 
an excellent opportunity to exercise ownership control, because the family members 
stockholdings tend to be concentrated by kinship ties. DeAngelo & DeAngelo supported 
this view when they noted that implicit contracts, e.g., as among officers and their rela-
tives, can also act to consolidate voting rights within a group (1985: 50).  
 
In widely held public corporations, the board of directors is the common apex of in-
ternal decision control systems (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). In that role, the board can, for 
example, hire and fire the CEO, and decide which strategic initiatives will be imple-
mented. The role of the board has a broad variation between family firms. Neubauer & 
Lank (1998) classified the boards role in family firms into four categories, where (1) 
the board has little or no influence, (2) the board has a fiduciary role protecting family 
and shareholder interests, (3) the board has a decisive role in strategy setting, control, 
and hiring top executives, and (4) the board is in fact running the business. If compared 
to the role of the board in widely held public corporations, as normally understood, the 
first two board roles in the Neubauer & Lank categorization seem under-involved, 
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whereas the fourth role appears over-involved in terms of the boards participation in 
strategic decision making and in the day-to-day running of the business.  
 
Agency theory suggests that boards of directors represent and protect the interests of 
owners by monitoring and controlling top management (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). In 
family businesses, however, this division of roles is easily blurred. Forbes & Milliken 
note the board [of family firms] may simply have no control function in the conven-
tional sense, because shareholders rights and managerial responsibilities will reside in 
the same persons (1999: 501). This is especially true early in a companys life when 
ownership may reside in a single owner manager. Later, members of the extended fam-
ily may serve on the board or in top management positions and share the controlling 
ownership (Gersick et al., 1997). 
 
Many scholars believe that a boards independence, whether in large or small corpora-
tions, is undermined by the formal and informal power of the CEO (e.g., Galbraith, 
1972; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1972). Baysinger & Hoskisson noted that man-
agers dominate their boards by using their de facto power to select and compensate di-
rectors and exploiting personal ties with them (1990:72). Pettigrew (1992) identified 
four explanations of the managements control over the board: (1) top managements 
control over the selection of directors, (2) the limited time outside directors have avail-
able for their duties, (3) top managements superior information about the firms busi-
ness, and (4) norms of board conduct limiting the outsiders independence. The CEO of 
a family firm may even have more power vis-à-vis the board. The CEOs family ties 
and high ownership stake contribute to high CEO power. Additionally, CEO power is 
increased when the chair and CEO positions are held by the same individual, which is 
often the case in family firms. Figure 4.2 summarizes the discussion of the contractual 
nature of family firms.  
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Figure 4.2  Contractual nature of family firms  
 
 
4.2.2 Contractual governance mechanisms and strategic decision-making  
 quality  
 
This study follows some earlier governance studies as it integrates aspects of organiza-
tional-economics and strategic management literature (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; 
Johnson, Hoskisson & Hitt, 1993). More specifically, agency theory provides a frame-
work for understanding how the ownership structure is linked to board composition and 
board participation in decision processes, while strategic management literature contrib-
utes to views on how the boards activities affect managerial choices and their imple-
mentation. Both agency theory and the strategic choice approach emphasize the role of 
top executives in setting the strategic direction for a firm.  
 
Vigilant boards are believed to set premises of managerial decision making 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990: 76). Board vigilance is commonly related to board in-
dependence. Previous research has found that board composition, in terms of the ratio of 
outside members to the total number of directors on the board, can serve as a proxy for 
board independence and vigilance (Daily, Johnson & Dalton, 1999).  
 
Corporate governance literature has studied extensively activities of the boards of direc-
tors. The literature classifies the activities under two broad tasks: control and service 
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tasks (e.g., Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Following agency theory, control centers on hir-
ing, compensating, disciplining, and firing senior managers; approving top managers 
initiatives; and evaluating senior managers performance (Johnson et al., 1996). Service 
includes those activities that enhance a firms reputation and competitiveness by giving 
advice and counsel to management, establishing links with the external environment, 
and representing the firm in the community. Directors service roles support the com-
panys strategic decision process (e.g., Zahra, 1990), which influences the firms per-
formance. In this study, board monitoring addresses parts of the boards control task, 
including monitoring of strategic decision making and financial outcomes; board coun-
sel consists of those activities of the boards service task that involve advice and coun-
sel in the strategic decision-making process. 
 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the research model for contractual governance, reflecting the fol-
lowing four views: (1) the board of directors is the common apex of internal control sys-
tems, (2) ownership structure is an important determinant of board composition and its 
functions, and (3), the two vital board functions, board monitoring and board counsel, 
have consequences for strategic decision-making outcomes. 
 
Board
monitoring
Board
counsel
Decision
quality
Managements
decision
commitment
Board
composition
Contractual governance
Inside
Ownership
-
Decision-making
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+
+
+
+
+
+
 
Figure 4.3 The contractual governance model 
 
Ownership structure is an important determinant of managerial behavior in agency the-
ory. In this study, the ownership structure is defined in terms of inside ownership, indi-
cating the proportion of common stock held by family members who are either directors 
or officers of the family firm (Kesner, 1987; Luoma & Goodstein, 1999). 
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Inside ownership and Board Composition 
 
Following agency theory, the composition of the board determines directors independ-
ence from management and their ability to undertake their monitoring and service roles 
(Dalton, Johnson & Ellstrand, 1999). The representation of outside directors on the fam-
ily firms board is especially important. Outside directors are defined here as directors 
who are not from the family or from the family firms management. Despite contradic-
tory past findings about the link between the representation of outside directors and 
company performance (Dalton et al., 1999; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), agency theory sug-
gests that increased outside directors representation enables the boards to exercise its 
control (through monitoring) and service (via counsel) roles.  
 
Despite their major potential contributions outside directors can make to the success of 
a family business, owner managers are often reluctant to recruit outside directors. Fam-
ily owner managers value their independence (Johannisson & Huse, 2000), and are of-
ten unwilling to share their powers with other family members and outsiders. Family 
members may also be unwilling to involve outsiders in running their companies, be-
cause they worry about confidentiality and privacy, and are concerned about loss of 
control and autonomy (Gersick et al., 1997). Having outside directors join the com-
panys board may upset long-standing emotional ties that bond the family, thereby caus-
ing conflict. Outsiders may not fully understand the culture that prevails in the firm and 
drives the decision-making process; they might challenge the core values that dominate 
the firms decision-making process. These factors can undermine the emotional and po-
litical balance that exists in the family firm, forcing owners to hire outside directors 
only in cases of crises (Johannisson & Huse, 2000).  
 
Agency theory posits that there is a relationship between the firms ownership structure 
and delegation of decision rights. According to Fama & Jensen (1983b), the decision 
process has four broad phases: (1) initiation: generation of proposals for resource utili-
zation, (2) ratification: choice of the decision initiatives to be implemented; (3) imple-
mentation: execution of ratified decisions, and (4) monitoring: measurement of the 
performance of decision agents and rewarding them. Decision management combines 
the initiation and implementation phases, whereas decision control combines the ratifi-
cation and monitoring phases.  
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Fama & Jensen (1983b) proposed that decision control and decision management are 
separated, when residual risk bearing (ownership) is separated from decision manage-
ment. And correspondingly, decision control and decision management are combined 
when residual claims are restricted to important decision agents. In large, diffusely- 
owned corporations, the independent board of directors is assumed to perform decision 
control functions (ratification and monitoring), whereas the management is assumed to 
handle decision management tasks (initiation and implementation). In family firms, the 
level of family executives ownership stake varies from complete ownership to low or 
even no ownership, depending on the dispersion of common stock and the degree of the 
family members participation in the board and management. Thus, it can be expected 
that the degree of separation of decision control and decision management varies ac-
cordingly. The proportion of outside directors on the board has been used as a proxy of 
board independence (Johnson et al., 1996), which reflects the degree of the separation of 
decision control and decision management. 
 
Hypothesis 1. The higher the proportion of the familys inside ownership of the 
firm, the lower is the proportion of outside directors on the board. 
 
 
Composition of the board of directors and board monitoring 
 
The composition of the board of directors has been judged to be critical in corporate 
governance, including family firms (e.g., Ward, 1991). Outside directors are expected to 
be well aligned with the interests of the owners, whereas inside directors usually have 
better information about the firms operations but are less independent (Johnson et al., 
1993).  
 
According to organization theory, drawing inferences about the performance of organ-
izational actors may be based on two types of observations: monitoring their behavior or 
monitoring observable outputs as thought to result from their behavior (e.g., Eisenhardt, 
1995). Also, the relationship between the strategic planning process and a firms finan-
cial performance is tenuous due to complexity of planning-performance links and the 
many contingencies that can affect implementation of the strategy (Pearce, Freeman & 
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Robinson, 1987). Consistent with the organization theorys classification of control into 
behavior control and output control, Baysinger & Hoskisson (1990) proposed two board 
level controls, which they termed strategic controls and financial controls. Strategic 
controls entail largely subjective, strategically relevant long-term criteria, while finan-
cial controls involve objective criteria such as return on investment (Hitt et al., 1996). 
The board monitoring construct in this study addresses both types of controls of top 
management.  
 
Agency theory posits that ownership aligns the interests of managers and the firm 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983b). This alignment is conducive to shareholders value maximiza-
tion. However, although family ownership might align the interests of owners with the 
company, it also gives owner managers a free hand in running the firm in ways that can 
reduce efficiency and profitability. Owner managers may hire their relatives who are 
less qualified than other candidates. Indeed, nepotism is common in family business 
firms (Kets de Vries, 1996), where a job may be considered a birthright of a family 
member (Dunn, 1995). Further, owner managers may resist adaptation to environmental 
changes, putting their firms survival at risk. Owner managers may act opportunistically 
because they are insulated from open competition for superior managerial talent 
(Schulze et al., 2001). Managers may also fail to train or select successors, leave con-
flicts among family members unresolved, or simply fail to develop long-term strategies 
for their companies. These problems are exacerbated by the entrenchment of family 
business managers (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). Outside directors can play a critical role 
in monitoring senior managers (Dalton et al., 1999).  
 
Though inside board members (i.e. directors that are also managers) have more knowl-
edge of the firms operations, they are usually dependent on top executives for their jobs 
and may thus be less willing to challenge CEOs (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). In con-
trast, outside directors will be more independent from managements influence and 
more vigilant in monitoring executives (Fama, 1980; Johnson et al., 1993). Further, be-
cause outside directors are often managers or directors of other companies, they are mo-
tivated to protect their reputations as professional directors by acting independently 
from top management (Finkelstein & DAveni, 1994). Outside directors, therefore, 
monitor top managers and ensure that shareholders interests are protected (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983b). Also, the more there are outside members on the board of directors, the 
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clearer the separation of ownership from management should be, and the clearer the 
monitoring function of the board should be. These directors play an important role in 
firing and replacing CEOs, and in strategy formulation and evaluation of prior strategies 
(Johnson et al., 1993; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). Effective monitoring is evidenced in 
managements support of, and investment in, long-term value creating activities such as 
innovation. 
  
Hypothesis 2. The higher the proportion of outside directors on a family firms 
board, the higher is the boards monitoring on top management. 
 
 
Composition of the board of directors and board counsel 
 
The agency theory has identified control over management as the boards primary func-
tion, while the boards potential role in providing advice and counsel to management 
has gained less attention. For example, while acknowledging the importance of a con-
trol component of corporate governance, Prahalad called for a more constructive, 
value-adding relationship between management and investors (1997: 55). However, 
the counsel role of the board is consistent with the agency theory. Fama & Jensen 
(1983b) noted that outside board members may have relevant complementary knowl-
edge on a number of issues, and they can act as arbiters in disagreements among man-
agers. Literature suggests that board involvement is increasing in all phases of the 
strategic planning process (Johnson et al., 1996; Tashakori & Boulton, 1985; Zahra, 
1990). Judge & Zeithaml (1992) found in an empirical study that increased outside di-
rectors representation on the board promotes active involvement in strategy formation 
and evaluation stages, addressing aspects of both decision control and decision man-
agement (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). 
 
This study suggests a positive relationship between the proportion of outside directors 
and their counsel and advice role. Outside board members have a wealth of experience 
and diversity of backgrounds that allows them to provide advice and counsel to man-
agement (e.g., Zahra & Pearce, 1989). These directors view their normal duty as pro-
viding advice and counsel to the CEO (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). This information can 
improve strategic decision making by exposing managers to fresh ideas and multiple 
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perspectives that do not exist with the management team, thereby helping them discover 
new business directions. They may also act as sounding boards for the owner manag-
ers by listening to executives ideas and offering feedback (Ward, 1991), and by asking 
them vital, but uncomfortable, questions which only the executive team could answer 
(Cadbury, 1995: 47). Outside directors established business networks and relationships 
also connect owner managers to external information sources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978), further widening their access to data about industry conditions and potential 
competitive moves.  
 
The boards service tasks may have an added importance in family firms, because they 
are usually relatively small, and thus have a lack of resources and systems in place to 
analyze their industries on a formal and ongoing basis (Daily & Dalton, 1993; Fiegener, 
Brown, Dreux & Dennis, 2000; Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Further, Whisler (1988) em-
phasized the value of outside members for threshold family firms, companies that ex-
perience their first growth-induced crisis. Also, outside presentation on the board is 
likely to be associated with high effort norms, inducing active board discussions, and 
increased effort by individual board members (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Having more 
outside directors on the board also increases the professionalization of the firms man-
agement (Daily & Dalton, 1993) through the advice and counsel directors offer senior 
executives. Mace summarized this by noting the primary function of the outside direc-
tors is to provide a source of advice and counsel to the family owner-managers (1972: 
44). Additionally, a board with outside members can be a resource to the family busi-
ness by balancing emotional conflicts (Ward, 1991), by counseling family members di-
rectly (Lansberg, 1999), and by supporting generational succession (Brunninge & 
Nordqvist, 2001).  
 
Hypothesis 3. The higher the proportion of outside directors on a family firms 
board, the higher is the level of the boards counsel to top management. 
 
 
Board Monitoring and Decision Quality 
 
The agency theory posits that the potential divergence of interests among a firms own-
ers and managers may lead to sub-optimal decisions and undermine shareholders value 
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by incurring residual losses (Fama & Jensen, 1983a; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Resid-
ual losses are opportunity losses due to bad strategic choices, which affect the firms 
resource allocation, cash flow generation, and ultimately the firm value. Agency costs 
associated with bad decisions can be reduced by increasing control or by reducing devi-
ating interests by increasing incentive alignment (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The high-
est level of control in corporations with dispersed ownership is exercised by the board 
of directors as it is the common apex of the decision control systems (Fama & Jensen, 
1983b). Board monitoring can alleviate these problems by improving the quality of the 
companys strategic decisions and thereby its performance. Although the board may 
have a limited control function in smaller, owner-managed firms (Forbes & Milliken, 
1999), many family firms with more dispersed ownership are likely to benefit from 
board monitoring. Thus, it can be expected that the quality of strategic decisions in fam-
ily firms will improve as the board monitoring activities increase. 
 
Managers firm-specific knowledge, which is often superior to that of the owners, is an 
important power source for managers, allowing them to pursue their own preferences. 
Such information asymmetry contributes to moral hazard, manifested in managerial de-
cisions that are inconsistent with owners interests (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Zajac & 
Westphal, 1994). Increased monitoring of managers reduces this information asymme-
try, and thus, the likelihood of moral hazard.  
 
Also, the managers and owners may have different attitudes toward risk taking. In larger 
corporations with dispersed ownership, managers are likely to be more risk averse than 
the owners because the owners can easily diversify their risk across many firms while 
the human capital of managers is generally employed in a single company (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983a). Without an effective system to monitor decisions, managers tend to re-
duce their exposure to risks by selecting less risky and less profitable investment alter-
natives (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). This may happen in family firms also, 
especially when the common stock is dispersed among a large number of extended fam-
ily members and other types of owners.  
 
A specific instance where the board involvement may radically affect the quality of de-
cisions is during organizational decline. Previous research indicates that adversity can 
lead to organizational rigidities, such as resistance to change, reliance on past policies, 
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and increased formalization (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Singh, 1986). Daily & Dalton 
(1994) found that independent boards with active control in a turnaround situation im-
proves decision making and increases the chances of survival.  
 
Hypothesis 4. The higher the boards monitoring of top management, the better is 
the strategic decision quality in the family firm. 
 
 
Board monitoring and decision commitment  
 
The nature of top managements commitment to the chosen strategy varies greatly in 
family firms. In owner-managed companies, the top executives and the shareholders 
interests are automatically aligned to the degree to which the executives hold the com-
panys common stock (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). Forbes & Milliken even noted that in 
owner-managed firms the board may simply have no control function in the conven-
tional sense, because shareholder rights and managerial responsibilities will reside in 
the same persons (1999: 501). This implies high commitment to strategic decisions in 
owner-managed family firms, regardless of the amount of board monitoring activities. 
Although the boards of closely-held companies lack control power over management, 
some owner-managed firms see boards with outside directors helpful in providing unbi-
ased views and forcing management accountability (Schwartz & Barnes, 1991).  
 
On the other hand, in family firms where the ownership risk and managerial decision 
making are separated to a large extent, the boards monitoring of the managerial deci-
sion function becomes more effective. As discussed earlier, a boards monitoring activi-
ties are expected to reduce bad managerial decision making due to deviating preferences 
between the owners and management. Because managerial rewards are often tied to 
firm performance, increased monitoring should motivate the management to implement 
strategic decisions well. This should promote a positive attitude on monitoring 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990), thus increasing managements commitment to strategic 
choices. 
 
The boards active and vigilant follow-up of the implementation of ratified strategic de-
cisions signals the directors commitment to the successful implementation of the firms 
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chosen strategy. Also, the board may make public statements, for example, in annual 
reports, about the firms new strategic direction. All this is likely to create expectations 
throughout the company and its constituencies. The boards visible commitment to stra-
tegic decisions, combined with widespread social expectations, gives the management 
an additional incentive to implement decisions well (Janis, 1989; Zajac & Westphal, 
1994).  
 
Recognition of their decisions as the subject to the boards critical analysis and review 
is likely to promote interest of executives in evaluating their firms systems and operat-
ing procedures and ensure these fit in with their proposed strategy. Monitoring by direc-
tors also increases willingness of executives to involve lower ranking managers and 
employees in the strategic decision-making process and to build support for their initia-
tives. Subordinates front-end participation enhances their commitment to the resulting 
strategy and eases its successful implementation (Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990). Thus, 
monitoring motivates executives to plan the successful implementation of the proposed 
strategy.  
  
Hypothesis 5. The higher the boards monitoring on top management, the higher 
is the top managements decision commitment in the family firm. 
 
 
Board Counsel and Decision Quality 
 
The strategic decision process is challenging to its participants because the strategic 
choices determine how effectively corporate resources will be used, and because the 
strategic problems are complex and non-routine (Mintzberg et al., 1976; Nutt, 1998). 
Because of the importance and multifaceted nature of the strategic decision-making 
task, theorists have found that information-processing capabilities are imperative in the 
strategic decision processes. Much of the work in strategic management literature is in-
duced by Ashbys (1959) requisite variety theorem, which implies that variety in a sys-
tems environment can only be controlled by variety in the systems outcomes. Ansoff, 
for example, restated the requisite variety theorem in business terminology by noting 
for a successful response to the environment the complexity and speed of the firms 
response must match the complexity and speed of the environmental challenges (1984: 
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27). It is argued here that counsel provided by the boards of directors improves informa-
tion processing capabilities during strategic decision making, and thus the strategic de-
cision quality.   
 
Literature on conflict and decision making has shown that there are two different types 
of conflict that have a bearing on the effectiveness of group decision making, namely 
cognitive conflict and affective conflict (Amason, 1996; Jehn, 1997; Priem, Harrison & 
Muir, 1995). Cognitive conflict refers to depersonalized, task oriented conflict, and it 
focuses on judgmental differences between decision alternatives, while affective con-
flict is conflict involving interpersonal relations, and it tends to focus on emotionally 
based personal disputes. Cognitive conflict is generally considered functional to group 
decision making because it provides an amount and variety of information that match 
the complexity and uncertainty of the strategic decision-making task (Dooley & Fryx-
ell, 1999: 390). On the contrary, affective conflict is considered detrimental to decision 
making because it diverts the attention from the decision task to interpersonal issues. 
 
Cognitive capabilities are related to the cognitive diversity within the group (Amason, 
1996; Dooley & Fryxell, 1999). Thus, board counsel to senior managers can induce 
cognitive conflicts that compel executives to effectively assess alternative courses of 
action, increase the diversity of knowledge inputs into the companys decision process, 
and reduce information asymmetries that exist between managers and directors.  
 
Cognitive conflict also improves decision quality because the synthesis emerging from 
diverse perspectives is generally superior to the individual perspectives (Amason, 
1997). Outside directors presence on the board can enhance this diversity. Outside di-
rectors, who encourage open discussion, inquiry and debate, can promote informed 
board involvement in strategic decision-making (Westphal, 1999). Schweiger et al. 
(1986) found that programmed conflict, using dialectical inquiry and devils advo-
cacy, generates significantly better quality decisions than consensus decision making. 
Consistent with these arguments, Pearce & Zahra (1991) reported that active board par-
ticipation in a firms strategic decision-making process was associated with superior 
financial performance. These observations suggest a positive relationship between di-
rectors counsel and advice and decision quality. 
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Hypothesis 6. The higher the boards counsel to top management, the better is the 
strategic decision quality in the family firm. 
 
 
Board Counsel and Decision Commitment 
 
Not only does board counsel improve decision quality, the process itself leads to in-
creased commitment by top management to the resulting strategic decisions. Board 
counsel for top management on strategy increases and intensifies senior managers par-
ticipation in the strategic process. It also increases their examination of different strate-
gic options and their implications for the family firms competitive and financial 
position. This involvement increases participants acceptance of the resulting decisions 
because it gives them an opportunity to discuss different perspectives during the deci-
sion-making process (Priem et al., 1995b; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990).  
 
Further, the involvement increases participants commitment to the resulting decisions 
because it gives them an opportunity to exercise voice in the decision process (Ama-
son, 1996: 128). More generally, engagement in decision processes results in increases 
in participants procedural justice judgments, leading to improved commitment to de-
cisions, increased voluntary cooperation, and ultimately, more successful implementa-
tion of the strategic decisions (Kim & Mauborgne, 1998; Korsgaard et al. 1995; Lind & 
Tyler, 1988). Procedural justice refers to the extent to which the dynamics of the deci-
sion process are judged to be fair (Kim & Mauborgne, 1998: 325).  
 
An intensive process of board counsel and deliberation also instills positive, cognitive 
conflict within the company, as discussed earlier. These conflicts can increase the com-
mitment of all participants to the decisions made. In family firms, participants in the de-
cision-making process usually have common bonds that often allow them to work 
collaboratively through conflicts. Although the risk of affective, disruptive conflict is 
high in family business (e.g., Kets De Vries, 1996), cognitive conflicts present an op-
portunity for family firms. As Cosier & Harvey noted, in a family business setting, 
merely raising the awareness that the disagreement inherent in process conflict can be 
positive may promote collaboration. Reminders that prevent process conflict from be-
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coming relationship conflict should be frequent (1998: 77). Getting through these con-
flicts should increase commitment to the resulting decisions.  
 
Increased board counsel should also increase the options being considered. Research on 
escalation of commitment has shown that when there are more options under considera-
tion, the psychological stake in any one strategic option is significantly reduced (Eisen-
hardt, 1989b; Staw, 1981). This makes it easier for senior managers to change their 
positions on different strategic alternatives in favor of the option(s) to which they are 
willing to commit themselves.  
 
Hypothesis 7. The higher the boards counsel to top management, the higher is 
the top managements decision commitment in the family firm. 
 
 
Mediating effects in the contractual governance model 
 
The above hypotheses has linked inside ownership with board composition and board 
composition with two vital board functions, namely board monitoring and board com-
position. Also, these board functions were directly linked to decision quality and man-
agements decision commitment. Additionally, the contractual governance model 
shown in Figure 4.3 suggests several indirect relationships among the variables. While 
inside ownership is associated with less vigilant board activity, in terms of board moni-
toring and board counsel, it is the board composition that converts low inside ownership 
into active board monitoring and board counsel.  
 
Hypothesis 8. Board composition mediates the effects of inside ownership on 
board monitoring and on board counsel. 
 
While it is proposed that board composition is related to a firms strategic decision mak-
ing, it is the board monitoring and board counsel that converts board composition into 
strategic decision-making quality. 
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Hypothesis 9. Board monitoring and board counsel mediate the effects of board 
composition on strategic decision quality and managements decision commit-
ment. 
 
 
4.3 Relational governance model  
 
To date, governance-related studies using a social capital framework have mainly fo-
cused on inter-organizational relationships (e.g., Larson, 1992; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998; Yli-Renko, Autio & Sapienza, 2001). This dissertation extends the analysis of 
social capital to the study of corporate governance, especially in family firm contexts. 
While the previous section focused on the influences of contractual governance on stra-
tegic decision making, this section addresses mechanisms of relational governance, and 
their effects on strategic decision making. Relational governance is concerned about in-
formal, social control that regulates the relationships among the stakeholders, and it is 
induced by resources embedded in social relationships. This section is divided into two 
parts. The first part discusses social capital in family firms, and constructs used in the 
relational governance model. The second part develops the model and associated hy-
potheses. 
 
 
4.3.1 Social capital in family firms  
 
In family businesses, social relationships are usually strong and long lasting. Strength of 
relationships is amplified due to familial ties and family members multiple roles in the 
firm. Traditions, bonding relationships, loyalty, and altruism determine how resources 
are used to create value for owners of family firms (Harvey, 1999a). Harvey also ob-
served that the key features of the family system that usually have the greatest influ-
ence on the operation of the firm are preexisting, implicit, social ties among family 
members (1999a: 61). Thus, relational governance, which builds on social capital in-
duced by strong ties within the family business system, is likely to have a high level of 
importance to success in family firms. 
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Earlier literature suggests that social controls may act as self-enforcing governance 
mechanisms in an exchange relationships (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Some aspects of social 
capital, such as trust (e.g., Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Uzzi, 1996; Zaheer & Venkatra-
man, 1995), organizational reputation (e.g., Jones et al., 1997; Larson, 1992), and asso-
ciability with an organization through collective goals and values, and shared vision 
(e.g., Leana & Van Buren, 1999; Ouchi, 1980; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998), can serve as a 
governance mechanism. 
 
The relational governance model presented in this dissertation employs five aspects of 
social capital in family firms, as shown in Figure 4.4. The five forms of social capital 
are classified according to Nahapiet & Ghoshal (1998) under structural, relational, and 
cognitive dimensions. The structural dimension addresses characteristics of the network 
of relationships as a whole, while the relational dimension is concerned about assets that 
are generated through personal relationships (Granovetter, 1992; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998). The cognitive dimension deals with resources that provide shared interpretations 
and language among parties (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  
Social capital in family firms
Structural dimension
- Family institutions
- Family size
- Social interaction
Relational dimension
- Trust
Cognitive dimension
- Shared vision
 
Figure 4.4 Social capital in family firms  
 
The structural dimension of social capital in the model includes three constructs: family 
institutions, family size, and social interaction. Family institutions refers to informal and 
formal structures and processes within the owner family, such as family meetings and 
family councils. In this study, the family institutions construct addresses the number of 
qualitatively different family institutions used by a family. Family size refers to the 
number of individuals in the owner family, and social interaction refers to the level of 
personal and social ties among the owner family members.  
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The relational dimension of social capital in this study focuses on trust between the 
owner family members and management. Because there is no commonly agreed defini-
tion of trust among scholars, the concept of trust is briefly discussed and defined below. 
Following earlier trust researchers, Bigley & Pearce (1998) proposed that actor vulner-
ability could be a common theme to otherwise diverse trust literature. Trust as will-
ingness to be vulnerable attaches the notion of risk to the concept of trust. Being 
vulnerable in a trusting relationship means that potential loss exceeds potential gain 
(Zand, 1972; Mishra, 1996). The trusting party is willing to be vulnerable to the extent 
it believes the trusted party will act as expected. In the recent literature, trust has been 
found to be a multidimensional construct. For example, trust has been divided into cog-
nitive, emotional, and behavioral components (Mishra 1996, Cummings & Bromiley, 
1996). The present study adopts Cummings & Bromileys definition of trust as as an 
individuals belief or a common belief among a group of individuals that another indi-
vidual or group (a) makes a good-faith efforts to behave in accordance with any com-
mitments both explicit or implicit, (b) is honest in whatever negotiations preceded such 
commitments, and (c) does not take excessive advantage of another even when the op-
portunity is available (1996: 303). 
 
The cognitive dimension of social capital in this study addresses a shared vision among 
the owner family members. A shared vision embodies the owner familys collective 
goals and aspirations concerning their firm, addressing the continuity of the company 
under the control of a given family. A shared vision may include some broad descrip-
tions of desired business domains, desired growth rates, and financial performance. In 
short, shared vision denotes the family members collective idea about the future of the 
family firm. The shared vision helps the family members to understand common long-
term goals and proper ways of acting in a family business system (Tsai & Ghoshal, 
1998). Thus, a shared vision promotes cohesiveness and group action.  
 
The elements of social capital used in the relational governance model primarily focus 
on social capital within the owner family. In addition to being owners, the family mem-
bers may serve as directors or as officers in the company. Thus, it is likely that high so-
cial capital within the family will result in high social capital among the top executives. 
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The only social capital construct where management is explicitly modeled is the trust 
between the family and management. 
 
 
4.3.2 Relational governance mechanisms and strategic decision-making quality  
 
Notions of social capital and strategic management are rarely explicitly connected, even 
though various social aspects of organizations have been linked to their strategies. For 
example, Rumelt et al. (1995) did not address social capital when they identified 
streams of organizational sociology literature that has contributed to strategic man-
agement research, namely resource dependence, organization ecology, and so called 
new institutionalism (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). However, there is an increasing 
awareness that social capital and strategic decision making may be related. For example, 
Eisenhardt & Zbarachi noted that strategic decision makers resolve conflict...also by 
developing cooperative decision styles, building trust, maintaining equity, and evoking 
humor (1992: 34). 
 
Social capital theory is consistent with the resource-based theory of strategy, which em-
phasizes the role of unique, firm specific resources in creating sustained competitive 
advantage (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). Barney (1991) claimed that some re-
sources are difficult to imitate by competitors because the resources may be socially 
complex, as is the case with the interpersonal relations among managers. Drawing from 
the resource-based view, Nahapiet & Ghoshal (1998) suggested that differences in firm 
performance might reflect differences in the firms ability to create and exploit social 
capital. Using the social capital framework suggested by Nahapiet & Ghoshal (1998), 
Tsai & Ghoshal (1998) proposed and tested a model linking different dimensions of so-
cial capital and value creation in terms of a firms product innovativeness. The rela-
tional governance model of this dissertation studies in much the same way the 
relationships among different aspects of social capital and their effect on the decision-
making quality in family firms. 
 
The research model for relational governance, as illustrated in Figure 4.5, is based on 
three views: (1) social interaction between the owner family members is a major factor 
in creating other forms of social capital, namely shared vision and trust, representing the 
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cognitive and relational dimensions of social capital, respectively, (2) social interaction, 
representing the structural dimension of social capital, is largely determined by social 
processes and structures, and the size of the owner family itself, (3) shared vision and 
trust are direct determinants of decision-making quality, addressing decision quality and 
decision commitment within the management and the family. 
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Figure 4.5 The relational governance model 
 
 
Family Institutions and Social Interaction  
 
Changes in family institutions can affect the formation of social capital within a family 
business. Gilding (2000) noted that new family structures, increased individual auton-
omy, and democratization among family members have led to more open ended per-
sonal values and decreased solidarity among the family members. Like many other 
authors, Gilding proposed that new family institutions, such as family councils, could 
contribute the restoration of trust and communication within the families. For example, 
Habbershon & Astrachan (1997) found in an empirical study that collective encoun-
ters, i.e. family meetings, contribute to create shared beliefs, which represent the 
cognitive dimension of social capital.  
 
Family business governance addresses multiple relationships among the family, owners, 
and company management (e.g., Tagiuri & Davis, 1992; Lansberg, 1999). Thus, an im-
portant governance role is assigned to family institutions, or family systems and proc-
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esses that are intended to facilitate the familys links with ownership and business 
(Montemerlo, 2000; Neubauer & Lank, 1998). Neubauer & Lank pointed out that fam-
ily institutions range from highly informal to formal bodies, and of course tend to vary 
over time and in parallel with the familys life cycle, the ownership stage and the life 
cycle of the business (1998: 80).  
 
A variety of family institutions have been identified in the family business literature 
(e.g., Gersick et al., 1997; Lansberg, 1999; Neubauer & Lank, 1998; Ward, 1987). In 
smaller families, governance may be based on informal get-togethers, often on a daily 
basis (Neubauer & Lank, 1998). As the owner family grows, formal family meetings 
bring together the family members to discuss issues of mutual interest. Some families 
use family councils as a representative body of the family. Other families draft family 
plans that define the familys vision about the future of the business and rules for family 
members participation in the business. 
 
The various family institutions discussed above perpetuate the familys active owner-
ship and control of the firm. They also represent and integrate the needs and interests of 
the owner family members and link the family and the company. Family institutions 
also promote social interaction and cohesion among the owner family members, ena-
bling other forms of social capital (e.g., shared vision) to develop. These institutions 
also create opportunities for family members to meet and discuss issues, further leading 
to increased interactions among members of the owner family. It can be expected that at 
any given point of time, a family business has a certain combination of different family 
institutions, reflecting the developmental phase of the family business system. It is ar-
gued here that each family institution adds a level of social interaction because family 
institutions address different aspects of links between the family and business, and in-
volve different combinations of family members. 
 
Hypothesis 10. The higher the variety of family institutions, the higher is the level 
of social interaction among the owner family members. 
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Size of the family and social interaction 
 
The family is tied together by the interpersonal relationships among family members 
both horizontally across the family and vertically over succeeding generations. Strong 
social ties among the family members allow dilemmas of collective action to be re-
solved (Putnam, 1995: 67), they ensure the effectiveness of norms that help to achieve 
positive effects of social capital and constrain dysfunctional behavior (Coleman, 1990). 
Tie strength is further increased if the same people are linked together via multiple over-
lapping roles. These dense relationships are sometimes called multiplex networks 
(Boissevain, 1974; Portes, 1998). Family businesses often involve multiplex networks, 
because family members may participate in the family business system via multiple 
roles, both within the family and in the business.  
 
As the owner family grows larger, natural occasions for interaction diminish because 
the social ties between family branches are weaker and fewer than within the branches 
(Gersick et al. 1997), and it is more difficult for the extended family members to reach 
each others (Dubini & Aldrich, 1991). Similarly, Davis & Herrera noted that cohesion 
of the family is difficult to maintain because at every ownership stage, the physical 
proximity and the ease and frequency of interaction of family shareholders affects the 
flow of information (1998: 255), and that familial ties are generally weaker in larger 
families (1998: 258). Further, the familys participation in the business is likely to be 
relatively less in bigger families, contributing to further attenuation of social relations 
within the family. Also, organizational studies in contexts other than the family business 
have shown that group size is negatively related with the interaction between individual 
members (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992).  
 
Hypothesis 11. The bigger the owner family of the family firm, the lower is the 
level of social interaction among the family members. 
 
 
Social Interaction and Shared Vision 
 
As discussed earlier, shared vision refers to a familys members collective idea about 
the future of the firm, or a shared reasonable clear image of a desired future (Leavitt, 
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1986: 62). In a family business, a shared vision centers on the continuity of the com-
pany under the control of the family. This vision usually includes broad descriptions of 
desired business domains, desired growth rates, and financial performance (Collins & 
Porras, 1996). Due to their extended ownership horizon, family business owners have 
strong incentives to see that their resources are used efficiently (Harvey, 1999b). Harvey 
suggested that family relations and family members reciprocal involvement contrib-
utes to creating shared visions that foster long-term value creation. Effective family 
leadership is able to convey and transform the founders original vision into a shared 
vision among the succeeding generations (Hoy & Verser, 1994). Further, social interac-
tion facilitates family members collective learning and development of shared cogni-
tive schemas (Kogut & Zander, 1996). 
 
Family businesses are characterized by intense interactions among family members and 
between the family and management. These interactions facilitate intense information 
exchanges that promote cohesion among family members, enabling them to forge a 
shared view of the goals of the family business. Also, family meetings contribute to ex-
pressing shared beliefs (Habbershon & Astrachan, 1997). Further, Aronoff (1998) ar-
gued that family ownership is becoming less autocratic, and more a team effort, 
enabling family members to participate in formulating ownership goals. These claims 
are supported by the literature in social psychology, which indicate that interaction 
among people tends to increase their similarity in attitudes and opinions (Brown, 1986; 
Vroom & Yetton, 1973).  
 
Nahapiet & Ghoshal (1998) suggested that ongoing interactions create a shared lan-
guage and collective narratives that provide a common basis for shared cognition, which 
is important under conditions of uncertainty and complexity. These conditions are char-
acteristic of ongoing conversations about a family firms strategy and future. Shared 
vision develops incrementally, with repeated interactions as parties learn about each 
other (Yli-Renko et al., 2001). These factors indicate a positive association between so-
cial interaction and shared vision.  
 
Hypothesis 12. The higher the level of social interaction among the family mem-
bers, the greater is the shared vision among the owner family. 
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Social interaction and trust  
 
Social interaction in family firms is amplified by the interacting domains of the family 
and business. Trust formation is clearly important in such a setting, because trust can be 
seen both as a cause to and a result of successful collective action (Leana & Van Buren, 
1999; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). Indeed, formation of trust within the family business, as 
well as an ability to avoid distrust, are associated with lasting success through genera-
tions of the family business (LaShapelle & Barnes, 1998). Gulati (1995) posited that 
trust is incrementally developed with repeated interactions because the trusting parties 
learn about each other and build trust around norms of equity.  
 
Social interaction creates opportunities for information exchange and a series of infor-
mation exchanges shapes the parties experiences about how the information has been 
used. These experiences then influence the perceptions of trustworthiness (Krackhardt, 
1992). Social interaction also enables open and prompt communication needed to settle 
any differences, thus enhancing trust among parties (Das & Teng, 1998). Powell (1996) 
argued that trust is a learned attribute, and is therefore a result of ongoing interaction. 
He has also noted that without mechanisms and institutions that sus-
tain...conversations, trust does not ensue (1996: 63).  
 
The need for interaction among family members, so as to avoid disruptive conflicts be-
tween the family and business, has been a consistent theme in the family business litera-
ture (e.g., Neubauer & Lank, 1998). Lansberg argued that trust needed for collaboration 
requires regular maintenance, and that communication is the foundation on which 
trust is build (1998: 340). Otherwise, in wealthy extended dynastic families the basis 
for trust, cooperation, and moral authority erodes because of the dominance of the self-
interest and the loss of ancestors authority (Davis & Herrera, 1998: 253). Trusting re-
lationships within the family can be expected to influence trust forming between the 
family and management due to familys involvement in the family business through 
multiple roles.  
 
 Hypothesis 13. The higher the level of social interaction among the family mem-
bers, the higher is the trust among the owner family and top management. 
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Shared Vision and Decision Quality  
 
A shared vision can positively influence decision-making in complex and ill-structured 
business situations, because it promotes information sharing among stakeholders and 
encourages specialization and the production of high-quality information for the deci-
sion-making process. Strategic decisions are often complex and usually demand the 
analysis of large amounts of data (Eisenhardt, 1989b). When all constituents share a 
common vision, opportunism is reduced and the sharing of information increases within 
the firm (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1999; Ouchi, 1980). This provides for richer 
information for strategic decisions, improving decision quality. Also, a shared under-
standing of roles and related tasks promotes internal role specialization (Ring & Van de 
Ven, 1994), which improves the quality of information that different stakeholders make 
available for decision processes. The enhanced search heuristics resulting from higher 
specialization also improves the ability of the family firm to monitor and learn about its 
environment, further improving the quality of its strategic decisions. Also, when the 
amount of information to be analyzed is great, information overflow may impede, rather 
than facilitate, strategic decision making (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). A shared vision 
provides a common framework by which to assess available information and focus on 
relevant issues. 
 
Family business literature has identified many relational aspects, pertaining to long-term 
relationships, which support the positive association between the shared vision and de-
cision quality. Ward (1997) found that disparate family goals and values hinder fam-
ily business growth, and he proposed that defining family purpose, mission, and values 
is the most important best practice to ensure long-term family business growth. Also, 
family values, in addition to the shared vision, can provide guidance in decision making 
by defining desired and undesired forms of behavior (Adams, Taschian & Shore, 1996; 
Gallo, 1998). A similar view was presented by McCollom, who argued that common 
language and conceptual categories (1988: 408) help to integrate activities among the 
family and business. Finally, Aronoff & Ward (1995) noted that fusion of family goals 
and business strategy could be a unique strength of family firms (1995: 122).  
 
Hypothesis 14. The greater the shared vision among the owner family, the better 
is the strategic decision quality in the family firm. 
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Shared Vision and Decision Commitment 
 
The relational governance model addresses both the managements and the family 
members commitment to strategic decisions. Obviously, the degree of the separation of 
the family and management depends on the sizes of the family and the company, and 
the familys propensity to participate in the management. Because of the commitment of 
both groups is deemed important, they are modeled separately in the model. Also, fam-
ily members participation in decision processes may vary from full participation to no 
participation. The level of individual family members involvement in decision making 
depends largely on the number of different roles he or she holds in the family business 
system, personal motivations, and the degree of autocracy in decision making.  
 
Shared vision and cooperation are closely linked. Successful implementation of strate-
gic decisions requires the cooperation of decision-making teams. The level of coopera-
tion in implementing strategic decisions is determined by the decision-making teams 
commitment to the intended outcomes. Decision commitment implies the acceptance of 
choices and the intention to cooperate with others in their successful implementation. 
Gaining commitment to strategic decisions is a challenge because strategic decision 
processes are laden with conflicts. These conflicts create the requisite diversity of in-
formation necessary to map and analyze strategic options (Dooley & Fryxell, 1999). 
 
Leana & Van Buren (1999) proposed that a shared vision, reflecting associability with 
the organization, increases willingness and ability of the organizations members to 
subordinate their individual goals and actions to collective goals and actions. According 
to Leana & Van Buren, a shared vision provides the members with a rationale to be 
good agents, and to commit themselves to collective goals and actions, and defer their 
individual wants. Thus, family business participants commitment to strategic choices 
should be enhanced by the shared vision.  
 
Shared vision promotes coherence in stakeholders expectations and opinions on organ-
izational goals. Shared agreement on organizational goals also serves to strengthen 
stakeholders commitment to achieving these goals. Shared vision also promotes coop-
erative behavior through clarified role interactions (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Estab-
lished role interactions and related expectations concerning the behaviors, contributions, 
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and obligations of each stakeholder promote cooperative behaviors and commitment to 
jointly agreed decisions. Established role interactions and shared vision also reduce the 
threat of opportunistic behavior and help establish a social norm of reciprocity, which 
reinforces commitment to jointly agreed decisions (Uzzi, 1996). Absence of distrust re-
sulting from goal conflict and open discussions of decisions also improves managers 
perceptions of the fairness of the strategic decision process (Korsgaard et al., 1995), 
leading to greater commitment to the chosen strategy.  
 
A shared vision among the owner family demonstrates other constituencies that the 
family has a degree of cohesiveness, and they are able to cooperate towards realizing 
their collective ownership-related goals. Also, the shared vision provides broad guide-
lines for strategic decision making in the company. Shareholders clarified expectations 
and their willingness to cooperate can be expected to commit managers to strategic 
choices. 
 
Hypothesis 15. The greater the shared vision among the owner family, the 
stronger is the managements decision commitment in the family firm. 
 
The strategic choices should be well aligned with the shared vision. This is influenced 
by the family members multiple roles in the family business, and their ability to closely 
monitor strategic decisions in the company.  
 
Hypothesis 16. The greater the shared vision among the owner family, the 
stronger is the familys decision commitment in the family firm. 
 
 
Trust and decision quality 
 
Extant literature suggests that trust has a positive influence on decision making. For ex-
ample, Zand has noted that shared trust or lack of trust apparently are a significant de-
terminant of managerial problem-solving effectiveness (1972: 229). The arguments are 
based on improved information processing. As discussed earlier, high-quality decisions 
require a large amount of information. The amount and quality of information need to 
match the complexity of the problem (Leifer & Mills, 1996). As strategic decisions are 
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complex and ill structured, the information requirements are especially high. High lev-
els of trust result in relevant, comprehensive, accurate, and timely information (Zand, 
1972: 231) and it gives exchange partners the confidence to be open toward each 
other (Zaheer et al., 1998: 145). Also, a high level of trust can increase cooperation in 
decision-making teams by encouraging help-seeking behavior (Jones & George, 1998). 
 
On the contrary, decision making with low trust results in reduced information sharing 
and to increased politics that impede the flow of information (Dooley & Fryxell, 1999; 
Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988). A high level of trust may also promote cognitive con-
flict that is considered to potentially improve decision quality (Zaheer et al., 1998). 
More specifically, trust may promote desired cognitive conflict and reduce dysfunc-
tional affective conflict (Amason, 1996). This view is supported by Cosier & Harvey 
who noted that if mutual trust can be established and maintained, there is an opportu-
nity for more effective collaboration between family business members by encouraging 
and using constructive conflict to identify win-win outcomes (1998: 77). 
 
Cohesive decision-making groups may experience concurrence-seeking behavior, or 
groupthink, which reduces decision quality due to reduced effort to find new solutions 
(Janis, 1989).  Davis & Herrera (1998) proposed that social demands to reach consensus 
decisions might make family businesses particularly vulnerable to groupthink. Trust 
among family business members may reduce conformance pressures, and thus encour-
age the seeking of a wider range of alternative courses of action, leading ultimately to 
better quality decisions (Walsh, 1994). 
  
Hypothesis 17. The higher the trust among the owner family and top manage-
ment, the better is the strategic decision quality in the family firm. 
 
 
Trust and decision commitment 
 
Trust-related benefits are particularly potential in family firms due to the long-term na-
ture of exchange relationships. This is observed by Litz who succinctly noted that 
management researchers have committed the error of overlooking the role of tribal, 
and more specifically familial, factors that characterize the vast majority of firms, and 
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that given the demonstrated agency-related problems that frequently plague non-
family-held concerns, and the apparent trust-based advantages that appear more readily 
attainable by family firms, business researchers may be well advised to reconsider the 
potential significance of family influence within the firm (1997: 66). Similarly, Davis 
& Harveston noted that since family members would likely trust each other more than 
unrelated individuals, family firms may actually have a competitive advantage (1998: 
35). However, as family business literature has demonstrated, trust cannot be taken for 
granted in family firms, and distrust can be a very destructive force. Consistent with 
these overall claims that trust can be a source of competitive advantage in family firms, 
the following two hypotheses argue that there is a relationship between trust and com-
mitment to strategic decisions. 
 
Trust and cooperation appear closely linked. Although the direction of causality is not 
obvious (Gambetta, 1988), many scholars have argued that trust can improve coopera-
tion among individuals and groups (e.g., Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995). Gaining 
wide commitment to high quality decisions can present a challenge because reaching 
high quality decisions requires certain amount of cognitive conflict to generate the nec-
essary diversity of information (e.g., Dooley & Fryxell, 1999). If higher levels of trust 
are associated with an honest and open discussion atmosphere, then higher levels of 
trust are likely to result in discussions that are more related to the facts relevant to the 
decision making task and less related to interpersonal disputes. As was discussed ear-
lier, trust may induce cognitive conflict and reduce affective conflict. Amason (1996) 
found in an empirical study that cognitive conflict is positively related and affective 
conflict is negatively related to decision commitment. Thus, trust should increase deci-
sion commitment through positive effects on cognitive conflict and negative effects on 
affective conflict. Additionally, high levels of discussion related to decisions should in-
crease participants perceptions of high procedural justice in the decision-making 
process because of increased personal involvement in the process (Korsgaard et al., 
1995).  
 
Family business managers dependence on the owner family members varies greatly. 
When the owner-manager runs the business, the dependence is generally low. On the 
other hand, when managers are not major shareholders, the dependence is higher. In 
those cases, the managers are more vulnerable to behavior and decisions of the owner 
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family. Greater trust between the family and management implies that managers have 
confidence in the familys cooperation, and they can expect that the family will comply 
with jointly agreed commitments (Das & Teng, 1998; Cummings & Bromiley, 1996). 
This confidence in family support is likely to increase managers commitment to the 
successful implementation of strategic decisions. 
 
 Hypothesis 18. The higher the trust among the owner family and top manage-
ment, the stronger is the managements decision commitment in the family firm. 
 
Lack of information or incomplete information on the processes and outcomes of deci-
sion making implies the presence of risk to owner family members (Leifer & Mills, 
1996). Trust among the family and management suggests an acceptance of potential risk 
in decision making, thus increasing the level of commitment to strategic decisions (Ring 
& Van De Ven, 1992). Further, past research in procedural justice indicates when group 
members have fewer opportunities to influence a decision, the more sensitive they be-
come to procedures used to make the decision (Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996). Thus, 
when family members have less direct influence on strategic decisions, procedural fac-
tors, such as having a chance to use voice (Korsgaard et al., 1995), have stronger effects 
on the perceived fairness of the decision process. Empirical research has shown that 
procedural justice is positively related to trust and decision commitment in entrepre-
neur-investor relations (Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996). Thus, it can be expected that a 
high level of trust is associated with a high level of the familys decision commitment. 
 
Hypothesis 19. The higher the trust among the owner family and top manage-
ment, the stronger will be the familys decision commitment in the family firm. 
 
 
Mediating relationships in the relational governance model 
 
The direct effects hypotheses in the relational governance model linked family institu-
tions and family size with social interaction, and social interaction with shared vision 
and trust. Finally, both shared vision and trust were directly linked to all three decision-
making quality constructs, including decision quality, managements decision commit-
ment, and familys decision commitment. Additionally, the relational governance model 
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shown in Figure 4.6 suggests several indirect relationships among the variables. While 
family institutions are associated with increased shared vision and trust, and family size 
with decreased shared vision and trust, it is the social interaction that enables family in-
stitutions and family size to influence shared vision and trust. 
 
 Hypothesis 20. Social interaction mediates the effects of the variety of family in-
stitutions and family size on shared vision and trust. 
 
While social interaction is proposed to be related to the quality of a family firms strate-
gic decision making, it is the shared vision and trust that convert social interaction into 
strategic decision-making quality. 
 
Hypothesis 21. Shared vision and trust mediate the effects of social interaction on 
strategic decision quality, managements decision commitment, and familys deci-
sion commitment. 
 
 
4.4 Complementarity of contractual and relational governance  
 
The contractual and relational governance models, as developed above, were used to 
study the effects of governance on decision-making quality in two separate models. It 
can be expected that most of the family firms employ both contractual and relational 
modes of governance, as least to some degree. Yet, it is not clear what the relationship 
of these two different types of governance to the firm outcomes is. Literature has indi-
cated the possibility of both complementary and supplementary relationships between 
formal and social forms of control (Das & Teng, 1998).  
 
A large part of control-related literature has focused on formal, hierarchical control in 
organizations. A control system is effective to the extent that task performance meets 
or exceeds organizational goals and expectations (Leifer & Mills, 1996: 114). Thus, 
effective control implies that organizational goals and performance targets have been 
established. Control systems may include both measurement of performance and re-
warding people based on how well the agreed performance targets have been met (Jen-
sen & Meckling, 1998). Control structure is reflected through the whole organization, 
 122
from the very top level to the shop floor level. The effectiveness of formal controls 
depends on how accurately either the behavior of individuals or outcomes of those be-
haviors can be measured (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). Formal control seems to focus on 
preventing opportunistic and other non-productive behaviors, and on reducing associ-
ated agency costs.  
 
Formal control may not be the optimal form of control, especially when the exchange 
relationship has a long-term nature. Consequently, socially based control mechanisms 
have been proposed in the literature, as discussed throughout this dissertation (e.g., 
Ouchi, 1980; Ring & Van De Ven, 1992). Social controls such as norms of reciprocity, 
trust, and shared values have been argued to reduce control-related costs, and to in-
crease value-adding activities. For example, many authors have addressed the role of 
trust in reducing opportunistic behavior, and associated agency costs (e.g., Das & Teng, 
1998;  Nooteboom et al., 1997; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995).  
 
The relational type of governance may be more prevalent in small family firms because 
they are more likely to lack formal controls, and their social capital can be expected to 
be at a higher level due to smaller and more closely-knit families (Moores & Mula, 
2000). In such cases, social controls may substitute for formal controls. Similarly, Har-
vey noted that the key features of the family system that usually have the greatest in-
fluence on the operation of the firm are the preexisting, implicit, social ties among 
family members...[that] are often an effective substitute for the relatively more formal-
ized, explicit contractual relationships (1999a: 61). This may not be always true, how-
ever, because even smaller families do not always exhibit high levels of social capital. 
Lack of trust, for example, and associated family feuds have destroyed many family 
businesses (e.g., Kets De Vries, 1996).  
 
Further, formal controls such as board monitoring are not free from social influences 
(e.g., Westphal, 1999). In family firms, formal and social controls are intertwined in a 
complex way due to the multiple roles family members may have. Also, relational gov-
ernance that regulates the relations between the family and business may exhibit some 
formal aspects. For example, family members may explicitly agree in family proto-
cols or in family constitutions on the rules for ownership transfers (Montemerlo, 
2000). Interestingly, agreements among family members resemble relational contracts 
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known in law and economic literature (e.g., Williamson, 1985; Macneil, 1978). Rela-
tional contracts are flexible and are stated broadly, serving to set common expectations. 
Milgrom & Roberts described a relational contract as an agreement that frames the re-
lationship, and where the parties do not agree on detailed plans of action but on goals 
and objectives, on general provisions that are broadly applicable 1992: 131). 
 
Although social control may substitute for formal control to some degree, and vice 
versa, it is argued here that contractual and relational modes of governance are comple-
mentary. Social and formal controls partly serve different purposes, and they affect 
through different mechanisms. Contractual governance, as a task of boards of directors, 
is targeted to protect the shareholders interests, and to ensure the long-term viability of 
the company. By doing this, contractual governance focuses on the ownership-
management axis of family business governance. On the other hand, the relational gov-
ernance is about processes within the family addressing a variety of issues by which the 
family is linked to the company. As such, relational governance is a form of voluntary 
cooperation among a specific shareholder group, the family. The argument of comple-
mentarity of formal and social controls is consistent with Corbetta & Montemerlos 
proposition that family firms should find great interest in...the orientation to separate 
ownership, governance [i.e. boards of directors], and top management roles (1999: 
373). Also, family business literature argues that both business governance and family 
governance should be part of effective family business governance (e.g., Lansberg, 
1999).  
 
Hypothesis 22. Contractual and relational governance mechanisms have a com-
plementary effect on decision-making quality. 
 
 
4.5 Strategic decision-making quality and firm performance  
 
The contractual and relational governance models developed in previous sections exam-
ined various formal and informal governance mechanisms, and their effects on the stra-
tegic decision-making quality of a family firm. In this section, hypotheses on the effects 
of decision-making quality on the overall performance of a family firm are developed.  
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Strategy research has not been able to convincingly show how a firms strategic deci-
sion process and the firm performance are related. This is difficult because firm per-
formance is a function of a vast number of different factors that may mask the effects of 
strategic decision processes (Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Pearce et al., 1987). The strategic 
choice perspective assumes that managers attempt to optimize their companies finan-
cial performance (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). According to 
Dean & Sharfman (1996) managerial choice processes assume that variations in stra-
tegic decision-making processes lead to different strategic choices, which then lead to 
variations in decision outcomes.  
 
Measuring family firm performance is generally problematic. Although family-owned 
businesses range from small firms to large multinational enterprises, the majority of 
family firms are small, privately held entrepreneurial companies (Morris, Williams, Al-
len & Avila, 1997). Such firms are unwilling to disclose performance information, mak-
ing it difficult to obtain traditional financial measures of performance (Chandler & 
Hanks, 1993). Also, research has shown that firm performance is a multidimensional 
concept (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1996). This makes the firm performance evalua-
tion open to interpretation, depending on what definitions and measures of performance 
are used. Finally, the same performance level may be considered good in one company, 
while only mediocre in another company, indicating that performance cannot be as-
sesses without regard to contextual factors, such as aspired performance levels in a par-
ticular firm or industry-related factors.  
 
The present study examines the performance of family firms using two different, but 
related, dimensions of the overall firm performance, that is, profitability and growth. 
Both performance criteria are linked to a firms long-term viability and survival. Profit-
ability generally refers to how efficiently the firm is using it assets. Different financial 
ratios, such as return on assets or return on equity, may be used to assess a firms profit-
ability. Firm growth refers in this study to sales growth. Profitability and growth are re-
lated because a firms growth rate is partly constrained by profitability. Prolonged poor 
profitability translates into reduced financial resources, thus limiting the amount of in-
vestments that can be made to achieve growth.  
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In the present study, both profitability and growth are subjectively assessed in broad 
categories. This approach allows problems caused by unwillingness to disclose informa-
tion to be overcome, while not sacrificing precision of measurement to a significant de-
gree (Chandler & Hanks, 1993). Because performance can be seen as attainment of firm 
goals, literature on strategy has suggested that firm performance should be analyzed in 
the light of firm goals (Sanchez & Heene, 1997). Thus, the analysis of performance in 
this study takes into account the profitability and growth goals. Figure 4.6 illustrates the 
research model linking decision-making quality to the performance of a family firm. 
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Figure 4.6 Strategic decision-making quality and family firm performance 
 
Earlier strategic planning literature regarded strategy formulation and its implementa-
tion as separated, independent phases of the process. More recent strategic decision-
making literature claims that the strategy formulation phase, addressing the generation 
of decision alternatives and their evaluation against some criteria, affects both the qual-
ity of decisions, and their effective execution, often in a seemingly paradoxical way 
(Amason, 1996; Dooley & Fryxell, 1999; Korsgaard et al., 1995; Wooldridge & Floyd, 
1990). On the one hand, reaching high quality decisions is benefited by a divergence of 
opinions within the team, thereby providing more diverse information needed for better 
decisions. The needed cognitive conflict during the formulation phase may adversely 
affect team members consensus on the strategic choices, especially if there is non-
productive affective conflict among the team members. On the other hand, team consen-
sus on decisions is deemed crucial for successful execution of the decisions. Thus, solic-
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iting cognitive conflict, avoiding affective conflict, and building consensus all at the 
same time, seems to be the key to achieve decision quality and decision commitment, as 
well as improved firm performance.  
 
The contractual and relational governance models identified a number of factors that are 
hypothesized to have a positive effect on decision quality and decision commitment. In 
the models, neither decision quality nor commitment is specified in terms of any spe-
cific measure of firm performance. This allows the presentation of hypotheses on rela-
tionships between the three decision-making quality constructs and two firm 
performance constructs, under three hypotheses. 
 
As discussed earlier, high strategic decision quality is related to information processing 
capabilities during the planning phase. Information used in the identification, develop-
ment, and selection phases needs to match the complexity of the strategic challenge. 
This complexity may include both uncertainty, i.e. the state of not knowing, and ambi-
guity about meanings of a variety of information (Leifer & Mills, 1996). Strategic deci-
sions are always complex because they are non-routine, and involve the whole business 
system. Also, stakes are very high when strategic choices are committed. Bad choices 
may have severe impacts on the firms performance, or even on its very survival.  
 
To reach high quality strategic decisions, a large array of issues needs to be considered, 
such as the internal consistency of the strategy, consistency with the environment, re-
sources available, amount of risk, and time horizon (Tilles, 1963), stakeholder expecta-
tions (Freeman, 1984), organizational goals (Bourgeois, 1980), competitive forces in the 
industry and positioning of the firm (Porter, 1980; 1985), unique firm-specific resources 
(Penrose, 1959) and environmental dynamism  (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Given the number 
of issues that should be considered during the formulation phase, it is obvious that deci-
sion quality is related to rationality of the decision-making process. Although there are 
mixed results relating to how decision process rationality and firm performance are re-
lated (Eisenhardt, 1989b), researchers have found a positive relationship between ra-
tionality and firm performance (Priem et al., 1995a).  
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 Hypothesis 23. 
 Hypothesis 23a. The better the strategic decision quality, the higher is the profit-
ability of the family firm. 
Hypothesis 23b. The better the strategic decision quality, the faster is the growth 
of the family firm. 
 
Ultimately, superior firm performance hinges on the willingness of the whole organiza-
tion to commit to the strategic choices. It is often argued that consensus on choices con-
tribute to team members affective responses, such as commitment to decisions, which 
in turn lead to increased cooperation (Korskaard et al., 1995). As top-level managers are 
supposed to lead the organization, their motivations and behaviors are vital in mobiliz-
ing the rest of the organization. Middle management support is central because it is usu-
ally heavily involved in implementing strategy. Wooldridge & Floyd noted that 
uncommitted middle managers may give implementation a low priority, engage in 
foot-dragging, create implementation obstacles, or even sabotage strategy (1990: 
232). In a same vein, Amason noted that commitment is also important because it re-
duces the likelihood that a particular decision will become the target of cynicism or 
countereffort (1996: 125). In sum, commitment to strategic choices induces high levels 
of voluntary cooperation during the implementation, while uncommitted individuals 
may effectively obstruct the implementation. 
 
 Hypothesis 24. 
Hypothesis 24a. The higher the managements decision commitment, the higher is 
the profitability of the family firm. 
Hypothesis 24b. The higher the managements decision commitment, the faster is 
the growth of the family firm. 
 
Much of the family business literature has questioned the owner familys contribution to 
family business (Dyer, 1994). More recently, several authors have suggested that the 
family may be a source of sustained competitive advantage to the family firm (e.g., 
Davis & Herrera, 1998; Dyer & Handler; 1994). Specifically, it is proposed here that the 
familys decision commitment has a positive effect on the family firms performance. 
This may be so for several reasons. The owner family has the final control over the 
firms resources. If the family is not committed to strategic choices, it may not release 
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all the resources needed in the implementation of the selected strategy (Pfeffer & Salan-
cik, 1978). Also, lack of support from the family may reduce managements willingness 
to take risks, which are inevitably involved in executing strategies. Such risk aversion is 
likely to result in slowing down resource commitments needed in implementing strate-
gic decisions. Further, the familys low commitment to strategy may decrease outside 
managers motivation to stay in the company. The resulting managerial turnover can be 
expected to affect the implementation of strategies adversely.  
 
 Hypothesis 25. 
Hypothesis 25a. The higher the familys decision commitment, the higher is the 
profitability of the family firm. 
Hypothesis 25b. The higher the familys decision commitment, the faster is the 
growth of the family firm. 
 
 
4.6 Summary of hypotheses 
 
This chapter has developed three separate models with the aim of explaining the gov-
ernance structures found in family firms, and their effects on performance. The first 
model addressed contractual governance mechanisms, and their effects on strategic de-
cision-making quality. Similarly, the second model examined relational governance, 
and their effects on strategic decision-making quality. The third model focused on the 
relationship between decision-making quality and family firm performance in terms of 
profitability and growth. Additionally, a hypothesis concerning the complementary na-
ture of the relationship between contractual and relational forms of governance was pre-
sented. Figure 4.7 shows the combined research model with the hypothesized 
relationships among the constructs. The next two chapters of the present dissertation are 
devoted to the empical testing of the hypotheses. First, the methodology used for em-
pirical testing is described, then the results of the tests are presented. 
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Figure 4.7 Combined research model 
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5 METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter describes the methodology for testing the hypotheses presented in the pre-
vious chapter. First, the main statistical methods are reviewed. Then, the data collection 
process is described addressing the sample, questionnaire, and responses to the survey. 
After that, the operationalization of the models variables is explained. Finally, the reli-
ability and validity of the empirical analysis are discussed. 
 
 
5.1 Statistical methods 
 
5.1.1 Confirmatory factor analysis  
 
Factor analysis is an interdependence method used to identify a few factors that are re-
sponsible for the correlation among a group of variables. In this study, confirmatory fac-
tor analysis (Jöreskog, 1969) is used for analyzing the validity and reliability of 
theoretical, latent constructs that are measured by multiple indicators in questionnaire.  
 
In factor analysis each variable is expressed as a linear combination of underlying fac-
tors. The coefficients in the linear combination are called factor loadings; they deter-
mine how much each factor is responsible for the variation in each variable. Variance of 
each variable is divided into a specific component unique to the variable and a compo-
nent of variance shared with the factors. The factors are derived so that the first factor 
accounts for the largest share of the variation, the second factor accounts for the second 
largest share of the variation, and so on. The eigenvalue represents the variance ex-
plained by each factor. The objective of the factor analysis is to identify a set of com-
mon factors that are responsible for most of the total variation and that are fewer in 
number than the variables. Factors can be extracted by various computational methods. 
In this study, principal components analysis is employed for the factor extraction 
(Sharma, 1996).  
 
This study adopts the rule that factors having eigenvalues greater than 1.0 will be re-
tained. The reasoning of this rule is that factors with an eigenvalue of less than 1.0 
should not be used because it accounts for less than the variation explained by a single 
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variable (Aczel, 1999). A factor solution is not unique because there are an infinite 
number of solutions that satisfy the conditions of factor extraction. Factor rotation can 
be used for finding a factor solution that can be interpreted meaningfully. This study 
employs VARIMAX rotation whenever the factor solution indicates that more than one 
factor has an eigenvalue greater than 1.0. VARIMAX rotation is used for finding a fac-
tor structure where a variable loads highly on one factor only and loads lowly on other 
factors (Sharma, 1996). This study uses the common rule of thumb suggesting that 
measurement items with factor loadings of .6 or higher on the primary dimension and .4 
or lower on all other dimensions are retained.    
 
In the present study, confirmatory factor analysis is complemented by the use Cron-
bachs alpha coefficient (Bohrnstedt, 1983). Cronbachs alpha is used to assess internal 
consistency reliability, that is, consistency of results across measurement items. 
Calculation of Cronbachs alpha takes into account the number of measurement items 
and correlations between the items. It is recommended that Cronbachs alpha should be 
greater than .7 and, at least, it should not be less than .5 (Nunnally, 1978). 
 
 
5.1.2 Multiple linear regression analysis  
 
Multiple linear regression analysis is a statistical dependence method used for analyzing 
the relationship between one dependent and several independent variables. It can be 
used for testing hypotheses or predicting values for dependent variable. The generic 
form of the multiple linear regression model is  
 
yi = β0 + β1xi1 + β2xi2 +...+ βkxik + εi  
 
where y is the dependent variable, x1, . . ., xk are independent variables, β0, . . ., βk are re-
gression coefficients, index i refers ith case in the n sample observations, and ε is an er-
ror term, or disturbance term. In the use of linear regression, it is normally assumed that 
relationships are linear, error terms are normally distributed and have zero means, and 
that observations are independent. 
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The unknown parameters β0, . . ., βk are estimated by using a fitting criterion. The most 
common method of estimating the parameters of the linear regression model is the ordi-
nary least squares method (Greene, 1993), which minimizes the sum of squared residu-
als. The least squares method for estimating regression coefficients is used in this study 
when testing hypotheses on relationships among constructs.  
 
Statistical inference is inductive in its nature, i.e. propositions are considered true or 
false only with a certain probability. The significance level is a pre-selected probability 
of declaring the null hypothesis false when it is actually true. A significance level of .05 
is widely used in testing hypotheses; in social sciences a significance level of .1 is still 
acceptable (Frees, 1996). In this study, p values below a level of .05 are considered sig-
nificant, and below a level of .1 marginally significant. 
 
Individual hypotheses are examined by analyzing beta coefficients β0, . . ., βk. A hypothe-
sis is supported if the sign of the beta coefficient is as hypothesized and if the p-value of 
the coefficient is below the pre-selected significance level. A t-test is used to test 
whether the beta coefficient is significantly different from zero by comparing the critical 
t-value to the ratio of the estimated beta-coefficient to its standard error. Standardized 
beta-coefficients can be used for comparing the relative explanatory power of each in-
dependent variable.  A coefficient of determination R2 represents the proportion of 
variation in the dependent variable that can be accounted for by the variation in the in-
dependent variables. Mathematically, R2 = 1 - (error sum of squares)/(total error sum of 
squares).  The use of the ordinary least squares method automatically maximizes R2, 
because it minimizes the sum of squared errors. Adding new independent variables to 
the regression model may artificially increase the value of R2. To avoid this problem, an 
adjusted R2 is often used as an indicator of the explanatory power of the model. Ad-
justed R2 takes into account the number of independent variables and sample size. F sta-
tistics is used to evaluate the significance of the joint effect of all independent variables.  
 
A multicollinearity problem arises when two or more independent variables are linearly 
related, or approximately so. When independent variables are highly related, informa-
tion on how independent variables contribute to the variation in the dependent variable 
is reduced and the estimation of regression coefficients deteriorates. Multicollinearity 
between two variables can be detected by checking their correlation coefficient. It has 
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been suggested that the value of a correlation coefficient greater than .8 indicates severe 
multicollinearity (Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lütkephol & Lee, 1988; Kennedy, 1992). Mul-
ticollinearity can also be detected by analyzing variance inflation factors VIF, which 
indicate the degree an independent variable can be expressed as a linear combination of 
other independent variables. VIF value 1.0 means that the variable is orthogonal to all 
other independent variables, thus implying no multicollinearity. A VIF value greater 
than 10 indicates problematically high multicollinearity (Kennedy, 1992).  
 
The explanatory power of multiple regression analysis is directly affected by sample 
size. Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black (1995) have given guidelines for the minimum 
and maximum sample size. The minimum sample size is 20-30 observations, whereas 
large samples with more than 1000 observations can result in overly sensitive regression 
analysis. Additionally, Hair et al. (1995) have suggested a minimum of 15 to 20 obser-
vations per independent variable.  
 
The family firm governance model presented in the previous section implies several in-
direct relationships, in addition to direct effects between variables. More specifically, 
the type of indirect effect examined in this study is mediation. Figure 5.1 illustrates the 
basic sequence of variables in mediation, in which the effect of A on C takes place 
through B.  
                                 
A B C
 
Figure 5.1 Mediating relationship between A and C through B 
 
Variable B functions as a mediator when the following three conditions are fulfilled 
(e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986). First, variations in the independent variable A signifi-
cantly account for variations in the assumed mediator B. Second, variations in the inde-
pendent variable A significantly account for variations in the dependent variable C. 
Third, when variables A and B are entered simultaneously, the previously significant 
relation between A and C is no longer significant, while B has a significant effect on C. 
Mediation is partial when the relation between A and C is still significant in the third 
stage, but at reduced level compared to the second stage. 
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5.2 Data collection  
 
5.2.1 Population and sample  
 
The target population of the study consists of family businesses in Finland. No specific 
limitation was placed on the type of business. Generally, finding samples for family 
business research is challenging because there is lack national statistics on family busi-
ness (Chua, Chrisman & Sharma, 1999; Johannisson & Huse) This is also the case in 
Finland. Empirical research on family business has relied a lot on samples based on 
membership lists of professional associations or mailing lists of family business con-
sultants (Chua, et al., 1999).  
 
The sample of the present study is partly drawn from the membership directory of the 
Family Business Network Finland. This prominent and respected association is well 
connected to Finnish firms that identify themselves as family firms. Also, the new 
member recruitment list of Family Business Network Finland was used to form the 
sample. The list had been composed regionally by representatives of member companies 
and their contacts in local institutions such as chambers of commerce. These sources 
produced as comprehensive a list as possible of potential family businesses in Finland.  
 
The sampling of firms was based on three criteria, supporting the investigation of the 
research problem of the present study. First, firms in the sample had to be corporations, 
not any other form of organization. This allowed the testing of the hypotheses about 
boards of directors. Second, the firm had to be controlled by one nuclear or extended 
family. If several different families controlled a firm, then the influence of social capital 
embedded in a given family on strategic decision-making might be clouded. Third, the 
firm had to be at least five years old, in order to ensure it had already developed govern-
ance structures.  
 
The initial list of potential family businesses included 545 firms. During the first round 
of evaluation, 128 companies were excluded from the sample because they failed to ful-
fill the first sampling criterion: they were not corporations. This evaluation was based 
on multiple sources, including the list of firm names, trade registry, and directly con-
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tacting the companies. The initial screening of companies produced a base sample of 
417 family firms. 
 
 
5.2.2 Questionnaire  
 
Development of the questionnaire was guided by the theory presented in the previous 
section, extant literature on operationalizations of the constructs used in the hypotheses, 
and exploratory interviews with five family firm executives, three coming from a family 
business with concentrated ownership (three owners) and two coming from a family 
business with spread-out ownership (large extended family and non-family owners). An 
eight-page questionnaire had six main sections: (1) description of the business, (2) own-
ership structure, board of directors, and familys participation in the business, (3) strate-
gic decision making, (4) administration of the company, (5) relationships within the 
family, and among the family and company, and (6) size of the business and evaluation 
of financial results. The questionnaire consisted of 97 statement-style scaled items and 
49 various other types of questions, 146 questions altogether. The questionnaire is 
shown in Appendix A. 
 
After constructing the survey instrument, it was pre-tested with the help of seven family 
business executives. The test respondents were asked to read the accompanying cover 
letter and fill the questionnaire according to instructions. Then they were asked to check 
whether  
- the cover letter motivates the key informant to respond to the questionnaire 
- the answering instructions are clear 
- the question items can be understood and are unambiguous 
- the question items can be answered without too much effort 
- the question items feel intrusive 
 
The feedback from test interviews was then used to modify the questionnaire to increase 
the chances of a high response rate and of obtaining higher quality answers. Time to fill 
the questionnaire was around 30 minutes. The test respondents were excluded from the 
final mailing list. 
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5.2.3 Response pattern  
 
It was important to have respondents who had a good understanding of both the busi-
ness and the family. Therefore, whenever possible, the questionnaire was primarily tar-
geted at family members who were either the chairman of the board or chief executive 
officer. All 417 companies of the base sample were contacted by phone prior to sending 
the questionnaire. The purpose of the calls was to identify the respondents name, posi-
tion, and contact information. The information was obtained from the switchboard op-
erator or from a secretary. 
 
The survey questionnaire was send to 417 companies at the end of April 2000. The av-
erage response time was 27 days, while the minimum was 2 days and maximum 140. 
The response time was skewed towards a short response time as indicated by a median 
of 14 days. After about two weeks from mailing the questionnaires, a process of making 
follow-up calls to non-responding firms was started. Altogether, follow-up calls were 
made to 280 firms, up to three calls per one firm. The questionnaire was re-sent to 63 
firms. 
 
Table 5.1 shows the response pattern of the study. The final sample size was 402 firms, 
after 15 cases were excluded. 198 questionnaires were returned; the number of usable 
responses was 192. The effective response rate was thus 48%, which compares favora-
bly with similar studies (Fiegener et al., 2000; Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000). On aver-
age, responding firms were 57 years old, generated  58 million annual sales, and had 
7.3 owner family members. Respondents held senior leadership positions in their firms: 
57% were CEOs, 34% were board chairs, and 9% were other managers and board mem-
bers. In all cases but one, the respondent was a member of the owner family. Respon-
dents were dominated by males: 16 (8.3%) respondents were female. 
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Table 5.1 The response pattern of the study 
 Number of firms Percentage 
Number of firms the questionnaire was sent to 
Firms excluded from the sample after follow-up calls: 
- Family had sold the firm      4 
- Firm owned by two or more separate families   3 
- Respondent did not consider the firm as a family business 6 
- Firm was part of a company already in the sample  1 
- Firm was not a corporation     1 
 
Sample size  
 
Firms that did not return the questionnaire: 
- Respondent did not have time to respond   39 
- Respondent did not want to respond    40 
- No specific reason was detected for not responding  125 
Returned questionnaires   
Questionnaires non-usable because of an excessive amount of 
missing data 
Number of usable responses 
417 
(15) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
402 
 
204 
 
 
 
198 
(6) 
 
192 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100.0% 
 
50.7% 
 
 
 
49.3% 
 
 
47.8% 
 
 
5.2.4 Non-response analysis 
 
Mailed surveys have a possibility of response bias caused by low response rates (Fox, 
Robinson & Boardley, 1998). Even when the response rate is reasonable high in this 
study, response bias can still be problem. Response bias can be evaluated by comparing 
early and late respondents. It has been suggested that late respondents are similar to 
non-respondents, especially after repeated follow-up (Churchill, 1991). Response bias 
was evaluated by comparing the composition of early and late respondents, as shown in 
Table 5.2. No significant differences were found between early and late respondents in 
terms of sales, firm age, family size, or board size. These results suggest that response 
bias presents no problem in this study. 
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Table 5.2 Independent samples t-test of the difference between early (first 60) 
and late (last 60) respondents in terms of sales, firm age, owner family 
size, and number of members in the board 
 Early respondents 
Mean (s.d.) 
Late respondents 
Mean (s.d.) 
t df Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Sales 1997  
 ( millions) 
Firm age, years 
Family size 
Board size 
38.89 (53.65) 
 
56.23 (31.05) 
6.15 (6.36) 
4.30 (1.79) 
35.33 (73.45) 
 
51.48 (35.28) 
5.31 (6.01) 
3.85 (1.51) 
.29 
 
.78 
.74 
1.50 
110 
 
118 
117 
117 
.77 
 
.44 
.46 
.14 
 
 
5.3 Construct operationalizations  
 
This section discusses descriptive statistics and operationalizations of the constructs in 
the governance model. Confirmatory factor analysis was performed for every construct 
having more than one measurement item in order to achieve sufficient construct valid-
ity. Further, Cronbach alpha coefficients were calculated to check inter-item reliabilities 
of composite indices. Previously used operationalizations were used whenever possible. 
If an operationalization was not available from the past empirical research, a new one 
was developed based on the extant theoretical literature. All statement-style items fol-
lowed a Likert-scale response format ranging from 1 do not agree to 7 completely 
agree. When a measurement item did not follow this format, its scale was explained 
separately. The construct operationalizations are described in five sub-sections, address-
ing: 
 
- three dependent decision-making quality variables 
- four contractual governance variables 
- five relational governance variables 
- eight control variables for contractual and relational models 
- two dependent and two control variables for firm performance 
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5.3.1 Decision-making quality variables  
 
Decision-making quality variables consist of decision quality, managements decision 
commitment, and familys decision commitment. Confirmatory factor analysis was able 
to find a factor structure where measurement items loaded on their theoretically derived 
factors, i.e. constructs, as shown in Table 5.3. The table also shows the sources from 
which the items were adopted. The items were either adopted as such from previous 
studies or modified to fit the family business research context of the present study. 
 
Table 5.3 Measurement items and factor loadings for decision-making quality vari-
ables 
Measurement items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Decision quality 
Strategic decisions helped (help) the company achieve its objectives 
(Dooley & Fryxell, 1999) 
 
Strategic decisions are consistent with the family firm's vision  (Doo-
ley & Fryxell, 1999) 
 
Strategic decisions contribute to the overall effectiveness of the 
company (Dooley & Fryxell, 1999) 
 
Management’s decision commitment 
Top management is willing to put in a great deal of effort to see the 
strategic decisions be successful  
(Dooley & Fryxell, 1999; Mowday, Steers & Porter, 1979) 
 
The decisions were consistent with top managements priorities and 
interests (Amason, 1996;  Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990) 
 
Top management have supported strategic decisions that were made 
(Sapienza & Korskaard, 1996) 
 
Family’s decision commitment 
Family members support the strategic decisions  
(Sapienza & Korskaard, 1996) 
 
Family members are willing to talk strategic decisions up with other 
family members as being good for the company  
(Dooley & Fryxell, 1999; Mowday et al., 1979) 
 
Family members really care about seeing strategic decisions be suc-
cessful (Dooley & Fryxell 1999; Mowday et al., 1979) 
 
.78 
 
 
.62 
 
 
.88 
 
 
 
.19 
 
 
 
.19 
 
 
.19 
 
 
 
.24 
 
 
.01 
 
 
 
.18 
 
.25 
 
 
.36 
 
 
.08 
 
 
 
.79 
 
 
 
.77 
 
 
.86 
 
 
. 
.24 
 
 
.04 
 
 
 
.18 
 
 
.15 
 
 
.20 
 
 
.09 
 
 
 
.06 
 
 
 
.22 
 
 
.18 
 
 
 
.68 
 
 
.90 
 
 
 
.75 
Principal components analysis and VARIMAX rotation were employed for finding the optimal factor 
structure. Items loading more than .6 on a primary factor, and less than .4 on any other factor were re-
tained. 
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Decision quality. Decision quality was measured by three items reflecting the extent to 
which the strategic decisions made in the recent past helped in achieving the companys 
objectives, were consistent with the firms vision, and contributed towards the overall 
effectiveness. The Cronbach alpha for the construct was .74. 
 
Decision commitment. Both managements and familys decision commitment are based 
on the same concept of decision commitment. Operationalization of decision commit-
ment variables relies a lot on Mowday et al.s (1979) work on validation of organiza-
tional commitment measures. Both decision commitment variables were measured by 
three items, as shown in Table 5.4. The Cronbach alpha for managements decision 
commitment was .79 and for familys decision commitment .73. 
 
Table 5.4 shows the descriptive statistics of the decision-making quality variables. The 
means of the variables are above the midpoint of the scale indicating a decision-making 
quality perceived as high. Familys decision commitment has the highest spread of the 
values. 
 
Table 5.4 Descriptive statistics of the decision-making quality variables 
 N Min Max Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Decision quality 
 
Managements decision 
commitment 
 
Familys decision com-
mitment 
191 
 
191 
 
 
192 
4.00 
 
3.67 
 
 
1.67 
7.00 
 
7.00 
 
 
7.00 
5.87 
 
6.02 
 
 
5.48 
6.00 
 
6.00 
 
 
5.67 
.73 
 
.76 
 
 
1.10 
 
 
5.3.2 Contractual governance variables  
 
Inside ownership. According to the agency theory, ownership structure is the main vari-
able determining how decision-making processes are structured within a firm (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). Agency theory divides equity into two parts: inside equity owned by 
managers and outside equity held by any one outside of firm (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). It is the proportion of outside equity that reflects the degree of separation of 
ownership from management control. Operationalization of inside ownership is based 
on this distinction between inside and outside equity. Inside ownership was measured 
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by the proportion of the equity owned by inside family members, i.e. family members 
who served on the board or the top management team. Similar operationalization of 
ownership structure has been used by Kesner (1987) and Luoma & Goodstein (1999). 
 
Board composition. Dalton, Johnson & Ellstrand (1999) have suggested that there are 
different ways to measure board composition. Board composition was measured in the 
present study by the ratio of outside members divided by total board size (Daily & Dal-
ton, 1993; Johnson et al., 1993; Johnson & Greening, 1999). Outside members included 
individuals who were not part of the owner family or the firms top management team. 
 
Board monitoring and board counsel are both based on five statements, as indicated in 
Table 5.5.  Factor analysis confirmed two distinctive constructs. Board monitoring 
items address the companys strategic decision making as well as monitoring of finan-
cial performance. The Cronbach alpha coefficient for board monitoring was .87. Board 
counsel reflects the boards advice role to management, often on an informal basis. The 
Cronbach alpha for board counsel was .82. 
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Table 5.5 Measurement items and factor loadings for board monitoring and board 
counsel constructs 
Measurement items Factor 1 Factor 2 
Board monitoring  
Formal financial reports prepared by top management are reviewed in board 
meetings (Hitt et al., 1996) 
 
Return criteria such as return on assets, return on invested capital, and so forth 
are regularly followed-up in board meetings 
(Hitt et al., 1996) 
 
Cash flows are regularly followed-up in board meetings  
(Hitt et al., 1996) 
 
Return on investment of large individual investments are regularly monitored by 
the board 
 
The board closely monitors top managements strategic decision making  
(Westphal, 1999) 
 
Board counsel 
The board is actively involved in shaping the firm's strategy 
(Pearce & Zahra, 1991; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) 
 
The board and top management often discuss the firm's future strategic choices 
(Pearce & Zahra, 1991; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) 
 
Board members give top management plenty of counsel on the firm's strategy 
(Pearce & Zahra, 1991; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) 
 
Top management very often solicit board assistance in the formulation of corpo-
rate strategy (Westphal 1999) 
 
Directors provide advice and counsel in discussions outside of board meetings 
(Westphal 1999) 
 
.27 
 
 
.20 
 
 
 
.08 
 
 
.15 
 
 
.37 
 
 
 
.77 
 
 
.76  
 
 
.85 
 
 
.69 
 
 
.63 
 
 
.75 
 
 
.83 
 
 
 
.85 
 
 
.79 
 
 
.69 
 
 
 
.32 
 
 
.33 
 
 
.13 
 
 
.23 
 
 
.04 
Principal components analysis and VARIMAX rotation were employed for finding the optimal factor 
structure. Items loading more than .6 on a primary factor, and less than .4 on any other factor were re-
tained. 
 
Inside ownership and board composition have relatively skewed distributions, as indi-
cated in Table 5.6 for descriptive statistics. This can be expected because family firms 
commonly have active owners participation in the business. Both board functions have 
a full range of values from 1 to 7, while the mean values are above the midpoint of the 
scale. 
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Table 5.6  Descriptive statistics of the contractual governance variables 
 N Min Max Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Inside ownership 
Board composition 
Board monitoring 
Board counsel 
189 
187 
192 
192 
.00 
.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
7.00 
7.00 
.79 
.21 
4.95 
4.56 
.91 
.00 
5.20 
4.80 
.27 
.25 
1.44 
1.25 
 
 
5.3.3 Relational governance variables   
 
Relational governance variables reflect the social capital among the family and man-
agement. The focus of operationalizations is on social capital within the family, because 
the relational model mainly addresses governance of the family. Social capital within 
the management is explicitly addressed in the trust construct and implicitly in other con-
structs, except family size. 
 
Family institutions. Although the extant literature has recognized a need to govern the 
family, in addition to business, no prior operationalizations existed for family govern-
ance. Neubauer & Lank (1998) has used the term family institutions for describing 
various systems and processes used within a family aiming to improve the familys link 
to the company. This study relied on descriptive literature on family business govern-
ance for finding a set of family institutions (Gersick et al., 1997; Lansberg, 1999; 
Neubauer & Lank, 1998; Ward, 1997). Four such institutions were identified: informal 
and formal family meetings, family councils, and family plans. Respondents were asked 
to indicate whether they used each of these systems. Response categories were yes 
(coded 1) and no (coded 0). To develop a measure of family institutions, the four re-
sponses were summed. This index has a scale from 0 to 4 indicating the variety of dif-
ferent family institutions in use.  
 
Family size. Family size is operationalized simply as the number of share-owning fam-
ily members. The actual family size is often bigger than the number of owning family 
members. For example, spouses, children, and in-laws may be closely involved in the 
family business without any direct ownership stake. However, membership in a family 
is ambiguous. Therefore, ownership was used to determine the family size. 
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Three distinct social capital constructs were confirmed in factor analysis; factor load-
ings and measurement items are shown in Table 5.7. Shared vision was measured with 
three items reflecting the familys long-term goals on their business. The Cronbach al-
pha coefficient for shared vision was .77. Trust was measured with five statements indi-
cating the level of trust between the owning family and company management. The 
Cronbach alpha coefficient for trust was .80. Social interaction indicates the level of 
level personal and social ties between the owner family members. The construct was 
measured with three items, having the Cronbach alpha .69 
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Table 5.7 Measurement items and factor loadings for shared vision, trust, and social 
interaction constructs 
Measurement items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Shared vision 
Family members share the same vision about their firm  
(Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998) 
 
Family members are committed to the jointly agreed goals of the 
firm 
 
Family members agree about the long-term development objectives 
of the firm 
 
Trust 
Owners can rely on top managers without any fear that they will take 
advantage of them even if opportunity arises  
(Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998) 
 
Top management takes advantage of familys problems  
(Cummings & Bromiley, 1996), reverse coded 
 
Owner family tries to get the upper hand over top management 
(Cummings & Bromiley, 1996), reverse coded 
 
Top management tries to get out of its commitments  
(Cummings & Bromiley, 1996), reverse coded 
 
Top management  regards the owner family as reliable  
(Cummings & Bromiley, 1996) 
 
Social interaction 
Family members maintain close social relations  
(Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998) 
 
Family members know each other on a personal level  
(Yli-Renko, 1999) 
 
Family members seldom visit each other, reverse coded 
 
.30 
 
 
.16 
 
 
.21 
 
 
 
.66 
 
 
 
.83 
 
 
.70 
 
 
.78 
 
 
.64 
 
 
 
.08 
 
 
.20 
 
 
.06 
 
.85 
 
 
.67 
 
 
.83 
 
 
 
.34 
 
 
 
-.01 
 
 
.13 
 
 
-.02 
 
 
.32 
 
 
 
.37 
 
 
.31 
 
 
-.01 
 
.10 
 
 
.31 
 
 
.16 
 
 
 
.07 
 
 
 
-.02 
 
 
.04 
 
 
.19 
 
 
.27 
 
 
 
.76 
 
 
.65 
 
 
.83 
Principal components analysis and VARIMAX rotation were employed for finding the optimal factor 
structure. Items loading more than .6 on a primary factor, and less than .4 on any other factor were re-
tained. 
 
Descriptive statistics of the relational governance variables in Table 5.8 show that fam-
ily size varies from 1 to 118, having, on average, 7.30 share-owning family members. 
On average, 1.27 different family institutions were in use. Social interaction, shared vi-
sion, and trust all have a mean value above the midpoint of the scale. Similarly, Table 
5.4 indicated that decision-making quality variables have mean values close to or above 
six on the seven-point scales. This suggests that these measures may not fully tap the 
variation in the sample, which could reduce the model fit of the regression analyses.  
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Table 5.8  Descriptive statistics of the relational governance variables 
 N Min Max Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Family institutions 
Family size 
Social interaction 
Shared vision  
Trust 
191 
191 
187 
189 
189 
0 
1 
2.67 
2.67 
3.40 
4 
118 
7.00 
7.00 
7.00 
1.27 
7.30 
5.84 
5.45 
6.14 
1.00 
4.00 
6.00 
5.67 
6.25 
1.01 
12.12 
1.10 
1.01 
.83 
 
 
5.3.4 Control variables in contractual and relational governance models 
 
Multiple control variables were used to capture family, company and industry effects on 
the relationships depicted in the studys model: (a) control variables for family effects 
were the generation in charge, dual leadership, voting control, family on the board, and 
inside ownership, (b) control variables for firm-level effects included size and past per-
formance, and (c) the control for industry effects was environmental turbulence. Table 
5.9 indicates how the control variables were used among the contractual and relational 
governance models. 
 
Table 5.9 Control variables in contractual and relational governance models 
Control variable Contractual model Relational model 
Generation 
Firm size 
Past performance 
Dual leadership 
Voting control 
Family members on board 
Inside ownershipa 
Environmental turbulence 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
a Inside ownership is also an independent variable in contractual governance model. 
 
Generation. Generation in charge indicates which generation of the family is primarily 
in charge of the family business. The respondent was asked to indicate this by checking 
an appropriate box in the questionnaire. Generation in charge is likely to affect leader-
ship and decision-making styles (e.g., Lansberg, 1999). Therefore, it was used as a con-
trol variable. Generation in charge is similar to company age, which is often used to 
control for company effects in empirical research. Company age and the generation in 
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charge were highly correlated (r=.79 and p<.001). Because of a possible multicollinear-
ity problem, the company age was not used as a control variable. 
 
Dual leadership. Dual leadership in a company occurs when the same person holds both 
the chairman and chief executive officer positions. This is common in family compa-
nies, especially when they are younger and controlled by one or few owner-managers. 
Duality of leadership could increase the chief executive officers power and entrench-
ment, but also, it might enhance a unity of command in the firm (Finkelstein & 
DAveni, 1994). Therefore, dual leadership was included as a dummy control variable.  
 
Voting control. The owner familys total voting control is used as a control variable in 
testing hypotheses on contractual governance. A blockholders, such as a family, voting 
power is an important governance variable indicating the relative power of different 
shareholder groups (e.g., Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Voting control is operationalized 
as the owner familys votes divided by all votes.  
 
Family on the board. The number of family members on the board could affect the gov-
ernance of a family business. The family members presence on the board may enhance 
the level of social interaction and shared vision among some family members. There-
fore, the familys representation on the board was included as a control variable.  
 
Inside ownership. Just as the number of family members on the board can affect social 
capital among the family and management, so can the familys inside ownership. The 
familys inside ownership implies, by definition, that the family is actively involved in 
company management. This means that family members have increased opportunities 
for social interaction through work, in addition to family life. Thus, inside ownership 
was entered as a control variable in the relational governance model. 
 
Firm size. Firm size can influence managerial decision processes (Simons, Pelled & 
Smith, 1999). Managers and directors are less constrained by complex structures and 
processes in smaller companies (Dalton et al., 1999), which would influence the strate-
gic decision process. Some researchers have also found that company size is an impor-
tant correlate of board functions (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998). Therefore, 
company size is included as a control variable, using the natural logarithm of the com-
 148
panys sales in 1997 (Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand & Dalton, 1998; Johnson & Greening, 
1999). A logarithm is used because sales figures are highly skewed towards small sales 
volumes. 
 
Past firm performance. Past performance of firms affects the vigilance of the oversight 
on management (e.g., Finkelstein & DAveni, 1994). Respondents assessment of their 
companys average profitability during the last three years, measured as net profit di-
vided by sales, was used as a proxy for the firms past performance.  
 
Environmental turbulence. Turbulence may place pressure on senior managers deci-
sion-making processes (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Environmental turbulence was measured 
with two items. The measurement items and their factor loading are shown in Table 
5.10. The Cronbach alpha coefficient for environmental turbulence is .64. This control 
was used in testing relationships involving decision-making quality or board functions 
(monitoring and counsel).  
 
Table 5.10 Measurement items and their factor loadings for environmental turbu-
lence construct 
Measurement items Factor 1 
Your firm often needs to change its marketing practices to keep up with competi-
tors (Miller et al., 1998)  
 
Your firm must frequently change its operating procedures to keep up with com-
petitors (Miller et al., 1998)  
.88 
 
 
.86 
 
 
Table 5.11 shows the descriptive statistics for the control variables.  
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Table 5.11  Descriptive statistics of the control variables used in contractual and 
relational governance models 
 N Min Max Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Generation 
Firm sizea 
Past performance 
Dual leadership 
Voting control 
Family members on board 
Inside ownership 
Environmental turbulence 
192 
181 
190 
190 
192 
191 
189 
191 
1.00 
.15 
1.00 
.00 
.30 
.00 
.00 
1.00 
5.00 
2001.44 
5.00 
1.00 
1.00 
10.00 
1.00 
7.00 
2.18 
58.51 
2.17 
.21 
.94 
2.86 
.79 
4.15 
2.00 
14.30 
2.00 
.00 
1.00 
3.00 
.91 
4.00 
.99 
175.47 
1.08 
.41 
.14 
1.38 
.27 
1.41 
a Sales in 1997, million  in 1997. 
 
 
5.3.5 Firm performance variables  
 
The two variables indicating a family firms overall performance are profitability and 
growth. Operationalizations of firm performance were based on the key informants 
subjective self-assessment, because no actual profitability or growth data were available 
through secondary sources. Table 5.12 shows the descriptive statistics for firm perform-
ance variables. 
 
Profitability.  The profitability index was based on two measurement items. The first 
item asked how well the objectives concerning the return on equity has been achieved. 
The scale for the item was from 1 to 7 with the following anchors: 1 = lagging badly 
behind the goals, 4 = goals have been met reasonable well, and 7 = goals have been 
met completely. The second item asked to evaluate the firms return on equity relative 
to other companies in the same industry on a scale from 5 to 1, by ranking their business 
in top 20%, next 20%, mid 20%, lower 20%, or lowest 20%. Because the two items 
used different measurement scales, standardized values (z-scores) were used in the 
analyses. Factor loadings for both items were .92. The Cronbach alpha coefficient was 
.82 for the profitability index.  
 
Growth. The growth index was formed in a way similar to the profitability index by us-
ing two measurement items, one measuring how well the growth goals have been met 
and the other measuring the relative growth of the firm compared to other companies in 
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the same industry. The two growth items were measured on the same scales as the two 
profitability items; one scale was from 1 to 7 and the other scale from 5 to 1. Factor 
loadings for both standardized items were .89. The Cronbach alpha coefficient was .72 
for the growth index.  
 
Profit and growth orientation. A companys orientation towards profit and growth gen-
eration was used as control variables in regression equations for testing the hypotheses 
on the decision-making qualitys effect on firm performance. The respondents were 
asked to assess the importance of various objectives, including profitability and com-
pany growth, in two different ways. First, they were asked to rate eleven different objec-
tives according to their importance on a scale from 1 (not important at all) to 7 (the most 
important). Second, the respondents were asked to allocate a total of 100 points to four 
different objectives according to their relative importance, so that the most important 
objective would receive the most points, the next most important objective would re-
ceive the second most points, and so on. Because the scales were different, the analyses 
were completed with standardized values. The factor loading for the two profit orienta-
tion items were .83 and the Cronbach alpha was .55. For growth orientation items, fac-
tor loadings were .87 and the Cronbach alpha was 67. The Cronbach alphas are at 
relatively low levels, but still acceptable.  
 
Table 5.12  Descriptive statistics of the firm performance variables and related 
control variables 
 N Min Max Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Profitability 
Growth 
Profit orientation 
Growth orientation 
192 
192 
192 
192 
-2.56 
-2.43 
-2.87 
-1.71 
1.34 
1.54 
2.26 
3.49 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.20 
.04 
-.08 
-.09 
.93 
.89 
.83 
.87 
Standardized values of the measurement items are used in the analyses. 
 
 
5.4 Reliability and validity analysis 
 
There are two primary criteria upon which any theory may be evaluated: its falsifiability 
and its usefulness in explaining and predicting phenomena (Bacharach, 1989). Falsifi-
ability of a theory allows its empirical refutation. According to one view, hypotheses 
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cannot be claimed true, they can only be supported, or corroborated, by subjecting 
them to various tests (Popper, 1959). Validity is concerned with the quality of the theo-
retical propositions and hypotheses, as related to their empirical testing. Validity can be 
addressed on several levels of analysis, each contributing to important aspects of the 
validity. In this study, validity is assessed on three main levels: validity of measure-
ment, validity of hypothesized relationships, also referred to as internal validity, and 
generalizability of the results, also referred to as external validity (e.g., Dooley, 
1995). Reliability is concerned with errors in data collection. Good reliability of an em-
pirical test is a prerequisite for good validity. Thus, reliability of the study is discussed 
before addressing the validity issues. 
 
 
5.4.1 Reliability 
 
Reliability refers to the degree to which results are consistent across repeated measure-
ments (Carmines & Zeller, 1979). Measurement is defined here as the assignment of 
numbers to observed phenomena according to certain rules (Bohrnstedt, 1983: 70). The 
observed value of the variable of interest is thought to consist of its unobserved true 
value and measurement errors. Reliability is related to random measurement errors. In 
repeated measurements, the random errors are assumed to cancel each other out. Opera-
tionally, reliability is expressed as the ratio of true score (nonrandom) variance to ob-
served variance (e.g., Bohrnstedt, 1983). The use of repeated measurements in survey 
research is rarely feasible for the purpose of estimating reliability. In survey research, 
reliability can be assessed quantitatively and qualitatively by means other than repeating 
the same test (Babbie, 1990).  
 
The main method of improving and assessing the reliability of data in survey research is 
to use multiple items to measure a construct within a single test (e.g., Dooley, 1995). 
The Cronbach alpha is a commonly used reliability coefficient used to estimate the reli-
ability, or internal consistency, of multi-item constructs. The value of Cronbach alpha is 
determined by the number of measurement items used in defining the constructs and the 
average correlations of each item with every other. Cronbach alpha greater than .7 indi-
cates good internal consistency reliability for a multi-item construct (Nunnally, 1978). 
Dooley (1995) has suggested that measures with reliability less than .5 should be 
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avoided, while measures with modest reliability, from .5 to .7, may be used. Low reli-
abilities contribute to underestimating relationships between the constructs, an effect 
called attenuation (Nunnally, 1978).  
 
The majority of the studys constructs were operationalized using multiple items. Table 
5.13 summarizes inter-item reliabilities of the studys 13 constructs having more than 
one measurement item. Internal consistency of multi-item constructs is generally very 
good. One social capital variable and three control variables had a modest (more than .5 
but less than .7) internal consistency: social interaction (.69), environmental turbulence 
(.69), profit orientation (.55), and growth orientation (.67).  
 
Table 5.13 Summary of Cronbach alpha reliability coefficients and number of meas-
urement items for multi-item constructs 
Construct Cronbach 
alpha 
Number of 
measurement 
items 
N 
Decision quality 
Managements decision commitment 
Familys decision commitment 
Board monitoring 
Board counsel 
Social interaction 
Shared vision  
Trust 
Environmental turbulence 
Profitability 
Growth 
Profit orientation 
Growth orientation 
.74 
.79 
.73 
.87 
.82 
.69 
.77 
.80 
.69 
.82 
.72 
.55 
.67 
3 
3 
3 
5 
5 
3 
3 
5 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
191 
191 
192 
192 
192 
187 
189 
189 
191 
192 
192 
192 
192 
 
In addition to inter-item reliability, the reliability of empirical data sources is of con-
cern. The design of the questionnaire went through several revisions and a pilot test to 
make the answering as easy as possible, thereby contributing to the reliability of the 
empirical data. Whenever possible, construct operationalization was based on an objec-
tive measure, leaving only a small amount of room for subjective assessment. However, 
this was only partially possible because many constructs in the models are inherently 
perceptual, thus exposing them to personal opinion. The yield of data in the question-
naire was good, as indicated by the small amount of missing data. For all the 24 inde-
pendent, dependent, and control variables, the amount of missing data was 0.93%. 
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This study relied on a single key informant per firm for obtaining self-reported data. 
One reason for this is that the respondent needed to have a good understanding of both 
family-related and business-related issues (Kumar, Stern & Anderson, 1993). Usually, 
very few persons in a company have insight into both areas. As discussed earlier, in 
most cases, the respondent was a family member who held the chair or the chief execu-
tive officer position, or both. Another reason for using self-reported data is the shortage 
of objective sources of data on family businesses.  
 
Using self-reported data from a single respondent raises the possibility of common 
method variance, i.e. significant relationships are caused by methodological bias instead 
of true association between variables (Spector, 1987). To further check the reliability of 
the survey data, 144 telephone interviews were conducted with 72 randomly selected 
respondent firms, consisting of two interviews in each company. All follow-up inter-
views were conducted with respondents other than the original respondent. Interviewees 
were selected so that one individual was a non-family top management team member 
while the other was a family member actively involved in the business. The interviews 
covered the studys eight key constructs, which are shown in table 5.15. The constructs 
in interviews included all three dependent decision-making variables, two contractual 
governance variables addressing the board functions, and three social capital variables 
used in the relational governance model. All the variables had multiple measurement 
items in the original survey instrument and the same response format from 1 to 7. The 
original multiple measurement items in the survey questionnaire could not be used in 
the phone interviews. If the original items were used, then the interview would have 
beccme prohibitively time consuming. Instead, one-item summary operationalizations 
per construct were used as proxies for the original measures. The phone interviews 
lasted from 10 to 15 minutes each. The phone interviews were conducted between No-
vember 2000 and February 2001. The average time lag between the original survey and 
phone interviews was approximately 6 months.  
 
Correlations for all the eight constructs between the two phone interviews were signifi-
cant, as shown in Table 5.14. Board monitoring and board counsel had the highest num-
ber of significant correlations: all three possible correlations were significant for both 
constructs. Social interaction had two significant correlations: one between the phone 
interviews and the other between the original survey-based score and interview with a 
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family member. There were several non-significant correlations between the original 
survey-based score and interview scores. These non-significant correlations can partly 
be explained by the long time difference between the survey and the phone interviews, 
and the different operationalization of the constructs. Using one-item proxies in inter-
views in place of multi-item operationalizations used in the survey was likely to cause 
additional errors in the data. Also, there was a considerable time difference between the 
mailed survey and phone interviews, on the average about six months. This may have 
caused further errors in data. On the other hand, the two phone interviews per company 
were methodologically identical and occurred within a few days of each other, and pro-
vided consistent results for the measures. In sum, these results give some confidence 
that common method variance did not cause the significant relationships reported in the 
study. To further reduce the possibility of common method variance, previously vali-
dated measurement items were used whenever possible 
 
Table 5.14 Correlations among two phone interviews and original survey score 
 Phone interview 1a 
and phone inter-
view 2b 
Original survey 
score and phone 
interview 1 
Original survey 
score and phone 
interview 2 
Decision quality .33** -.10 .21 
Managements decision commitment .33** -.09 .12 
Familydecision commitment .24* -.02 .14 
Board monitoring .53** .26* .25* 
Board counsel .36** .37** .28* 
Shared vision .39** .08 .12 
Social interaction .27* .12 .44** 
Trust .26* -.10 .14 
** p < .01; * p <.05; two-tailed test; N = 72 
a Phone interview 1 was conducted with a management team member 
b Phone interview 2 was conducted with a family member 
 
 
5.4.2 Validity  
 
Validity of measurement refers to the extent to which a set of operations measures what 
it is supposed to measure (e.g., Bohrnstedt, 1983). While reliability focuses on the per-
formance of empirical measures, validity is more theoretically oriented because its ade-
quacy is viewed in relation to the purpose for which it is being used. Good reliability is 
a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for good validity. Validity of measurement is 
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often described under three topics: Criterion-related validity, content validity, and con-
struct validity (e.g., Babbie, 1990; Bohrnstedt, 1983; Carmines & Zeller, 1979; Dooley, 
1995; Litwin, 1995). Sometimes, face validity is regarded as one type of validity. Face 
validity is a casual assessment of item appropriateness by untrained judges. In the fol-
lowing, criterion-related validity, content validity, and construct validity are discussed 
in the light of the present study. 
 
Criterion-related validity indicates how well scores of a test relate to another variable, 
the criterion. The scores of the criterion variable are not directly obtainable, because it 
would be too expensive or otherwise impracticable, or even impossible. Therefore, the 
scores of the test are used as a substitute for the criterion. Criterion-related validity is 
assessed by the correlation between the test measure and the criterion, which is external 
to the test and which has been previously validated. Unlike content and construct valid-
ity, criterion-related validity is empirical in nature because both the test measure and 
criterion are based on empirical test. Criterion-related validity is broken into concurrent 
and predictive types, depending on whether the criterion exists in the present, or 
whether its future value is predicted.  
 
Criterion-related validity has been used mainly in education and psychology for analyz-
ing various selection processes and tests (Carmines & Zeller, 1979). Its use in survey 
research has been less because there is lack of empirical criteria against which the valid-
ity can be assessed (Bohrnstedt, 1983). That is the case with the present study since the 
measures are mainly related to theory-based, abstract constructs instead of other empiri-
cal variables. Firm performance is assessed in broad categories by using self-reported 
performance proxies for past performance (control variable), profitability, and growth. 
Broad firm performance categories are often preferred to accurate and detailed perform-
ance data, because executives are unwilling to disclose this information (Chandler & 
Hanks, 1993). Criterion-related validity could be used to assess the validity of firm per-
formance measures in the present study if correlations between self-reported and objec-
tive performance data were available from previous studies. However, this data was not 
available.  
 
Content validity is a subjective assessment of the appropriateness of measurement items 
as judged by knowledgeable reviewers. It refers to the degree to which a measure covers 
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the range of meanings included within a concept (e.g., Babbie, 1983). The items se-
lected to measure the concept should represent all the important dimensions of the con-
cepts domain. Content validity is not a quantitative measure, rather it is a qualitative 
expert opinion. Content validity has limited use because there is no agreed criterion for 
determining the extent to which a measure has attained content validity. Rather, content 
validity is regarded as a process that helps to achieve construct validity (Babbie, 1990; 
Bohrnstedt, 1983). The present study followed the guidelines provided by Bohrnstedt 
(1983) for enhancing content validity. First, extant literature was searched to determine 
how other authors have used the concept. Based on this review, the concepts, or con-
structs, were defined. Second, the domain of the concept was stratified into its major 
facets and several previously used measurement items were researched and adopted to 
reflect, whenever possible, the meanings of the different facets. Third, the measurement 
items were pre-tested with persons similar to those persons to whom the questionnaires 
were targeted. 
 
Construct validity is concerned with how well a measure reflects a theory-based con-
struct and whether a measure relates to other observed variables in a way that is consis-
tent with theoretically derived predictions (Bagozzi, Yi & Phillips, 1991; Bollen, 1989). 
Construct validity is sometimes divided into convergent and discriminant validity 
(Campbell and Fiske, 1959). Convergent validity refers to the degree to which multiple 
attempts to measure the same concept are consistent, while discriminant validity refers 
to the degree to which measures of different concepts are distinct. In the present study, 
construct validity was strengthened and checked by (1) carefully defining constructs and 
using previously validated measurement items whenever possible, (2) confirmatory fac-
tor analysis, and (3) examining correlations between variables (Bohrnstedt, 1983; Bol-
len, 1989; Carmines & Zeller, 1979).  
 
The confirmatory factor analysis was used to confirm unidimensionality of constructs. 
Factor analysis identified one construct (factor) for each set of measurement items in-
tended to measure that construct. Also, discriminant validity was supported in three 
separate factor analyses, in which theoretically derived sets of measurement items were 
loaded on different factors, according to their construct definitions. As discussed in the 
construct operationalization section, factor analysis distinguished the following con-
structs: (1) decision quality, managements decision commitment, and familys decision 
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commitment, (2) board monitoring and board counsel, and (3) social interaction, shared 
vision, and trust. 
 
Convergent validity is supported by significant correlations between different constructs 
reflecting a common broader concept. Correlations between the variables are reported in 
Tables 6.12, 6.17, 6.23, and 6.25 in Chapter 6 when addressing the results of the em-
pirical study. Three social capital constructs, including social interaction, shared vision, 
and trust, have significant positive correlations between themselves. Family size has a 
negative relation, although not significantly in two cases, to these social capital vari-
ables, as can be expected. Also, family size and number of family institutions in use are 
significantly related. In the contractual model, board monitoring and board counsel are 
significant related. Finally, all the three dependent decision-making quality variables 
have positive and significant correlations. Discriminant validity is supported when two 
variables correlate significantly with each other, and they correlate significantly differ-
ently with at least one third variable. All pairwise significant correlations were exam-
ined against this criterion. All those correlations had at least one different correlation 
with a third variable. These results give further confidence in the construct validity. 
 
The validity of measurement, as discussed above, addressed the question of how the 
measures correspond to the theoretical, unobserved constructs. Internal validity is con-
cerned about the quality of hypothesized relationships between the constructs. Science 
is ultimately interested in findings answers to why questions, i.e. finding causal rela-
tionships among constructs. Usually, three conditions are required for causality: 
association between constructs, temporal difference between the cause and effect, and 
exclusion of rival hypotheses. A correlational study can partially support causality by 
demonstrating association between variables, but it does not reveal the direction of cau-
sality. When multivariate techniques, like multiple regression analyses and structural 
equation modeling, empirically support the hypotheses, then internal validity receives 
support. Results concerning the hypothesized relationships are presented in the next sec-
tion. External validity, or generalizability of the results, is discussed in the last section 
of the study. 
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6 RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents the results of the analyses for testing the hypotheses of the re-
search model. First, the sample firms are described for the purpose of providing back-
ground information for the analysis. The descriptive statistics in the chapter focuses on 
both the general characteristics and the governance-related features of the firms. Then, 
the results of regression analyses are presented in four sections. First, the contractual 
and relational governance models are addressed in separate analyses. Then, the joint ef-
fects of the contractual and relational governance mechanisms on decision-making qual-
ity are reported. Finally, the relationships between the decision-making variables and 
firm performance are addressed. 
 
 
6.1 Descriptive statistics of the sample firms  
 
6.1.1 Age and size  
 
The youngest firm in the sample was six years old, while the oldest was 164. Table 6.1 
shows that firm ages since the founding of the firms were relatively evenly distributed 
within the 1 to 99 year age bracket.   
 
Table 6.1 Age of the sample firms 
Age in years since founding Number of firms Percent of non-missing 
0 to 24 
25 to 49 
50 to 74 
75 to 99 
100 to 124 
Over 125 
42 
51 
36 
43 
13 
6 
22.0 
26.7 
18.9 
22.5 
6.8 
3.1 
 
N Mean Median Std .dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
191 56.70 52.00 34.11 6 164 .62 -.01 
 
Some companies were founded before they came under the control of the present fam-
ily. The respondents were asked in which year the company was founded and since 
when the company had been under the familys control. In 35 five cases out of 192 
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(18.2%), family control started after the founding of the company, i.e. the family ac-
quired an existing business. At the time of the acquisition, the average age of the com-
pany was 28.2 years. Additionally, in four cases, the respondent did not specify the 
exact year of acquisition. Thus, approximately one fifth of the companies in the sample 
were not founded by a member of the owner family, but acquired as an established 
business. 
 
Size distributions of the sample firms are illustrated in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 in terms of the 
number of employees and sales revenue in 1999.  
 
Table 6.2 Size of the sample firms as measured by the number of employees at 
the end of 1999 
Number of employees Number of firms Percent of non-missing 
0 to 24 
25 to 49 
50 to 99 
100 to 199 
200 to 499 
500 to 999 
1000 to 1999 
2000 and over 
35 
27 
31 
35 
25 
17 
7 
7 
19.0% 
14.7% 
16.9% 
19.0% 
13.6% 
9.2% 
3.8% 
3.8% 
 
N Mean Median Std .dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
184 447.30 98.50 1772.36 2 22600 10.99 135.23 
 
In 1999, the average number of employees was 447.30 and the average sales revenue 
was  66.32  million. Both size distributions are skewed towards the small end and have 
high skewness and kurtosis values. 69.6 % of the companies employed less than 200 
employees and 74.8% had sales revenues less than  50 million. Median values were 
98.50 for the employees and  16.23 million for the sales revenue. Variability of com-
pany size was high, as indicated by the standard deviations for both size distributions. 
The sample included some large family enterprises also. Fourteen companies (7.6%) 
employed more than 1000 people, while nineteen companies (10.2%) had more than  
150 million sales revenue. 
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Table 6.3 Size of the sample firms as measured by the sales revenue in 1999 
Sales revenue in 1999 
Million Euros 
Number of firms Percent of non-missing 
0 to 49.9 
50 to 99.9 
100 to 149.9 
150 to 199.9 
Over 200 
139 
22 
6 
6 
13 
74.8% 
11.8% 
3.2% 
3.2% 
7.0% 
 
N Mean Median Std .dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
186 66.32 16.23 205.13 .12 2401.12 8.71 92.84 
 
 
6.1.2 Industries 
 
There were no restrictions placed on the type of industry for the sample firms in the 
study. Because only corporation form of companies were included in the sample, certain 
kinds of businesses did not appear. For example, there were no farms because they are 
commonly carried on as independent trade. Table 6.4 shows the main businesses of the 
sample firms. The categorization is based on the respondents own description of the 
companys main business. The businesses in Table 6.4 are organized so that all busi-
nesses involving some kind of production are listed first, then all trading-type busi-
nesses are listed, and finally, service businesses are listed. Additionally, three 
companies were described as multi-business companies by the respondents, called as 
conglomerates in the table. The sample consists of a versatile mix of businesses. How-
ever, it is noteworthy that the sample does not include many companies based on new 
technologies, like communications technology. This may be due to two reasons. First, 
family companies may generally operate in more traditional industries. Second, one 
sampling criterion required that the company had to be at least five years old. 
 
The respondents were also asked to indicate how many distinct industries the company 
operates in. Responses from 181 companies were received to this question. The results 
are as follows: 94 companies (52%) operate only in one industry, 37 companies (20%) 
operate in two industries, 26 companies (14%) operate in three industries, 14 (8%) 
companies operate in four industries, and 10 companies (6%) operate in five or more 
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industries. These results suggest that the firms in the sample were relatively focused on 
their main businesses. 
 
Table 6.4 Main businesses of the sample firms 
Business Number of firms Percentage of firms 
Production-related businesses  
 Metal and engineering productsa 
 Other manufacturingb 
 Wood-based productsc 
 Construction and construction materials 
 Textile products 
 Food productiond 
 Publishing and printing 
Trading-related businesses 
 Car retailing 
 Technical wholesale 
 Other wholesale and retailing 
Service-related businesses 
 Transportatione 
 Services to businessf 
 Services to consumers 
Conglomerate 
Total 
126 
36 
17 
19 
14 
12 
19 
9 
36 
10 
12 
14 
27 
10 
13 
4 
3 
192 
65.6% 
18.7% 
8.9% 
9.9% 
7.3% 
6.2% 
9.9% 
4.7% 
18.7% 
5.2% 
6.2% 
7.3% 
14.1% 
5.2% 
6.8% 
2.1% 
1.6% 
100% 
a Machinery, subcontracting and component manufacturing, metal products, steel construction  
b Electronic equipment, plastic products, small supplies, stone-based products, green-house products 
c Sawmilling, wood-based panels, furniture, log houses 
d Multiple products, fresh food, dairy products, bakery products, meat processing, beer and soft drinks 
e Ground transportation, shipping 
f Advertising, management consulting, real estate management, accounting, leasing, cleaning 
 
 
6.1.3 Location of firms 
 
Finland consists of five provinces in mainland Finland and the one semi-autonomous, 
Swedish speaking province of Åland Islands that lies off the southwest coast of Finland. 
The total population of Finland is approximately 5.2 million and the total area is 
338,000 square kilometers. The sample firms of the study cover all the provinces in 
Finland, except Åland. Table 6.5 shows the distribution of sample firms among the five 
provinces. For comparison, the distribution of population is also shown.  
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The distribution of firms roughly follows the distribution of population of Finland. 
Southern Finland is the most industrialized and populated province. Also, the Helsinki 
metropolitan area is located in the province of Southern Finland, often being the loca-
tion for the head offices of the larger companies in the sample. These facts probably 
contribute to the high proportion of sample firms (51%) located in Southern Finland.  
 
Table 6.5 Distribution of sample firms among the provinces in Finland 
Province Number of firms Percent of firms Population, 
million 
Percent of popu-
lation 
Southern Finland 
Western Finland 
Eastern Finland 
Oulu 
Lapland 
Total 
97 
70 
11 
12 
2 
192 
51% 
36% 
6% 
6% 
1% 
2.08 
1.84 
.59 
.46 
.19 
5.16 
40% 
36% 
11% 
9% 
4% 
 
 
6.1.4  Ownership structure 
 
The family is the largest owner group in family business, by definition. Table 6.6 shows 
how the firms equity is distributed among different owner groups. The figures are 
based on data provided by the key informants. The familys average ownership is 92.6% 
of the total equity. Institutional investors, small outside investors and management all 
have small equity holdings, the average ranging from 1.3% to 2.2%.  
 
Table 6.6 Ownership structure by owner groups and familys voting power  
 
Statistics 
Familys 
ownership 
Manage-
ments 
ownership 
Outside 
small        
investors 
Institu-
tional        
investors 
Other    
owners 
Familys 
total voting 
power 
N  Valid 
      Missing 
Mean 
Std. deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
192 
0 
92.6% 
16.3% 
10% 
100% 
192 
0 
1.3% 
6.5% 
0% 
68% 
192 
0 
2.1% 
7.7% 
0% 
59% 
192 
0 
2.2% 
7.8% 
0% 
50% 
192 
0 
1.4% 
6.2% 
0% 
49% 
191 
1 
93.9% 
13.5% 
30% 
100% 
 
Table 6.6 also shows the voting power of the family. The familys average voting power 
is slightly larger (93.9%) than the familys average ownership (92.6%). The familys 
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minimum voting power was 30% and maximum 100%. The number of share-owning 
family members ranged from 1 to 118, having the average value of 7.3 and median of 
4.0. 129 companies (67.2%) had one series of shares for all the owners, 59 companies 
(30.7%) had two series of shares with different voting rights, and 3 companies (1.6%) 
three series of shares with different voting rights. Ten companies (5.2%) in the sample 
were publicly listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange.  
 
 
6.1.5 Board composition 
 
The composition of the board of directors is broken down into four categories, as shown 
in Table 6.7. The average size of the board was 4.29 members, ranging from 1 to 11 
members. Compared to the other groups, families had the largest representation on the 
board, on average, 2.86 members. The next largest group on the board consisted of, on 
average, 1.04 outside members. There were, on average, .35 non-family management 
team members on the board. A few other board members were reported, mostly repre-
senting employees.  
 
Table 6.7 Board composition  
 
 
Statistics 
Total board Family      
members 
Outside mem-
bers (non-
family and 
non-
management) 
Management 
team members 
but not family 
members 
Other board 
members 
N  Valid 
      Missing 
Mean 
Std. deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
191 
1 
4.29 
1.75 
1 
11 
191 
1 
2.86 
1.38 
0 
10 
186 
6 
1.04 
1.26 
0 
5 
187 
5 
.35 
.80 
0 
5 
191 
1 
.03 
.23 
0 
2 
 
 
6.1.6  Leadership pattern 
  
The respondents were asked to indicate which generation of the family was primarily in 
charge of the family business. Table 6.8 shows that first, second, and third generation 
leadership are approximately equally represented in the sample, accounting together for 
92% of all cases. 
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Table 6.8 Generation primarily in charge of the family business 
Generation Number of firms Percent of firms 
First 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
Fifth or more 
Valid total  
57 
62 
58 
11 
4 
192 
29.7% 
32.3% 
30.2% 
5.7% 
2.1% 
 
In 15 cases the respondent indicated that two generations are primarily in charge: first and second genera-
tion in 7 cases, second and third generation in 6 cases, and third and fourth generation in 2 cases. It is 
assumed in the table that the earlier generation is in charge. 
 
 
It was asked in the questionnaire whether the chairman of the board was a family mem-
ber, whether the CEO was a family member, and whether the chairman and CEO was 
the same person. Table 6.9 indicates that the chairman comes from the family in 86.8% 
of the cases and the CEO comes from the family in 79.7% of the cases. Dual leadership, 
i.e. the same person holds both the chair and CEO positions, was reported in 21% of the 
cases. In all dual leadership cases it was a family member who held the both leadership 
positions. 
 
Table 6.9 Chairman and CEO positions 
 Number of firms Percent of valid 
Family chairman 
Non-family chairman 
Valid total 
Family CEO 
Non-family CEO 
Valid total 
Chairman and CEO are the same person 
Chairman and CEO are different persons 
Valid total 
165 
25 
190 
153 
39 
192 
40 
150 
190 
86.8% 
13.2% 
 
79.7% 
20.3% 
 
21.0% 
79.0% 
 
 
The respondents were asked also how many family members were employed in man-
agement and non-management positions. On the average, 1.84 family members held 
management positions, ranging from 0 to 10. The average for non-management posi-
tions was .88 family members, ranging 0 to 20. Figures on board composition and lead-
ership indicate that family members occupied upper managerial positions rather than 
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lower level positions in the organization. This is consistent with the extant family busi-
ness literature. 
 
 
6.1.7 Family institutions 
 
The respondents were asked to indicate whether they had a particular family institution 
in use. Additionally, if they held informal or formal family meetings, they were asked to 
report how many times annually those meeting were held. In addition to figures given in 
Table 6.10, 12 companies reported that they had informal family meetings daily, 
weekly, or very often. In the statistical analyses, the family institutions scale, from 0 
to 4, measures the variety of different institutions used in the family. As is shown later 
in Table 6.17, the mean value of this measure is 1.27 and the standard deviation 1.01. 
The most common family institution is the informal family meeting, as can be expected, 
then the formal family meeting, the family plan, and the least common is the family 
council. Family councils were generally associated with larger families. Family councils 
were found in 14 family firms, in which the owner family size ranged from 4 to 118 
members, the average being 28.6 members. The average size of the owner family in the 
sample was 7.3 members. Nine family companies had both the family council and fam-
ily plan 
 
Table 6.10  Family institutions 
 Number of 
firms 
Percent, 
N=191 
Average number of 
meetings per year when 
the number was given 
Informal family meetings 
Formal family meetings 
Family council 
Family plan 
144 
49 
14 
33 
75.4% 
26.7% 
7.3% 
17.3% 
7.5   (N=115) 
2.3   (N=45) 
 
 
 
 
6.1.8 Company goals 
 
Family businesses can operate to achieve many different types of goals. The respon-
dents were asked to rate ten goals using a scale from 1 to 7. Anchors in the scale were 
 166
the following. 1: Not at all an important goal; 4: A rather important goal; and 7: A 
very important goal. Table 6.11 shows the goals and respective statistics. 
 
Table 6.11 Importance of selected goals in family businesses 
Goal Mean Stand.dev. N 
To maximize sales growth  
To maximize profitability 
To maximize return on equity 
To maximize the firms value 
To be among the top three companies in the main business 
To continue the firm as a family business 
To sell the company if an opportunity arises 
To pay as high dividends as possible 
To pay steady dividends 
To provide financial independence to family 
3.57  (9) 
5.84  (3) 
5.21  (6) 
4.66  (7) 
5.94  (1) 
5.55  (4) 
2.60  (10) 
4.20  (8) 
5.27  (5) 
5.89  (2) 
1.33 
1.04 
1.23 
1.26 
1.37 
1.43 
1.46 
1.44 
1.34 
1.24 
192 
192 
191 
190 
191 
192 
190 
192 
192 
192 
The number in parenthesis indicates the order of importance  
 
The goal to be among the top three companies in the main business had the highest 
mean value (5.94), followed closely by the goals to provide financial independence to 
family (5.89) and to maximize profitability (5.85). Similar to the profitability goal, 
the goal to maximize return on equity was considered only the sixth most important 
(5.21). The fourth most important goal was to continue the firm as a family business 
(5.55). A similar goal, but stated in negative terms, was to sell the company if an op-
portunity arises. That was considered as the least important goal as indicated by the 
mean value (2.60). Concerning dividends, it was considered more important to pay 
steady dividends (5.27, rank 5) than to pay as high dividends as possible (4.20, rank 
8). The goal to maximize the firms value was considered as the seventh most impor-
tant goal (4.66). The low ranking of the firm value may reflect the fact that the shares of 
a family firm are not usually traded on capital markets. Low value may even incur tax 
benefits to owners. Maximizing sales growth had a low priority compared to other goals 
(3.57, rank 9). 
 
Goals on profitability and return on equity had the lowest variability as measured by 
standard deviation. This makes sense because achieving profitability enables the 
achievement of many other goals. Also goals concerning maximizing the firm value and 
providing financial independence to the family had relatively low variabilities. The 
largest variabilities were found in the goals of selling the company, paying high divi-
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dends, and continuing the business as a family business. These results are consistent 
with the existing literature on the difficulties of generational transfer of family busi-
nesses (e.g., Aronoff, 1998) and conflicting financial priorities between the family and 
business (Dreux, 1990). Goals of maximizing sales growth, paying steady dividends, 
and being among the top three companies in the main business represent medium vari-
ability of importance among the goals. 
 
 
6.1.9 Summary of the descriptive statistics 
 
The sample of family businesses in this study is in line with existing descriptions of 
family firms found in literature in that they constitute a large variety of companies in 
terms of their lifecycle phases, types of businesses, and familys involvement in the 
company (e.g., Brockhaus, 1994; Chua et al., 1999; Donckels & Fröhlich; 1991; Morris 
et al., 1997; Winter et al., 1998). The descriptive statistics in this section has shown that 
the sample firms cover many different businesses in the areas of manufacturing, whole-
sale and retailing, and various services. All the provinces of Finland (excluding the 
Swedish speaking Åland Islands) are represented in the sample, following roughly the 
distribution of the population. The majority of the companies, (87%), are located in 
Southern Finland and Western Finland, where, for example, eight out of the ten largest 
cities of Finland are located. 
 
The average age of the companies was 56.7 years, ranging from 6 to 164 years. In terms 
of generational leadership, the first, second, and third generation leadership were rela-
tively evenly distributed, accounting together for 92.2% of the cases. The size of com-
panies varied considerably, spanning from small entrepreneurial setups to large 
corporations employing thousands of people. However, the size distributions, in terms 
of sales revenue and the number employees, were skewed towards the small end. This 
bias is normal in entrepreneurship and strategy research reflecting the size distribution 
of all enterprises.  
 
The analysis of the importance of ten selected goals of the sample firms suggests that 
profitability is preferred to company growth and that stable dividends are preferred to 
paying high dividends. Also, the competitiveness of the business, the familys financial 
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independence, and continuing the business under the familys control had high impor-
tance ratings. These results are consistent with the findings of Tagiuri & Davis (1992).  
As an ownership group, the family was obviously in the dominant position. The fam-
ilys average ownership share was 92.6% and its voting power 93.9%. As an owner 
group, the family had 7.3 members on average. Approximately two thirds of the com-
panies had one series of shares and nearly all the remaining companies had two series of 
shares with different voting rights. Ten companies were listed on the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange. Family leadership was strongly present in the sample firms: in 86.8% of the 
cases the chairman of the board came from the family, and in 79.7% of the cases the 
CEO did so. Additionally, in 21% of the cases a family member held the both positions. 
The average size of the board was 4.3 members and the familys representation on the 
board was 2.9 members, on average. All four family institutions were present in the 
sample: 75.4% of the companies had informal family meetings, 26.7% formal family 
meetings, 17.3% family plans, and 7.3% family councils.  
 
 
6.2 Contractual governance model  
 
It was hypothesized in the contractual governance model that the familys decreasing 
inside ownership is associated with an increasing proportion of outside board members. 
Increasing outside representation was hypothesized to be associated with increasing 
board monitoring and board counsel activities. Finally, higher levels of these board ac-
tivities were hypothesized to be related to a higher strategic decision-making quality in 
terms of decision quality and decision commitment. The model features seven direct 
relationship hypotheses and two mediating effects hypotheses. 
 
 
6.2.1 Correlations among the variables  
 
Correlation coefficients as well as means and standard deviations of the variables in the 
contractual governance model are displayed in Table 6.12. There are several significant 
correlations in the table. All the statistically significant correlations are briefly discussed 
below. In line with the proposed model, decision quality and managements decision 
commitment are both positively correlated to board monitoring and board counsel. In-
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side ownership is negatively associated with board composition and board monitoring; 
this is also in line with the model. Board monitoring and board counsel are positively 
correlated. This is consistent with the model, because both these board function vari-
ables have a common antecedent, which is board composition. Similarly, decision qual-
ity and managements decision commitment are correlated. In the model, they also have 
common antecedents. Board composition is correlated with board monitoring, as the 
model implies. 
 
Firm size and generation in charge both reflect the lifecycle phase of the company. They 
are positively correlated with board composition and negatively correlated with inside 
ownership, as can be expected. Also, firm size is positively correlated with both board 
functions, i.e. monitoring and counsel. Firm size and generation in charge are positively 
correlated, as can be expected. 
 
Dual leadership and familys voting control are important governance variables in the 
model; they are correlated, as can expected. Both of the variables have partly similar 
correlations with other variables: a positive correlation with familys inside ownership 
and negative correlations with board composition and firm size. These results are con-
sistent with received governance literature. Also, dual leadership is negatively corre-
lated with board monitoring and generation in charge, but positively correlated with 
managements decision commitment. 
 
Interestingly, past performance is positively correlated with inside ownership and dual 
leadership but negatively correlated with generation in charge and firm size. These re-
sults suggest that smaller and younger family enterprises, where the separation of own-
ership from control has not yet occurred, at least not significantly, are more profitable. 
Table 6.12 Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables in the contractual governance model 
 
 Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1  Decision quality 
2  Managements decision commitment 
3  Inside ownership 
4  Board composition 
5  Board monitoring 
6  Board counsel 
7  Generation 
8  Firm sizea 
9  Past performance 
10  Dual leadership 
11 Voting control 
12  Environmental turbulence 
5.87 
6.02 
.79 
.21 
4.95 
4.56 
2.18 
1.90 
2.17 
.21 
.94 
4.15 
.73 
.76 
.27 
.25 
1.44 
1.25 
.99 
.77 
1.08 
.41 
.14 
1.41 
 
.51** 
-.10 
.01 
.31** 
.32** 
-.08 
.08 
.10 
.02 
-.13 
-.06 
 
 
.01 
-.14 
.16* 
.30** 
.02 
-.04 
.07 
.15* 
.03 
-.05 
 
 
 
-.38** 
-.23** 
-.04 
-.25** 
-.32** 
.19* 
.29** 
.51** 
-.18* 
 
 
 
 
.38** 
.13 
.26** 
.33** 
-.08 
-.30** 
-.35** 
.16* 
 
 
 
 
 
.50** 
.14 
.30** 
.03 
-.19** 
-.12 
.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.04 
.15* 
.04 
-.05 
-.01 
.16* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.37** 
-.15* 
-.23** 
.03 
.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.25** 
-.32** 
-.24** 
.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.17* 
.09 
-.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.15* 
-.15* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.07 
a Variable is a logarithm 
** p < .01; * p <.05; two-tailed test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 171
Environmental turbulence is positively correlated with outside members representation 
on the board and with the level of board counsel. This is in line with arguments that 
complexity and uncertainty of strategic decision-making task need to be matched with 
the requisite variety of information in the decision-making process. Also consistent with 
the same argument, increasing environmental turbulence is correlated negatively with 
inside ownership and dual leadership. In the other words, the more complex businesses 
seem to require higher amount of outside professionals on the board and management, 
and separation of board and CEO positions. 
 
 
6.2.2 Regression analyses  
 
To test Hypotheses 1 to 7, regressions were carried out in five separate regression tests. 
The results are displayed in Table 6.13, including both hypothesized relationships and 
control variables effects on the contractual models dependent variables. Each column 
shows the independent and control variables standardized beta coefficients with their 
respective significance levels. The independent and control variables multicollinearity 
was no problem in any of the regression equations. This is indicated by low variance 
inflation factors VIF values. The highest value of VIF was 1.54, as shown in Table 6.13. 
As discussed in the methodology section, VIF values exceeding 10 indicate harmful 
multicollinearity among the independent variables. 
 
Hypothesis 1 is supported in Test 1 in Table 6.13. As the familys inside ownership 
(share of equity of those family members who are either on the board or in top man-
agement) decreases, the proportion of outside board members (members who are not 
part of the family nor the management) increases (beta=-.15, p<.05). Test 1 also shows 
three significant control variable effects on board composition. Generation in charge has 
significant positive effect on the board composition (beta=.15, p<.05), whereas dual 
leadership (beta=-.15, p<.05) and the familys voting control (beta=-.23, p<.01) have 
negative relationships with the proportion of outside board members. 
 
Test 2 shows that Hypothesis 2 receives very strong support. The level of the boards 
monitoring activities on management is associated with board composition (beta=.33, 
p<.001). Also, one significant control variable effect is indicated by Test 2: firm size 
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has a positive effect on board monitoring (beta=.21, p<.01). Hypothesis 3 receives mar-
ginal support in Test 3, suggesting that board composition and board counsel are posi-
tively associated (beta=.12, p<.1). Of the control variables in Test 3, generation in 
charge is marginally and negatively associated with board counsel (beta=-.14, p<.1) 
whereas firm size (beta=.19, p<.05) and environmental turbulence (beta=.16, p<.05) 
have a positive relationship with board counsel. 
 
Table 6.13 Contractual governance mechanisms and decision-making quality 
Variables Board  
composition 
 
Board  
monitoring 
 
Board counsel 
 
Decision  
quality 
 
Manage-
ments       
decision  
commitment 
 Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 
Independent 
variables: 
Inside ownership 
Board composition 
Board monitoring 
Board counsel 
 
Control variables: 
Generation 
Firm size  
Past performance 
Dual Leadership 
Voting control 
Environmental 
turbulence 
Adjusted R2 
F 
Max VIF 
 
 
-.15* 
 
 
 
 
 
.15* 
.12 
.04 
-.15* 
-.23** 
 
 
.23 
10.28*** 
1.54 
 
 
 
.33*** 
 
 
 
 
-.01 
.21** 
.11 
-.07 
.04 
-.06 
 
.17 
6.43*** 
1.36 
 
 
 
.12 
 
 
 
 
-.14 
.19* 
.09 
.01 
.08 
.16* 
 
.04 
2.16* 
1.36 
 
 
 
 
.20** 
.22** 
 
 
-.08 
.03 
.07 
.06 
-.11 
-.07 
 
.13 
4.63*** 
1.50 
 
 
 
 
.03 
.32*** 
 
 
.11 
-.08 
.02 
.16* 
-.02 
-.09 
 
.10 
3.53** 
1.50 
Missing values replaced with means; one-tailed tests for standardized beta weights in hypotheses, other-
wise two-tailed tests;  p < .1, * p <.05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001 
 
 
Hypotheses 4 and 6 receive strong support in Test 4. Both the board functions, i.e. high 
levels of board monitoring (beta=.20, p<.01) and board counsel (beta=.22, p<.01) are 
associated with high decision quality. No significant control variable effects were indi-
cated in Test 4. 
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Hypothesis 5, which stated that board monitoring is positively related to managements 
decision commitment, is not supported in Test 5. Hypothesis 7 is strongly supported in 
Test 5. Board counsel is positively associated with managements decision commitment 
(beta=.32, p<.001). Test 5 also indicates one significant control variable association. 
Dual leadership is positively associated with managements decision commitment 
(beta=.16, p<.05). 
 
In sum, out of seven direct effects hypotheses in the contractual governance model, five 
were supported, one was marginally supported (p<.1), and one hypothesis was not sup-
ported. Five control variables had significant associations in Tests 1 to 5: generation in 
charge, firm size, and dual leadership had two significant relationships, while voting 
control and environmental turbulence had one significant relationship. Past performance 
had no effect in any sub-model in the contractual governance model. 
 
The values of the adjusted multiple coefficients of determination R2 varied from .04 to 
.23, as shown in Table 6.13. Test 3 had the lowest R2 (.04), indicating that variance of 
board composition and control variables explain only a small amount of the variation in 
board counsel. The highest R2 (.23) was present in Test 5, testing the effects on board 
composition. An F test was used to test if the regression was significant as a whole. Ta-
ble 6.13 shows that all regression equations have statistically significant F-ratios, indi-
cating good overall model adequacy.  
 
The contractual governance model has two hypotheses for mediating relationships. The 
mediating relationships are tested in stages, as discussed in the methodology section. 
Table 6.14 shows the regressions for testing Hypothesis 8, which stated that board com-
position mediates the effects of inside ownership on board monitoring and on board 
counsel. Because analyses for testing mediating effects involve the same control vari-
ables as the direct effects analyses above, their results are not reported in Table 6.14. 
 
Tests 1a and 1b are for testing whether board composition mediates the relationship be-
tween inside ownership and board monitoring. In the first stage, only inside ownership 
is entered. Test 1a shows that inside ownership is significantly and negatively associ-
ated with board monitoring, fulfilling one condition for mediation. In the second stage, 
board composition is also entered into the equation. Test 1b shows that the significance 
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level of inside ownership has decreased to a marginal significance level (p<.1), while 
board composition is significantly associated with board monitoring. For full mediation, 
inside ownership should not have a significant beta coefficient in Test 1b. Together, 
Tests 1a and 1b support part of Hypothesis 8: board composition mediates, at least par-
tially, the effects of inside ownership on board monitoring.  
 
Table 6.14 Mediating effects of board composition  
Variables Board monitoring Board monitoring Board counsel Board counsel 
 Test 1a Test 1b Test 2a Test 2b 
Independent  
variables: 
Inside ownership 
Board  composition  
 
Adjusted R2 
F 
 
 
-.16* 
 
 
.10 
3.96*** 
 
 
-.12 
.32*** 
 
.17 
5.92*** 
 
 
-.02 
 
 
.03 
1.85 
 
 
-.01 
.12 
 
.04 
1.88 
Missing values replaced with means; one-tailed tests for standardized beta weights in hypotheses, other-
wise two-tailed tests;  p < .1, * p <.05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001 
 
 
Tests 2a and 2b in Table 6.14 fail to support the second part of Hypothesis 8 that states 
that board composition mediates the effects of inside ownership on board counsel. In-
side ownership is not significantly associated with board counsel in Test 2a, ruling out 
the possibility of mediation. In sum, Hypothesis 8 is partially supported.  
 
Hypothesis 9 stated that board monitoring and board counsel mediate the effects of 
board composition on decision-making quality variables. Testing of Hypothesis 9 is 
split into Tables 6.15 and 6.16. Effects on decision quality are shown Table 6.15. Board 
composition does not have a significant relationship with decision quality when board 
monitoring and board counsel are not entered into the equation, as shown in Test 1a. 
This is sufficient for ruling out the possibility that board monitoring and board counsel 
together mediate the relationship between board composition and decision quality. Tests 
1c and 1d suggest that board counsel partially mediates a negative relationship between 
board composition and decision quality when board monitoring is controlled for. This is 
indicated by the significance level of beta coefficient of board composition decreasing 
from Test 1d to 1c, and board counsels significant beta coefficient in Test 1c. Tests 1b 
and 1c indicate no mediating relationship between board monitoring and decision qual-
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ity when board counsel is entered as a control variable. Thus, the first part of the Hy-
pothesis 9 is not supported. 
 
Table 6.15 Mediating effects of board monitoring and board counsel on decision 
quality  
 Decision quality 
 Test 1a Test 1b Test  1c Test  1d 
Independent  
variables: 
 Board composition 
 Board monitoring 
 Board counsel 
 
Adjusted R2 
F 
 
 
-.02 
 
 
 
.01 
1.30 
 
 
-.06 
 
.33*** 
 
.11 
3.88*** 
 
 
-.13 
.24** 
.22** 
 
.14 
4.43*** 
 
 
-.14* 
.35*** 
 
 
.11 
3.95*** 
Missing values replaced with means; one-tailed tests for standardized beta weights in hypotheses, other-
wise two-tailed tests;  p < .1, * p <.05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001 
 
 
Table 6.16 shows the regressions for testing mediating relationships on managements 
decision commitment.  
 
Table 6.16 Mediating effects of board monitoring and board counsel on manage-
ments decision commitment  
 Managements decision commitment 
 Test 1a Test 1b Test  1c Test  1d 
Independent  
variables: 
 Board composition 
 Board monitoring 
 Board counsel 
 
Adjusted R2 
F 
 
 
-.13 
 
 
 
.01 
1.12 
 
 
-.17* 
 
.35*** 
 
.12 
4.21*** 
 
 
-.20** 
.09 
.31*** 
 
.12 
3.88*** 
 
 
-.22** 
.26*** 
 
 
.06 
2.40* 
Missing values replaced with means; one-tailed tests for standardized beta weights in hypotheses, other-
wise two-tailed tests;  p < .1, * p <.05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001 
 
Tests 1a and 1c indicate that board monitoring and board counsel do not together medi-
ate the relationship between board composition and managements decision commit-
ment. Also, board monitoring does not mediate the relationship between board 
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composition and managements decision commitment when board counsel is controlled 
for, as indicated by Tests 1b and 1c. Similarly, board counsel does not mediate effects 
of board composition on managements decision commitment when board monitoring is 
controlled for. Interestingly, all four regressions in Table 6.16 indicate a negative and 
significant relationship between board composition and managements decision com-
mitment. Results from Tables 6.15 and 6.16 do not support Hypothesis 9. 
 
 
6.3  Relational governance model  
 
Hypotheses in the relational governance model posited that the variety of family institu-
tions and family size are related to social interaction among the family members, which 
in turn affects the levels of shared vision and trust. Finally, higher levels of shared vi-
sion and trust were hypothesized to be associated with strategic decision-making quali-
ties. The relational governance model has ten direct effects hypotheses and two 
mediating effects hypotheses. 
 
 
6.3.1 Correlations among the variables  
 
The relational governance model shares some variables with the contractual model. 
They have two common dependent variables and five common control variables. Table 
6.17 displays means, standard deviations and correlations among the variables in the 
relational governance model. Significant correlations are briefly discussed below. Dis-
cussions concerning the common variables among the contractual and relational models 
governance can be found in Section 6.2.1, and are not repeated here.  
 
Consistent with the relational model, social capital variables have several significant 
correlations among themselves. Family size is negatively correlated with social interac-
tion. The number of different family institutions in use is correlated with family size and 
with social interaction. Trust and shared vision are both correlated with social interac-
tion. Finally, shared vision and trust are correlated. In addition, all the five social capital 
variables (family institutions, family size, social interaction, shared vision, and trust) are 
correlated with at least one decision-making variable, but in most cases with all three 
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(decision quality, managements decision commitment, and familys decision commit-
ment). The three decision-making variables were correlated among themselves. 
 
Control variables have numerous correlations with social capital variables. Generation 
in charge is positively correlated with family institutions and family size and negatively 
correlated with social interaction action and shared vision. Firm size is also positively 
correlated with family institutions and family size and negatively correlated with social 
interaction action. Further, dual leadership is negatively related to family size. Interest-
ingly, the number of family members on board is positively correlated with the number 
of family institutions in use, family size, and firm size. Also, the number of family 
members on board and and familys decision commitment are correlated, as can be ex-
pected. Inside ownership is positively correlated with familys decision commitment, 
social interaction, and shared vision but negatively correlated with family institutions 
and family size.   
 
 
Table 6.17 Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables in the relational governance model 
 
 Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Decision quality 
2 Manag. decision commitment 
3 Familys decision commitment 
4 Family institutions 
5 Family size 
6 Social interaction 
7 Shared vision 
8 Trust 
9 Generation 
10 Firm sizea 
11 Past performance 
12 Dual leadership 
13 Family members on board 
14 Inside ownership 
15 Environmental turbulence 
5.87 
6.02 
5.48 
1.27 
7.30 
5.84 
5.45 
6.14 
2.18 
1.90 
2.17 
.21 
2.86 
.79 
4.15 
.73 
.76 
1.10 
1.01 
12.12 
1.10 
1.01 
.83 
.99 
.77 
1.08 
.41 
1.38 
.27 
1.41 
 
.51** 
.38** 
.15* 
.17* 
.19** 
.31** 
.24** 
-.08 
.08 
.10 
.02 
-.01 
-.10 
-.06 
 
 
.39** 
.08 
.10 
.29** 
.33** 
.40** 
.02 
-.04 
.07 
.15* 
.00 
.01 
-.05 
 
 
 
.28** 
.05 
.41** 
.59** 
.17* 
.01 
-.04 
.12 
-.05 
.16* 
.16* 
.03 
 
 
 
 
.39** 
.17* 
.12 
-.10 
.14* 
.33* 
.03 
-.12 
.24** 
-.18* 
.06 
 
 
 
 
 
-.16* 
-.09 
-.02 
.28* 
.29* 
.01 
-.17* 
.36** 
-.47** 
.09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.44** 
.28** 
-.23** 
-.16* 
.03 
.11 
-.08 
.20** 
.07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.35** 
-.15* 
-.07 
.14 
.06 
.08 
.17* 
.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.05 
-.08 
-.06 
.02 
.05 
-.02 
-.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.38** 
-.15* 
-.23** 
.12 
-.25** 
.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.25** 
-.32** 
.25** 
-.32** 
.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.17* 
-.09 
.19* 
-.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.12 
.29** 
-.15* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.05 
.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.18* 
a Variable is a logarithm 
** p < .01; * p <.05; two-tailed test 
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6.3.2 Regression analyses  
 
Regressions for testing Hypotheses 10 to 19 were carried out in six separate regression 
tests, which are displayed in Table 6.18. Similarly, as in the contractual governance 
model, multicollinearity was no problem in regressions because variance inflation fac-
tors VIF were at low levels, as shown in Table 6.18. Maximum VIF is 1.55, which is 
well below a threshold value of 10 for harmful collinearity among independent vari-
ables. 
 
Test 1 in Table 6.18 shows that Hypothesis 10 is strongly supported and Hypothesis 11 
marginally supported. Hypothesis 10 argued that as the number of different family insti-
tutions increases, the level of social interaction among the family members increases 
also (beta=.33, p<.001). Hypothesis 11 posited that increasing owner family size is 
negatively associated with social interaction (beta=-.13, p<.1). One control variable has 
significant and one marginally significant beta coefficient: generation in charge is nega-
tively associated with social interaction (beta=-.16, p<.05) and inside ownership posi-
tively is associated with social interaction (beta=.15, p <.1).  
 
Hypotheses 12 and 13, which suggested that increased social interaction would lead to 
greater shared vision among the owner family members (beta=.41, p<.001) and in-
creased level of trust among the owner and management (beta=.31, p<.001), are 
strongly supported, as shown in Test 2 and Test 3 in Table 6.18. Past performance 
(beta=.13, p<.1) and number of family members on board (beta=.12, p<.1) are margin-
ally associated with shared vision. Generation in charge (beta=.13, p<.1) is marginally, 
and firm size marginally and negatively, associated with trust (beta=-.14, p<.1). 
 
Decision quality was proposed to be associated with shared vision in Hypothesis 14 and 
with trust in Hypothesis 17. Both hypotheses are supported, as shown in Test 4 in Table 
6.18 (beta=.26, p<.001 for shared vision and beta=.17, p<.05 for trust). Of the control 
variables, both firm size (beta=-.15, p<.1) and inside ownership (beta=-.16, p<.05) are 
negatively related to decision quality. 
 
Tests 5 and 6 indicate effects on decision commitment. As stated in Hypothesis 15, 
managements decision commitment is associated with shared vision (beta=.23, p<.01), 
 180
and, as stated in Hypothesis 18, managements decision commitment is associated with 
trust, (beta=.31, p<.001). Dual leadership, acting as a control variable in Test 5, is asso-
ciated with managements decision commitment (beta=.16, p<.05). Hypothesis 16, ar-
guing that shared vision is linked to familys decision commitment, receives strong 
support (beta=.59, p<.001). Hypothesis 19 did not receive support: trust is not linked to 
familys decision commitment. Two control variable effects are marginally significant 
(for both, beta=.11, p<.1) in Test 6: both generation in charge and the number of family 
members on board are associated with familys decision commitment. 
 
Table 6.18 Relational governance mechanisms and decision-making quality 
 
Variables Social       
interaction 
Shared 
vision 
 
Trust 
 
Decision 
quality 
 
Manage-
ments 
decision  
commit-
ment 
Familys 
decision  
commit-
ment 
 Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Test 6 
Independent  
variables: 
Family institutions 
Family size 
Social interaction 
Shared vision 
Trust 
 
Control variables: 
Generation 
Firm size  
Past performance 
Dual Leadership 
Family on board  
Inside ownership 
Environmental 
turbulence 
 
Adjusted R2 
F 
Max VIF 
 
 
.33*** 
-.13 
 
 
 
 
 
-.16* 
-.12 
-.06 
.01 
-.08 
.15 
 
 
 
.13 
4.50*** 
1.55 
 
 
 
 
.41*** 
 
 
 
 
-.05 
.04 
.13 
-.01 
.12 
.06 
 
 
 
.19 
7.20*** 
1.36 
 
 
 
 
.31*** 
 
 
 
 
.13 
-.14 
-.06 
.02 
.09 
-.09 
 
 
 
.08 
3.26*** 
1.36 
 
 
 
 
 
.26*** 
.17* 
 
 
-.11 
-.15 
.10 
.04 
-.03 
-.16* 
-.06 
 
 
.13 
4.12*** 
1.39 
 
 
 
 
 
.23** 
.31*** 
 
 
.07 
.03 
.05 
.16* 
-.02 
-.06 
-.04 
 
 
.19 
5.96*** 
1.39 
 
 
 
 
 
.59*** 
-.05 
 
 
.11 
-.06 
.05 
-.09 
.11 
.09 
.02 
 
 
.35 
12.25*** 
1.39 
Missing values replaced with means; one-tailed tests for standardized beta weights in hypotheses, other-
wise two-tailed tests;  p < .1, * p <.05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001 
 
In sum, hypotheses on social capital variables and their effects on strategic decision-
making quality are well supported in the relational governance model. Of the ten hy-
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potheses, eight were significantly supported, one was marginally supported (p<.1), and 
one was not supported. Comparing effects of shared vision and trust on the three deci-
sion-making quality variables, shared vision performed slightly better than trust (Tests 
4, 5, and 6). As discussed above, there were several control variable effects. In Tests 1 
to 6, generation in charge had three significant relationships; firm size, the number of 
family members on board, and inside ownership had two significant relationships; past 
performance, and dual leadership had one significant relationship. Environmental turbu-
lence had no effect on decision-making quality. The adjusted multiple coefficient of de-
termination R2 varied from .08 (Test 3) to .35 (Test 6), indicating the amount of 
variation in dependent variables explained by independent and control variables. All the 
tests had statistically significant F-ratios indicating good statistical significance for the 
sub-models. 
 
The relational governance model has two hypotheses for mediating effects. Control 
variables are same as those in Table 6.18, but they not discussed in the mediating rela-
tionship analyses below. Table 6.19 shows the results of testing Hypothesis 20, which 
posited that social interaction mediates effects of family institutions and family size on 
shared vision and trust. Tests 1a and 1b support this hypothesis. In the first stage (Test 
1a), family institutions is positively associated, and family size is negatively associated, 
with shared vision. Family size is only marginally associated (p <.1) with shared vision. 
This result is in line with the result of Hypothesis 11, in which family size was nega-
tively and marginally associated with social interaction. When social interaction is en-
tered in the second stage (Test 1b), beta coefficients for family institutions and family 
size become non-significant, while social interaction is significantly associated to 
shared vision. Thus, social interaction fully mediates the relationship between family 
institutions and family size, and shared vision. 
 
Other parts of Hypothesis 20 are not supported, as indicated by Tests 2a and 2b. Family 
institutions and family size have not significant relationship with trust. Interestingly, 
when social interaction is entered in the second stage (2b), the relationship between 
family institutions and trust becomes significantly negative. In sum, Hypothesis 20 is 
partially supported. 
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Table 6.19 Mediating effects of social interaction 
Variables Shared vision Trust 
 Test 1a Test 1b Test 2a Test 2b 
Independent  
variables: 
Family institutions 
Family size  
Social interaction 
 
Adjusted R2 
F 
 
 
.17* 
-.12 
 
 
.05 
2.17* 
 
 
.04 
-.07 
.40*** 
 
.18 
5.66 *** 
 
 
-.09 
-.03 
 
 
0 
.77 
 
 
-.21** 
.02 
.36*** 
 
.10 
3.33*** 
Missing values replaced with means; one-tailed tests for standardized beta weights in hypotheses, other-
wise two-tailed tests;  p < .1, * p <.05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001 
 
Hypothesis 21 posited that shared vision and trust mediate the effects of social interac-
tion decision-making quality. This hypothesis has three parts corresponding to the three 
decision-making quality variables; Tables 6.20 to 6.22 show the respective results. Ta-
ble 6.20 shows the tests for mediating effects on decision quality. Tests 1a and 1c indi-
cate that shared vision and trust, together, fully mediated the relationship between social 
interaction and decision quality. Also, shared vision fully mediates the relationship be-
tween social interaction and decision quality when trust is controlled for, as shown in 
Tests 1b and 1c. Finally, trust partially mediates the relationship between social interac-
tion and decision quality when shared vision is controlled for as shown in Tests 1c and 
1d.  
 
Table 6.20 Mediating effects of shared vision and trust on decision quality  
Variables Decision quality 
 Test 1a Test 1b Test 1c Test 1d 
Independent  
variables: 
Social interaction 
Shared vision 
Trust 
 
Adjusted R2 
F 
 
 
.22** 
 
 
 
.06 
2.40* 
 
 
.16* 
 
.22** 
 
.09 
3.19** 
 
 
.08 
.23** 
.15* 
 
.13 
3.82*** 
 
 
.11 
.28*** 
 
 
.12 
3.73*** 
Missing values replaced with means; one-tailed tests for standardized beta weights in hypotheses, other-
wise two-tailed tests;  p < .1, * p <.05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001 
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Tests 1a and 1c in Table 6.21 suggest that shared vision and trust partially mediate the 
relationship between social interaction and managements decision commitment. The 
mediation is not full because social interaction still has a significant beta coefficient, 
although at a reduced level. When trust is controlled for, Tests 1b and 1c show that a 
shared vision partially mediates social interaction on managements decision commit-
ment. Similarly, Tests 1d and 1c show that trust partially mediates social interaction on 
managements decision commitment when shared vision is controlled for. 
 
Table 6.21 Mediating effects of shared vision and trust on managements decision 
commitment  
Variables Managements decision commitment 
 Test 1a Test 1b Test 1c Test 1d 
Independent  
variables: 
Social interaction 
Shared vision 
Trust 
 
Adjusted R2 
F 
 
 
.32*** 
 
 
 
.09 
3.28** 
 
 
.22** 
 
.34*** 
 
.19 
5.88*** 
 
 
.16* 
.17* 
.29*** 
 
.21 
5.92*** 
 
 
.21** 
.26*** 
 
 
.14 
4.44*** 
Missing values replaced with means; one-tailed tests for standardized beta weights in hypotheses, other-
wise two-tailed tests;  p < .1, * p <.05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001 
 
Table 6.22 Mediating effects of shared vision and trust on familys decision com-
mitment  
Variables Familys decision commitment 
 Test 1a Test 1b Test 1c Test 1d 
Independent  
variables: 
Social interaction 
Shared vision 
Trust 
 
Adjusted R2 
F 
 
 
.45*** 
 
 
 
.21 
7.28*** 
 
 
.41*** 
 
.05 
 
..21 
6.51*** 
 
 
.25*** 
.50*** 
-.09 
 
.39 
13.30*** 
 
 
.23*** 
.47*** 
 
 
.39 
14.46*** 
Missing values replaced with means; one-tailed tests for standardized beta weights in hypotheses, other-
wise two-tailed tests;  p < .1, * p <.05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001 
 
Finally, Table 6.22 shows that shared vision and trust only weakly mediate the relation-
ship between social interaction and familys decision commitment. Social interaction is 
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significantly associated with familys decision commitment in all tests in Table 6.22. 
Weak mediation is supported by the reduced values of social interaction in Tests 1b, 1c, 
and 1d compared to 1a. Taking together the results from Tables 6.20 to 6.22, Hypothesis 
21 is partially supported.  
 
 
6.4 Joint effects of contractual and relational governance mechanisms on  
 decision-making quality 
 
6.4.1 Correlations among the variables 
 
Table 6.23 displays the correlations among the variables in the joint effects model. In 
addition to earlier reported correlations, there are two significant correlations. Shared 
vision is positively correlated with board monitoring and board counsel.  
 
 
 Table 6.23 Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables in the joint effects model 
 
 Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Decision quality 
2 Managements decision commitment 
3 Board monitoring 
4 Board counsel 
5 Shared vision 
6 Trust 
7 Generation 
8 Firm sizea 
9 Past performance 
10 Dual leadership 
11 Voting control 
12 Family members on board 
13 Inside ownership 
14 Environmental turbulence 
5.87 
6.02 
4.95 
4.56 
5.45 
6.14 
2.18 
1.90 
2.17 
.21 
.94 
2.86 
.79 
4.15 
.73 
.76 
1.44 
1.25 
1.01 
.83 
.99 
.77 
1.08 
.41 
.14 
1.38 
.27 
1.41 
 
.51** 
.31** 
.32** 
.31** 
.24** 
-.08 
.08 
.10 
.02 
-.13 
-.01 
-.10 
-.06 
 
 
.16* 
.30** 
.33** 
.40** 
.02 
-.04 
.07 
.15* 
.03 
.00 
.01 
-.05 
 
 
 
.50** 
.27** 
.08 
.14 
.30** 
.03 
-.19** 
-.12 
-.02 
-.23** 
.00 
 
 
 
 
.36** 
.03 
-.04 
.15* 
.04 
-.05 
-.01 
.01 
-.04 
.16* 
 
 
 
 
 
.35** 
-.15* 
-.07 
.14 
.06 
.09 
.08 
.17* 
.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.05 
-.08 
-.06 
.02 
.02 
.05 
-.02 
-.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.37** 
-.15* 
-.23** 
.03 
.12 
-.25** 
.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.25** 
-.32** 
-.24** 
.25** 
-.32** 
.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.17* 
.09 
-.09 
.19* 
-.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.15* 
-.12 
.29** 
-.15* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.23** 
.51** 
-.07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.05 
.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.18* 
a Variable is a logarithm 
** p < .01; * p <.05; two-tailed test 
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6.4.2 Regression analyses 
 
Table 6.24 shows the results of the joint effects of the contractual and relational govern-
ance variables on decision quality and managements decision commitment. Control 
variables include all control variables combined from the contractual and relational 
governance models. Familys decision commitment is not included in the analysis be-
cause it is not part of the contractual model.  
 
Table 6.24 Joint Effects on Decision-Making Quality 
Variables Decision quality Managements decision             
commitment 
 Test 1a Test1b Test 1c Test 2a Test2b Test 2c 
Independent variables:  
Board monitoring 
Board counsel 
Shared vision 
Trust 
 
Control variables: 
Generation 
Firm size  
Past performance 
Dual Leadership 
Voting control 
Family members on board 
Inside ownership  
Environmental turbulence 
 
Adjusted R2 
Differences 1a 
   ∆ Adjusted R2  
   ∆ F  
Differences 2 b 
   ∆ Adjusted R2 
   ∆ F  
 
.19* 
.23** 
 
 
 
 
-.09 
.01 
.08 
.07 
-.10 
.05 
-.06 
-.08 
 
.13 
 
 
 
 
.26*** 
.16* 
 
 
-.10 
.13 
.10 
.04 
-.07 
-.02 
-.13 
-.06 
 
.13 
 
.14* 
.19* 
.14* 
.18** 
 
 
-.09 
.06 
.08 
.06 
-.09 
.02 
-.08 
-.08 
 
.18 
 
.05 
7.30** 
 
.05 
7.31** 
 
.03 
.32*** 
 
 
 
 
.10 
-.09 
.02 
.17* 
-.01 
.04 
-.04 
-.09 
 
.09 
 
 
 
 
.23** 
.32*** 
 
 
.06 
.03 
.05 
.16* 
.02 
-.02 
-.07 
-.04 
 
.19 
 
 
-.04 
.28*** 
.13* 
.37*** 
 
 
.09 
-.02 
.04 
.15* 
.00 
-.01 
-.06 
-.08 
 
.24 
 
.15 
18.75*** 
 
.05 
7.27** 
Missing values replaced with means; one-tailed tests for standardized beta weights in hypotheses, other-
wise two-tailed tests;  p < .1, * p <.05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001 
a Test1c vs. Test1a and Test2c vs. Test2a 
b Test1c vs. Test1b and Test2c vs. Test2b 
 
 
 
The analysis is structured as two sets of analogical analyses. In the first set, the full 
model, i.e. the model including both contractual and relational independent variables 
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(board monitoring, board counsel, shared vision, and trust), is compared to the model 
including only contractual independent variables. In the second set, the full model is 
compared to the model including only relational independent variables. In both cases, it 
is analyzed to discover whether the full model will fit the data better than the model 
with removed variables. If the full model explains the data better, then the complemen-
tary nature of contractual and relational governance receives support. 
 
Test 1c for the joint effects on decision quality repeats the earlier results, showing that 
board monitoring, board counsel, shared vision, and trust are all positively related to 
decision quality, as hypothesized. Test 1a tests the effects of contractual variables on 
decision quality, and Test 1b tests the effects of relational variables. Test 1c has a larger 
adjusted multiple coefficient of determination R2 than either Test 1a or 1b. The differ-
ence in adjusted R2 is in both cases .05. These results indicate that the independent vari-
ables in Test 1c explain more variation in decision quality than Test 1a or Test 1b alone. 
Differences in F-ratios (7.30 for Test 1c versus 1a and 7.31 for Test 1c versus 1b) are 
significant at level p<.01., supporting the view that the joint effects model in Test 1c is 
more adequate as a whole than the model in Tests 1a or 1b. 
 
The adequacy of the joint effects on managements decision commitment is tested in a 
similar vein. First, Test 2c repeats the earlier results from the contractual and relational 
governance models: board counsel, shared vision, and trust are positively related to de-
cision commitment, as hypothesized. Board monitoring was found to be negatively and 
non-significantly related to managements decision commitment, which is against the 
expectations of Hypothesis 5. Test 2c has a larger adjusted R2 than either Test 2a or 2b. 
The difference is .15 when compared to Test 2a and .05 when compared to 2b. Differ-
ences in F-ratios are 18.75 at level p<.001, and 7.27 at level p<.01, respectively. The 
results indicate that Test 2c explains more variation in decision commitment than Test 
2a or Test 2b alone. In sum, the results above support the Hypothesis 22, which pro-
posed that contractual and relational governance mechanisms have a complementary 
effect on decision-making quality. 
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6.5 Decision-making quality and firm performance  
 
6.5.1 Correlations among the variables  
 
Table 6.25 shows some new significant correlations. Profitability and growth are sig-
nificantly correlated. This is in line with the common argument that family firms have 
scarce financing opportunities. A typical way to finance growth is utilize retained earn-
ings, which are the result of past profitability. Consistent with the model, profitability is 
positively correlated with decision quality and managements decision commitment, and 
growth is positively correlated with decision quality and familys decision commitment. 
Profit orientation is negatively correlated with growth. This result is quite obviously, 
because profitability and growth are often at least partially competing goals. Generation 
in charge and growth orientation are negatively correlated. As can be expected, envi-
ronmental turbulence is negatively correlated with both profitability and growth. Inter-
estingly, environmental turbulence and growth orientation are positively correlated.  
 
 Table 6.25 Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlation coefficients between decision-making quality and firm performance vari-
ables 
 Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1  Profitabilitya 
2  Growtha 
3  Decision quality 
4  Managements decision commitment 
5  Familys decision commitment 
6  Generation 
7  Firm sizeb 
8  Profit orientationa 
9  Growth orientationa 
10  Environmental turbulence 
.00 
.00 
5.87 
6.02 
5.48 
2.18 
1.90 
.00 
.00 
4.15 
.93 
.89 
.73 
.76 
1.10 
.99 
.77 
.83 
.87 
1.41 
 
.46** 
.22** 
.15* 
.11 
-.08 
.04 
-.04 
-.01 
-.15* 
 
 
.19** 
.09 
.15* 
-.09 
.13 
-.20** 
.09 
-.17* 
 
 
 
.51** 
.38** 
-.08 
.08 
.07 
.08 
-.06 
 
 
 
 
.39** 
.02 
-.04 
.12 
.07 
-.05 
 
 
 
 
 
.01 
-.04 
.03 
.03 
.03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.37** 
-.11 
-.16* 
.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.04 
.03 
.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.04 
.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.17* 
b Variable is a logarithm 
a Index is based on standardized item values 
** p < .01; * p <.05; two-tailed test 
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6.5.2 Regression analyses  
 
Hypotheses 23a, 24a, 25a stated that higher decision-making quality is associated with 
higher profitability. Results for these hypotheses are shown in Test 1 in Table 6.26, 
where all the three independent decision-making variables are entered simultaneously. 
Hypothesis 23a, arguing that decision quality is associated with profitability, is sup-
ported (beta=.16, p<.05). Hypotheses as to effects of managements decision commit-
ment (Hypothesis 24a) and familys decision commitment (Hypothesis 25a) on 
profitability are not supported in Test 1. Environmental turbulence, a control variable, is 
marginally negatively associated with profitability (beta=-.13, p<.1). 
 
Table 6.26 Decision-making quality and profitability  
Variables Profitability 
 Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Test 6 Test 7 
Independent variables:  
Decision quality 
Managements decision 
commitment 
Familys decision  
commitment 
 
Control variables: 
Generation 
Firm size  
Profit orientation 
Environmental  
turbulence 
 
Adjusted R2 
F 
Max VIF 
 
.16* 
.06 
 
.04 
 
 
 
-.08 
.06 
-.07 
-.13 
 
 
.05 
2.31* 
1.49 
 
.21** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.07 
.05 
-.06 
-.13 
 
 
.05 
3.06* 
1.19 
 
 
.16* 
 
 
 
 
 
-.10 
.09 
-.07 
-.13 
 
 
.03 
2.30* 
1.18 
 
 
 
 
.12* 
 
 
 
-.10 
.09 
-.05 
-.15* 
 
 
.02 
1.88 
1.18 
 
 
.13* 
 
.07 
 
 
 
-.10 
.09 
-.07 
-.14 
 
 
.03 
2.06 
1.21 
 
.17* 
.07 
 
 
 
 
 
-.08 
.06 
-.07 
-.13 
 
 
.05 
2.67* 
1.40 
 
.19* 
 
 
.05 
 
 
 
-.07 
.06 
-.06 
-.13 
 
 
.05 
2.61* 
1.22 
Missing values replaced with means; one-tailed tests for standardized beta weights in hypotheses, other-
wise two-tailed tests;  p < .1, * p <.05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001 
 
Tests 2 to 4 indicate that, when all three decision-making variables are entered alone in 
separate analyses, their beta coefficients are significant. Tests 3 and 6 suggest that deci-
sion quality mediates the relationship between managements decision commitment and 
profitability. To further test this mediation, decision quality was regressed on manage-
ments decision commitment and to all the same control variables as shown in Table 
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6.26. Managements decision commitment was significantly related to decision quality 
(beta = .52, p<.001), supporting the mediation. Similarly, Test 4 and 7 suggest that deci-
sion quality mediates the relationship between familys decision commitment and prof-
itability. Familys decision commitment was significantly related to decision quality 
(beta = .39, p<.001), supporting the mediation. When decision quality is excluded from 
the analysis, managements decision commitment is significantly associated with profit-
ability but familys decision commitment is not, as indicated in Test 5. In a step-wise 
analysis, Tests 5 and 1 indicate that decision quality mediates the relationship between 
managements decision commitment and profitability, but does not mediate the relation-
ship between familys decision commitment and profitability. In sum, decision quality 
is associated with profitability directly, but both managements and familys decision 
commitment are only indirectly related to profitability, mediated by decision quality. 
Finally, managements decision commitment is slightly more strongly related to profit-
ability, as beta coefficients and their significance levels, and mediation analyses above 
suggest. 
 
Hypotheses 23b, 24b, and 25b posit that the three decision-making variables are posi-
tively associated with company growth. As Test 1 in Table 6.27 shows, decision quality 
(beta=.11, p<.1) and familys decision commitment (beta=.13, p<.1) are marginally re-
lated to growth, supporting Hypotheses 23b and 25b. Hypothesis 24b, stating that man-
agements decision commitment and growth are associated, is not supported in Test 1. 
Of the control variable effects, firm size was positively related (beta=.17, p<.05), and 
environmental turbulence negatively related (beta=-.19, p<.05), to growth. 
 
When independent decision-making variables are entered separately in Tests 2 to 4, the 
results are similar: decision quality and familys decision commitment are significantly 
related to growth but managements decision commitment is not. In a step-wise analy-
sis, Tests 5 and 1 suggest that decision quality partially mediates the relationship be-
tween familys decision commitment and growth. The mediation is not full, because 
familys decision commitment is still marginally significant in Test 1. 
 
Multicollinearity is not a problem in regressions testing the relationships between deci-
sion-making quality and firm performance. This can be seen in low variance inflation 
factors VIF in Tables 6.25 and 6.26. The adjusted multiple coefficient of determination 
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R2 are at relatively low levels in Tables 6.26 and 6.27. This suggests that profitability 
and growth are greatly affected by other variables, which are not included in the model. 
F-ratios are at significant levels indicating that the models are adequate as a whole. 
 
Table 6.27 Decision-making quality and growth  
Variables Growth 
 Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Test 6 Test 7 
Independent variables:  
Decision quality 
Managements decision 
commitment 
Familys decision  
commitment 
 
Control variables: 
Generation 
Firm size  
Growth orientation 
Environmental  
turbulence 
 
Adjusted R2 
F 
Max VIF 
 
.11 
-.02 
 
.13 
 
 
 
-.10 
.17* 
.09 
-.19* 
 
 
.07 
3.18** 
1.49 
 
.15* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.10 
.16* 
.09 
-.18* 
 
 
.07 
3.90** 
1.22 
 
 
.09 
 
 
 
 
 
-.12 
.18* 
.09 
-.18* 
 
 
.06 
2.23** 
1.22 
 
 
 
 
.16* 
 
 
 
-.12 
.19* 
.09 
-.19** 
 
 
.08 
4.08** 
1.21 
 
 
.03 
 
.15* 
 
 
 
-.12 
.19* 
.09 
-.19* 
 
 
.07 
3.41** 
1.22 
 
.15* 
.01 
 
 
 
 
 
-.10 
.16* 
.09 
-.18* 
 
 
.07 
3.23** 
1.40 
 
.10 
 
 
.12 
 
 
 
-.10 
.17* 
.09 
-.19* 
 
 
.08 
3.72** 
1.23 
Missing values replaced with means; one-tailed tests for standardized beta weights in hypotheses, other-
wise two-tailed tests;  p < .1, * p <.05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001 
 
 
 
6.6 Summary of results  
 
This chapter has empirically studied the hypothesized relationships among the con-
structs. Also, descriptive statistics of the sample firms addressing several key areas re-
lated to family firm governance were presented. Correlation and regression analyses 
were carried out in four blocks: Hypotheses 1 to 9 for the contractual governance 
model, Hypotheses 10 to 21 for relational governance model, Hypothesis 22 for joint 
effects of contractual and relational governance mechanisms, and Hypotheses 23 to 25 
for decision-making quality and firm performance. Table 6.28 summarizes the hypothe-
ses and empirical results. Overall, the hypotheses were well supported in the empirical 
tests. 
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Table 6.28  Summary of results 
Description of hypothesis  Result 
1  Familys inside ownership is negatively associated with proportion of outside 
directors on the board. 
Supported 
2 Proportion of outside directors on the board is positively associated with board 
monitoring of top management 
Supported 
3  Proportion of outside directors on the board is positively associated with board 
counsel to top management 
Marginally sup-
ported 
4 Board monitoring is positively associated with strategic decision quality  Supported 
5 Board monitoring is positively associated with managements decision com-
mitment 
Not supported 
6 Board counsel is positively associated with strategic decision quality Supported 
7  Board counsel is positively associated with managements decision commit-
ment 
Supported 
8 Board composition mediates effects of inside ownership on board monitoring 
and board counsel 
Partially supported 
9 Board monitoring and board counsel mediate effects of board composition on 
decision quality and managements decision commitment 
Not supported 
10 Variety of family of institutions is positively associated with social interaction Supported 
11 Owner family size is negatively associated with social interaction Marginally sup-
ported 
12 Social interaction is positively associated with shared vision Supported 
13  Social interaction is positively associated with trust Supported 
14 Shared vision is positively associated with strategic decision quality Supported 
15  Shared vision is positively associated with managements decision commit-
ment 
Supported 
16  Shared vision is positively associated with familys decision commitment Supported 
17 Trust is positively associated with strategic decision quality Supported 
18  Trust  is positively associated with managements decision commitment Supported 
19  Trust is positively associated with familys decision commitment Not supported 
20 Social interaction mediates effects of variety of family institutions and family 
size on shared vision and trust 
Partially supported 
21 Shared vision and trust mediate effects of social interaction on strategic deci-
sion quality, managements decision commitment, and familys decision com-
mitment 
Partially supported 
22 Contractual and relational governance have complementary effect on decision-
making quality 
Supported 
23 a & b Strategic decision quality is positively associated with profitability and 
growth 
Partially supported 
24 a & b Managements decision commitment is positively associated with prof-
itability and growth 
Not supported 
25 a & b Familys decision commitment is positively associated with profitability 
and growth 
Marginally sup-
ported 
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7 CONCLUDING DISCUSSIONS 
 
Mounting evidence highlights the distinctive challenge of family firm governance. The 
unique characteristics of family businesses induce these businesses to maintain govern-
ance structures that combine elements of formal control for overseeing managerial deci-
sion making, and informal control for creating resources rooted in social relationships 
among the owner family members and management. Despite the wide recognition of the 
existence of this dual system of governance in family firms, empirical documentation of 
its effects on a firms strategic decision-making process has been lacking. Therefore, 
this dissertation has sought to fill this gap in the literature by examining the systems of 
the contractual and relational governance, and their effects on family firms strategic 
decision-making quality. Using a sample of family-controlled firms in Finland, the re-
sults support the importance of the dual systems of contractual and relational govern-
ance in explaining the quality of a companys strategic decision process. This 
concluding section of the dissertation reviews the studys key results, and discusses 
their implications for theory and practice. Further, it discusses the studys limitations 
and presents suggestions for future research. 
 
 
7.1 Discussion of results  
 
7.1.1 Contractual governance model  
 
Contractual governance, which is formal and contractual in nature, is grounded in the 
familys ownership holdings. As extant literature has shown, family firms have specific 
contractual features that affect the relationship between the owners and management. 
First, the ownership is concentrated in the hands of a given family, and possibly with a 
few owner groups outside of the family. Concentration of the ownership allows the 
owner family members to participate in company decision making as directors or offi-
cers. So the separation of ownership and managerial control is significantly less in fam-
ily firms than in widely held corporations. Second, family firms are relatively free from 
pressures of external governance mechanisms, such as the market for corporate control. 
On the one hand, this allows the family firm to concentrate on company development 
with extended horizons (Harvey, 1999b). On the other hand, lack of external control 
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contributes to managements entrenchment, and so may allow poorly performing man-
agement to continue for a long time (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). Third, ownership hold-
ings are mostly illiquid, prompting the family members to active, or voice-based, 
ownership control (Nooteboom, 1999). These features focus attention on internal con-
trol in family firms.  
 
Drawing on agency theory, the contractual governance model posited that the family 
firms board of directors serves as the primary instrument through which the owner 
family monitors managements activities and supports its strategic decision-making 
processes. Literature on family business governance has demonstrated that family man-
agers may be reluctant to involve outside members in the family firms board, fearing 
that they may loose control if outsiders are involved (e.g., Schwartz & Barnes, 1991). 
Indeed, a high degree of variation in the roles and influence of boards of directors has 
been observed in family firms, ranging from no involvement to very active participation 
in governance (Neubauer & Lank, 1998). However, it has been widely recognized that 
outside presentation on the board is an opportunity for family firms (e.g., Johannisson & 
Huse, 2000; Ward, 1991). The main argument of the contractual governance model is 
that it is the ownership structure that largely determines the composition and function-
ing of boards of directors in family firms. 
 
The results provided good overall support for the hypothesized relationships in the con-
tractual governance model. First, the results showed that the proportion of equity owned 
by those family members, who were either directors or officers of the family firm, was 
negatively associated with the proportion of outside members on the board of directors. 
Second, increased outside presentation in the board resulted in more active board par-
ticipation in terms of the boards control (monitoring) and service (counsel) functions. 
Third, the analysis showed that the intensity of the boards monitoring and counsel ac-
tivities was positively associated with the quality of strategic decisions reached. Fourth, 
results indicated a strong statistical association between the boards counsel function 
and managements commitment to strategic decisions. However, the empirical analysis 
failed to support the hypothesis that board monitoring and managements decision 
commitment should be positively associated.  
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The first result showed that the owner familys inside ownership will influence the 
composition of its board of directors: the more the ownership and management coin-
cide, the smaller the proportion of outside board members is likely to be. This may 
place the owner-managed firm at a disadvantage, because the theory suggests that board 
composition may have an important influence on its control and service functions. The 
result is consistent with agency theory, which proposed that the separation of ownership 
from decision control functions (initiation and implementation) leads to reduced overlap 
between the board of directors and top management by separating decision control (rati-
fication and monitoring) from decision management (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). Further, 
similar empirical results were reported by Johannisson & Huse (2000), who found that 
entrepreneurial family businesses employed fewer outside directors than managerial 
family businesses.  
 
Consistent with the received theory, the results demonstrated that the proportion of out-
side members on the board of directors would be positively associated with both its con-
trol and service functions. The data showed a particularly strong association between 
the presence of outside members on the board of directors and the intensity with which 
the board monitors managements actions. This result is in line with corporate govern-
ance literature; for example, Monks & Minow noted, the boards primary role is to 
monitor management on behalf of the shareholders (1996: 167). 
 
However, the association between the board composition and board counsel was only 
marginally significant (p<.1). This result suggests that outside members role in counsel 
and advice may be less prevalent than hypothesized. However, this significant positive 
association between the proportion of outside members and the extent of board counsel 
is similar to the empirical results of Huse (1993). He found that independent boards are 
positively related to service task of the board. Although the value of the role of outside 
members in advice and counsel is widely accepted in governance literature because, for 
example, outside members can provide new perspectives to strategic questions, (e.g., 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989), the inside board members usually have superior firm-specific 
knowledge (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). Further, inside directors other than the CEO may 
provide an important internal monitoring function, reducing the information asymme-
tries between the CEO and external board members (Johnson et al., 1996). Thus, both 
external and internal board members may contribute to counsel and advice in strategic 
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decision making: outside members would provide more diversity in perspectives and 
information, while inside members would reduce information asymmetries and provide 
firm-specific knowledge. This may explain the weak positive association between the 
proportion of outside members and board counsel.  
 
Supporting the fourth hypothesis, the boards monitoring activities were positively as-
sociated with the quality of the strategic decisions reached. Agency theory posits that 
control activities help to better align the management interests with those of the owners. 
Further monitoring reduces information asymmetries between the management and 
board members, further improving the strategic decision quality. Prior research has 
demonstrated that the board can effectively control decision processes, even though 
strategic issues involve many uncertainties and ambiguities. This view is in line with 
Leifer & Mills (1996), and others, who have suggested that formal control may come in 
two forms. First, if cause-effect relationships can be established between a set of strate-
gic choices and firm outcomes, then formal control of the strategic decision processes 
can be effective. Second, if the causal links cannot be determined, then output controls, 
measuring the expected results of strategic choices, are more applicable. Because there 
is a lot of causal ambiguity in strategic decision making, the literature has suggested that 
monitoring by the board is more effective when it addresses both process controls and 
output controls (Hitt et al., 1996). Process controls are more subjective in nature than 
output controls, but they contribute to identifying proper strategic criteria, and ensure 
that the decision process itself sufficiently covers the identification, development, and 
selection phases (Mintzberg et al., 1976). 
 
Against expectations, the analysis demonstrated only a weak, statistically non-
significant positive relationship between the managements decision commitment and 
the boards monitoring activities. The arguments for a positive relationship were largely 
based on signaling effects of board monitoring; monitoring by the board was expected 
to signal the boards own commitment to the strategic choices, and so to influence man-
agements commitment. At least two reasons for the non-significant positive relation-
ship can be presented. First, top managers of family firms are often family members and 
shareholders. Thus family-managers interests may be naturally aligned through an 
ownership stake in the company, and the boards monitoring would not induce any fur-
ther commitment to strategic decisions. Further, prior research has not clearly shown 
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what the joint effects of monitoring and incentive alignment on managerial behavior are 
(Tosi et al., 1997). Because family-managers and non-family-managers are in different 
positions concerning incentive alignment, monitoring may have different effects on 
their decision commitment. Second, high levels of monitoring may be less effective, or 
as Gomez-Mejia et al. noted marginal returns to monitoring are a decreasing function 
of the level of monitoring (2001: 92). This implies that increasing monitoring improves 
decision commitment only to a certain point, after which it does not grow. Monitoring 
may even have a negative effect on managerial behavior. Ghoshal & Moran (1996) sug-
gested the use of rational controls adversely affects the feelings of both the controller 
and the controllee concerning their relationship (1996: 24). Hierarchical control may 
create feelings of distrust among the parties, and lead to a pathological spiraling rela-
tionship (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996: 25). 
 
The hypothesis that the boards counsel and advice would be positively associated with 
strategic decision quality was supported in the analysis. This result is consistent with an 
information-processing perspective of strategic decision making (e.g., Dooley & Fryx-
ell, 1999; Leifer & Mills, 1996). This view holds that heterogeneity in decision-making 
teams promotes cognitive conflict and diversity in debate, thus improving the teams 
information processing capabilities. Higher quality decisions are reached, because a di-
versity of information better matches the information requirements of complex strategic 
issues. 
 
Also, board counsel was positively linked to managements commitment to strategic 
choices, as hypothesized. The agency theory did not provide any direct arguments to 
support this hypothesis. Instead, justification of the hypothesis was mainly based on the 
procedural justice theory. It basically proposes that increasing involvement in decision 
processes will positively affect the participants perceptions of the fairness of those 
processes, ultimately leading to better acceptance and commitment to the strategic 
choices reached (e.g., Kim & Mauborgne, 1998). Because the board counsel is based on 
directors face-to-face contact with managers, it readily increases the engagement of 
both parties in the decision process, thus increasing their commitment.  
 
The contractual governance model hypothesized several mediating effects, combined in 
two hypotheses. The results of the first mediating hypothesis supported the claim that 
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effects of inside ownership are mediated, although not fully, through board composition 
on board monitoring, but failed to support the idea that effects of inside ownership are 
mediated through board composition on board counsel. The supported part of the hy-
pothesis is consistent with the agency theory. As Fama & Jensen (1983b) proposed, the 
separation of ownership from decision management, as manifested in low inside owner-
ship, leads to decision systems that separate management from control, as manifested in 
outside representation on the board of directors with higher levels of monitoring. The 
part of the results that refutes this suggests that there is no direct or indirect link 
(through board composition) between inside ownership and board counsel.  
 
The results that refute the second mediating hypothesis indicate that neither board moni-
toring nor board counsel mediates the effects of board composition on decision-making 
quality (decision quality and decision commitment). Rather, the regressions indicated 
that board composition, when entered with board monitoring and board counsel, has a 
direct negative effect on both decision quality (only marginally so) and managements 
decision commitment. This result suggests that the interaction between board-related 
variables is more complex than hypothesized. 
 
Several significant control variable effects were observed. Consistent with the expecta-
tions of the model, a higher generation in charge was positively related with a higher 
ratio of outside members on the board, whereas familys voting control and the inci-
dence of dual leadership were negatively associated with the outside representation. As 
higher generation is generally related to larger ownership dispersion and decreased fam-
ily members participation in the firms activities, a more outside-member oriented 
board can be expected. Both the voting control of the dominant shareholder group and 
dual leadership, i.e. the same person holding both the chairman and CEO officer posi-
tions, have been associated with higher levels of entrenchment in corporate governance 
literature. Thus, it can be expected that these structural factors are associated negatively 
with the outside influence on the board. Further, the results show that the firm size was 
positively associated with board monitoring and counsel functions, which is in line with 
the received theory. Finally, dual leadership was positively associated with manage-
ments decision commitment. This can be expected because dual leadership is usually 
associated with CEOs power and entrenchment. 
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7.1.2 Relational governance model  
 
Corporate governance has traditionally been grounded in agency theory, which empha-
sizes the contractual nature of exchanges while ignoring the effects of ongoing social 
relationships (Granovetter, 1985). However, it is largely the nature of the kinship ties 
among the owners and managers that defines the unique characteristics of a family 
business. Therefore, it has been proposed in this dissertation that a relational view of 
governance is relevant in family firms because it considers the social capital embedded 
in the social relationships. While the contractual governance model focused on formal 
control exercised by the board of directors, the relational governance model addressed 
different forms of social capital, and their effects on firm performance. The relational 
governance model argued that communication and frequent exchanges among members 
of the owner family enable a shared vision and trust to form, influencing the quality of 
the strategic decision process.  
 
The results showed good support for hypotheses on relational governance and on strate-
gic decision making. First, social interaction among the owner family was positively 
associated with the number of different family institutions in use, and negatively with 
the family size. Second, the strength of a shared vision among family members and trust 
between the family and management were both positively associated with social interac-
tion. Third, the shared vision was positively related with all three decision-making qual-
ity variables; trust was positively related to decision quality and managements 
decisions commitment, but failed to demonstrate a significant association with the fam-
ilys decision commitment.  
 
The extant literature suggests that when the third-generation of a family controls the 
business, the relationships among the extended family members become usually less 
intense and more politically oriented than those among the first and second-generation 
family companies (Gersick et al., 1997). In line with this suggestion, the results showed 
that the family size was negatively related to social interaction, although only margin-
ally (p<.1). However, declining social interaction, weakening familial bonds and family 
members reduced identification with the company can be overcome by implementing 
various processes and systems such family councils (e.g., Neubauer & Lank, 1998). In-
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deed, the results clearly showed that a more diverse use of family institutions was asso-
ciated with higher levels of social interaction.  
 
A shared vision among the key owners may play a key role within family firms because 
owner family members equity holdings are typically long-term in nature. Making a 
conscious investment in the familys cohesion and shared vision may help the business 
by preventing dysfunctional behavior within the family, and by aligning the familys 
resources with those of the business. The results indicate that interactions among family 
members also emerge as a critical enabling process in the formation of a shared vision 
of the family firms mission and goals. This is consistent with Harveys (1996b) claim 
that traditions, bonding relationships, and loyalty inherent within families will help as-
sume a long-term perspective of the family business. Further, the results are in agree-
ment with Gulati (1995), who suggested that trust among the key stakeholders 
contributing to collective action forms incrementally over time with repeated interac-
tions.  
 
A shared vision was found a strong determinant of decision-making quality in the em-
pirical test. First, the results demonstrated that the shared vision provides a common 
cognitive framework for decision processes leading to higher quality strategic choices. 
Supporting this finding, Nutt (1998) suggested that stakeholders claims, such as vi-
sion, frame decision making by activating the process and helping to select a direction 
to be followed. Second, the results demonstrate that a shared vision influences the 
commitment to strategic choices. The shared vision was statistically significantly related 
to both familys and managements decision commitment. The relationship was espe-
cially strong in the case of the family (beta=.59, p<.001). These results can be expected, 
because, in addition to a shared vision directing the decision-making process, it also im-
proves the acceptance of decisions reached, and induces the cooperation needed in their 
successful implementation (Korsgaard et al., 1995; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). 
 
Trust between the owner family and management was found significantly associated 
with the decision quality. Strategic decision quality-improving effects of trust can partly 
be accounted for by improved information processing, because trust gives the key 
stakeholders the confidence to be open in information exchanges, which in turn in-
creases the amount of relevant and timely information needed to reach high quality de-
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cisions (Dooley & Fryxell, 1999; Zaheer et al., 1998). On the contrary, increased poli-
tics associated with low trust between the family and management is likely to impede 
the flow of information, and destroy cooperation, leading to sub-optimal decision mak-
ing undermining shareholders value (Cosier & Harvey, 1998; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 
1988; Kets De Vries 1996).  
 
As hypothesized, a high level of trust was associated with managements decision 
commitment. Like a shared vision, trust can greatly improve cooperation within deci-
sion-making groups (Mayer et al., 1995). Trust can provide organizational members a 
rationale to be good agents, reducing individual opportunistic behavior, and justifying 
individual commitment to collective action such as implementing strategic choices 
(Leana & Van Buren, 1999). Trust as a source of commitment to collective action may 
have an added importance in family firms due to the long-term nature of exchange rela-
tionships. 
 
Interestingly, a high level of trust failed to be significantly related to the familys deci-
sion commitment. Instead, the results showed a weak negative, non-significant associa-
tion (beta=-.05, p>.1). This non-significant result occurred concurrently with the shared 
visions strong association with the familys decision commitment as reported above. 
To gain more insight into how trust and the familys decision commitment may be re-
lated, a regression was run having just trust and control variables as independent vari-
ables, omitting the effects of the shared vision. This regression showed a significant, 
positive relationship between trust and the familys decision commitment (beta=.17, 
p<.01). This result suggests that trust may influence family members commitment in 
strategic choices indirectly, having the owner familys shared vision as a mediating fac-
tor.  
 
In addition to direct effects hypotheses, the relational governance model implied several 
mediating effects, as presented in Hypotheses 21 and 22. The results partially support 
the first one: social interaction mediates the effects of the variety of family institutions 
and family size on the shared vision, but fails to mediate them on trust. This result sup-
ports the proposition that social interaction is an enabling process for a shared vision to 
form (Kogut & Zander, 1996; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998; 
Vroom & Yetton, 1973).  
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The other mediating hypothesis proposed that the effects of social interaction are medi-
ated through a shared vision and trust on the three decision-making quality variables. 
The first part of the analysis showed that a shared vision and trust together fully mediate 
the effects of social interaction on strategic decision quality, as expected1. The second 
part indicated that a shared vision and trust together partially mediate the effects of so-
cial interaction on strategic decision. Finally, the third part failed to show any statisti-
cally significant mediation of social interaction through a shared vision and trust on the 
familys decision commitment. Instead, the results suggest that the familys decision 
commitment is directly influenced by both social interaction and shared vision, while 
not being affected by trust at all.  
 
In sum, the relational governance model is supported well by the empirical tests. All the 
failing tests were associated with trust. Tests involving trust were supported in two 
cases and failed three cases. One reason for the poor performance of trust may be re-
lated to the way it was defined and operationalized. All the social capital constructs, ex-
cept trust, addressed social capital within the owner family, whereas trust was defined 
and modeled as trust between the owner family and management. As long as the family 
also constitutes the management, this difference in definition does not matter. But when 
the degree to which the family and management differs, a potential error in results may 
occur. The reason that all the social capital constructs except trust explicitly addressed 
only the family, but not the management, was the studys objective of gaining an under-
standing of the effect of the family on the performance of the firm.  
 
Several significant control variable effects were observed in the relational governance 
model. As the data show, the generation in charge of the family business is negatively 
associated with social interaction among the family members, which is consistent with 
the received literature. Also, generation in charge was positively related (marginally, 
p<.1) to both trust and familys decision commitment. These results suggest that affec-
tive responses, such as trust and commitment to decisions, increase as the family firm 
passes to following generations. This may reflect a proposal that family firm govern-
                                                           
1  Separate regressions, Tests 1b and 1d in Table 6.20, suggest that shared vision plays a bigger role than 
trust in mediating social interaction on decision quality. 
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ance becomes more sophisticated and explicit after generational transfers (e.g., Lans-
berg, 1999).  
   
Inside ownership was positively related (only marginally, p < .1) to social interaction. 
This result implies that when the family members have multiple roles in the business, as 
directors and managers, it increases social capital within the family, social interaction 
directly, and shared vision and trust indirectly. This is in agreement with social capital 
literature that suggests that when the same people are linked together via multiple over-
lapping roles, their social ties are strengthened (Boissevain, 1974; Portes, 1998). Inter-
estingly, inside ownership was negatively associated with decision quality, suggesting 
that the more the firm employs family members, the poorer is the quality of strategic 
decisions. Literature on nepotism is in line with this result (e.g., Kets de Vries, 1996).  
 
Firm size was found negatively associated (only marginally, p<.1) with both trust and 
decision quality. The first result is quite obvious, because a larger firm employs a larger 
number of managers, making it less likely that they will form social relations, and trust,  
with the owner family members. Negative association between the firm size and strate-
gic decision quality may reflect increasing agency costs due to the growing separation 
of ownership and management (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983b). Shared vision was linked 
to past financial performance and the number of family members on the board (only 
marginally, p<.1), as can be expected. Additionally, family members participation on 
the board was positively related to the familys decision commitment (only marginally, 
p<.1). This result is obvious, because direct participation in decision processes is likely 
to increase the participants acceptance of the choices (e.g., Kim & Mauborgne, 1998). 
Finally, the incidence of dual leadership was positively linked to managements deci-
sion commitment. This can be expected because in the case of dual leadership, the CEO 
has a good control of decision processes. 
 
 
7.1.3 Joint effects of  contractual and relational governance mechanisms 
 
The contractual and relational governance models studied the effects of governance 
mechanisms on the decision-making quality as separate models. Hypothesis 22 pro-
posed that, rather than being substitutive modes of governance, contractual and rela-
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tional governance mechanisms, including board monitoring, board counsel, shared vi-
sion, and trust, have a complementary effect on the decision-making quality variables, 
including decision quality and managements decision commitment. The results indi-
cated that the joint effects model explains the data significantly better than either the 
contractual or relational governance models alone, suggesting that the relational and 
contractual modes of governance indeed complement each other in family firm govern-
ance.  
 
Although arguments for both complementary and supplementary relationships between 
formal control and informal, social control have been proposed in governance literature 
(e.g., Das & Teng, 1998), family business literature generally argues that both contrac-
tual and relational modes can add value to a family firms governance, regardless of the 
size of the family or the business (e.g., Corbetta & Montemerlo, 1999; Gersick et al., 
1997; Lansberg, 1999; Neubauer & Lank, 1998; Ward, 1987). Also, the evidence sug-
gests that relational forms of governance may be more prevalent in small and young 
family firms, while older and larger family corporations rely increasingly on more con-
tractual forms of governance, mainly by the board of directors with substantial outside 
member representation. This view is also supported by Huse (1993), who applied 
Macneils (1980) relational norms to study relations between board of directors and 
management. Relational norms in contracting relations address relationship characteris-
tics such as harmonizing role conflicts and preservation of the relation. Relational 
norms seem closely related to social capital because they also represent resources em-
bedded in relationships. Huse found that the theory of contractual relations was sup-
ported for the smallest firms in his sample, but not for the largest firms. He concluded 
that  [r]elational norms and trust seem to be of greater importance in understanding and 
monitoring small firms than large firms (1993: 235). 
 
 
The normative recommendations have focused, roughly speaking, on two areas. First, a 
large number of researchers have recommended that family firms should more often use 
expert boards with outside members than currently is the case, especially in smaller 
firms (e.g., Brunninge & Nordqvist, 2001; Corbetta & Tomaselli, 1996; Schwartz & 
Barnes, 1991; Ward, 1991). Second, researchers have recommended the increased use 
of various structures within the family, or family institutions, for better governing the 
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interaction between the family and the business (e.g., Gersick et al., 1997; Lansberg, 
1999; Neubauer & Lank, 1998; Ward, 1987). These recommendations are mostly tar-
geted at larger, extended families, where the familial bonds are weaker, and the owner 
family members participation in the business is less.   
 
 
7.1.4 Decision-making quality and firm performance  
 
In the final set of three hypotheses, it was proposed that decision-making quality is posi-
tively related to a family firms overall performance, as measured by profitability and 
growth of the firm. The results indicated that decision quality was significantly related 
to profitability and marginally significantly related to growth (p<.1), supporting Hy-
pothesis 23. Tests failed to support Hypothesis 24: managements decision commitment 
was not significantly associated with profitability or growth. Hypothesis 25 received 
partial support, because the results showed that the familys decision commitment was 
positively associated with the family firms growth (marginal support, p<.1), but did not 
show a significant relationship with profitability. In sum, these results partially sup-
ported the argument that strategic decision-making outcomes, in terms of decision qual-
ity and commitment of the key stakeholders, are positively related to the overall 
performance of the family firm.  
 
To gain more insight into how decision commitment may be related to firm perform-
ance, additional analyses were performed to check the possibility of indirect effects be-
tween decision commitment and overall performance. The analyses suggested that 
decision quality mediates the effects of the managements decision commitment on 
profitability, and partially mediates the effects of the familys decision commitment on 
growth. The mediation results suggest that stakeholders commitment can improve the 
overall firm performance only when the quality of strategic decision is at a high level.  
 
As discussed in the theory development section, it has been found difficult to demon-
strate a positive link between the strategy process and firm performance (e.g., Dean & 
Sharfman, 1996; Pearce et al., 1987). Although the performance measures were based 
on subjective assessments, the results of this study gave some support to the proposal 
that decision quality and decision commitment indeed contribute to firm performance. 
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For achieving the intended results of decision processes, previous research has high-
lighted the importance of reaching both high quality decisions and gaining commitment 
to their implementation (e.g., Amason, 1996; Dooley & Fryxell, 1999; Korsgaard et al., 
1995). Further, the manner in which strategic decision processes are conducted can af-
fect both the quality of decisions, and the commitment of participants to execute the de-
cisions successfully.  
 
As reported earlier, the results indicated that (1) decision quality was positively related 
to board monitoring, board counsel, shared vision, and trust, (2) managements decision 
commitment was related to board counsel, shared vision, and trust, and (3) familys de-
cision commitment was related to shared vision. In order to reach both decision quality 
and decision commitment, these results may give some hints about critical governance 
issues. First, while board monitoring was related to decision quality, it was not related 
to the managements decision commitment. It can be speculated that in order to preserve 
the positive effects of board monitoring, and to increase the effects of this on manage-
ments decision commitment, it may be advisable to focus more on the strategic control 
aspect of board monitoring. This may be challenging to achieve with a high number of 
outside members, because boards with a high proportion of outside members may ex-
cessively employ financial controls at the expense of strategic controls (Hitt et al., 
1996). Second, the total effect of trust is somewhat unclear: while trust was positively 
related to decision quality and managements decision commitment, it was weakly (non-
significantly) related to familys decision commitment.  
 
Finally, there were some significant effects in the regression for decision-making qual-
ity and the overall firm performance. First, environmental turbulence was negatively 
associated with profitability (only marginally, p<.1) and with growth. This result is in 
agreement with the extant literature (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989b). Second, firm growth was 
positively associated with firm size. This may appear counterintuitive, because one 
might expect that small firms grow faster. However, the result is consistent with a firms 
growth following an s-curve, which is normally the case. 
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7.2 Theoretical and empirical contributions of the dissertation  
 
Family firms are generally considered as an understudied enterprise context in manage-
rial studies; consequently family businesses have largely remained omitted from rigor-
ous conceptual and empirical studies (Litz, 1997). Researchers have neglected family 
firms because there has been a widespread belief that corporations will become more 
diffusely-owned by institutional owners and managed by professional management in-
stead of being owned and controlled by families (Lansberg et al., 1988). However, it is 
nowadays recognized that family firms have a large macroeconomic impact, and they 
will remain as a viable enterprise form in the future. Although family business research 
is young as a field of inquiry, it is gaining increasing interest among a diverse group of 
researchers (Brockhaus, 1994). This dissertation contributes to the growing stream of 
research on family business by developing and testing hypotheses on family firm gov-
ernance, an area where the research has been particularly scarce (Neubauer & Lank, 
1998: xv).  
 
The role of the family in family businesses has engendered much discussion in the lit-
erature. Earlier literature considered the family potentially harmful to business, thus it 
was recommended to keep the family out of the business (e.g., Levinson, 1971), while 
more recent literature considers the family as a potential source of competitive advan-
tage (e.g., Davis & Herrera, 1998). This study has demonstrated how the family can af-
fect the business via multiple roles and mechanisms. This study has argued that family 
firm governance should be grounded on the unique characteristics of family firms, 
which, are to a large extent, the result of interactions of the family, ownership, and 
management (Gersick et al., 1997; Tagiuri & Davis, 1982).  
 
The unique characteristics imply that a family business has potentially many cohesive 
forces such as kinship ties, relatively illiquid ownership stakes, and the family mem-
bers high involvement through various roles, that keep the family business succeeding 
over long time horizons. However, the same factors can lead to less satisfactory devel-
opments if the governance of family business system fails. Thus, this study has aimed at 
developing a better understanding of family firm governance by addressing both the 
formal aspects of governance that regulate the relationship between the owners and the 
management, and the social aspects of governance that are deemed important to con-
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structive interaction between the family and the company. To do this, the dissertation 
has expanded the use of agency theory in corporate governance by incorporating ele-
ments from social capital theory. Therefore, the dissertation offers a more comprehen-
sive analysis of family firm governance.  
 
The agency theory and family business research has a somewhat ambivalent relation-
ship. Some family business studies have applied the agency theory as a theoretical 
framework (e.g., Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Hufft, 1997; 
McConaughy, 1994), while some others have questioned its applicability in a family 
business context (e.g., Dyer, 1994; Schulze et al., 2001). Although the family business 
context may challenge some of the assumptions of the agency theory, the present study 
has argued that the agency theory is applicable to the study of family firm governance. 
This claim was justified by the fact that separation of ownership from control also oc-
curs in family firms, although to a smaller extent than in diffusely-owned, large corpo-
rations. Thus, this study contributes to the empirical testing of the agency theory. The 
contractual governance model presented in this study follows the overall argument of 
the agency theory, which suggests that a firms ownership structure, defined in terms of 
outside equity (equity not owned by top management), determines to a large extent the 
governance systems used in the firm, and that, in turn, affects how economic value is 
created in the firm, and distributed among the stakeholders (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). This study focuses on family firms internal governance systems, addressing the 
composition and functions of the boards of directors, and their effects on the firms per-
formance. 
 
Corporate governance literature has identified two broad tasks of the board of directors: 
the control task and the service task. The present study used these categories to define 
and operationalize the functions of the board employed in the contractual governance 
model. The results of the study were in agreement with received governance literature, 
because the empirical analyses identified the board monitoring (control) and the board 
counsel (service) as distinctive factors.  
 
The social capital theory appears highly applicable to the study of family firms because 
of the strong social ties and enduring exchanges among the key stakeholders in those 
firms. Surprisingly, past family business research has not explicitly used the social capi-
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tal theory as a theoretical framework. This dissertation clearly shows that the notion of 
social capital is highly applicable in family business research. Social capital research 
distinguishes between weak and strong social ties. Research on weak ties typically fo-
cuses on entrepreneurial opportunities through unobvious social ties, whereas research 
on strong ties addresses the cohesiveness of a group, and voluntary cooperation within 
that group. The present study contributes to the research on strong ties. 
 
The relational governance model addressed three dimensions of social capital that have 
been identified in the extant literature, including the structural, relational, and cognitive 
dimensions. By using these dimensions, altogether five social capital constructs were 
defined and operationalized. In line with the received theory, three multi-item social 
capital measures were distinguished as separate factors. These results contribute to the 
empirical validation of social capital constructs, and support the proposal that social 
capital is a multi-dimensional concept. 
 
While formal governance, which focuses to a large extent on the boards of directors, has 
received extensive attention in past research, the relational governance has only recently 
been brought under systematic empirical study. Consequently, the relevant social capital 
constructs are not well understood, neither is the way they are related in relational gov-
ernance systems. The present study contributes to this understanding by proposing and 
testing relationships among the social capital constructs in a family firm governance 
context. Social interaction among the owner family members was found as a key 
mechanism that enables various family institutions to generate other forms of social 
capital, such as a shared vision. Although the extant literature has recognized the impor-
tance of family institutions in the development of enlightened family ownership (e.g., 
Lansberg, 1999), the knowledge of social mechanisms explaining how this actually 
happens has not been very clear. The present study has shed some light onto this ques-
tion. 
 
Furthermore, the findings of this dissertation concerning the dual system of contractual 
and relational governance may be applicable to corporate governance contexts other 
than that of the family business. In many cases, there are enduring interactions between 
the owners and management of a firm. This might be the case, for example, when the 
investor takes a large ownership position and holds it for long period of time, and ac-
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tively monitors the investment. As mentioned earlier, Brancato (1997) termed this type 
of investor a relationship investor. She identified Warren Buffet of Berkshire Hatha-
way Inc. as a guru of relationship investing. Also, venture capital companies, which 
typically provide long-term equity financing and other services to growth companies, 
are likely to employ elements of both contractual and relational governance. Further, 
other types of institutional investors may possess similar characteristics of active gov-
ernance, including, for example, various pension funds. Finally, many private and cor-
porate investors may hold significant blocks of equity of corporations, and consequently 
be actively involved in governance of those. Indeed, there is a trend for growing inves-
tor activisms aiming at improving corporate performance for a select group of owners 
(Brancato, 1997; Monks & Minow, 1996). The present dissertation is consistent with 
this growing trend because it contributes to the understanding of how companies with 
enduring interactions between owners and management are governed, including both 
contractual and relational governance mechanisms.  
 
Corporate governance literature has addressed links between governance and perform-
ance of firms in different ways. A number of studies have focused on how ownership 
and governance influence a firms financial performance (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber; 
1996; Morck et al., 1988; Oswald & Jahera, 1991). However, these studies do not ex-
plain the processes and mechanisms by which the overall performance is reached. Some 
other studies have addressed how governance has influence on some internal measure of 
performance, such as firm innovation (Hitt et al., 1996), or restructuring (Johnson et al., 
1993). A growing number of studies have specifically addressed the links between cor-
porate governance and strategic decision processes (e.g., Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; 
Daily & Dalton, 1993; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Tashakori & Boulton, 1985; Zahra, 
1990). This dissertation contributes to this stream of research by addressing how gov-
ernance mechanisms, both contractual and relational, affect the strategic decision proc-
esses in terms of the quality of the decisions reached, and the stakeholders commitment 
to successfully implement those decisions.  
 
The present study has participated in research addressing the relationship between stra-
tegic decision-making processes and the firms overall performance. As discussed ear-
lier, it has been difficult in past research to demonstrate a positive association between a 
firms strategic process and its financial performance due to many contingencies and 
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effects influencing the performance (e.g., Pearce et al., 1987). The results of this study 
gave some support to the proposition that strategic decision-making quality variables 
are related to a firms profitability and growth. Further, this dissertation has contributed 
to the study of strategic decision-making processes in family firms, an area that has not 
been researched much (e.g., Harris et al., 1994; Sharma et al., 1997).  
 
Finally, the dissertation broadens the base of data that have been used in corporate gov-
ernance research. Past research in corporate governance has mostly studied large com-
panies such as Fortune 500 corporations (e.g., Dalton et al., 1999). The data set used in 
this study contributes to empirical research on family firms, which represent almost en-
tirely small and medium-sized companies. 
 
 
7.3 Managerial implications 
 
This study has demonstrated the extensive and distinctive challenge of family firm gov-
ernance. Governance of a family business is a multi-faceted task where both the busi-
ness and the owner family need to be addressed. The existence of a dual system of 
governance suggests that family firms can reduce agency problems related to eventual 
and gradual separation of ownership from control, and at the same time, maintain a con-
tinuingly cohesive family needed as a value-adding owner group for the business. 
 
It appears that family firm success has many threats. On the one hand, when managed 
and governed well, a family firm can create wealth and success to its stakeholders over 
a long time, sometimes over many succeeding owner family generations. On the other 
hand, a family firm has a considerable chance to cease as a family business, in more or 
less dramatic circumstances. Sometimes the decision to sell or discontinue the family 
firm can be a rational and jointly agreed event. However, family firms often discontinue 
because the business goes bankrupt or the family is forced to sell the company. Even 
when the company continues as a family firm, it may experience a prolonged period of 
low success, and just barely survive. It has been argued in this study that proper govern-
ance can make a difference to the success of a family business. In order for this to hap-
pen, family business leaders and owners need to be aware of the dual nature of family 
firm governance, and to develop governance systems accordingly.  
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Results of the contractual governance model indicate that selecting qualified outside di-
rectors can improve the strategic decision-making outcomes and firm performance sig-
nificantly. The increased proportion of outside directors on a board enhances monitoring 
and, to a lesser extent, counsel offered to management. In turn, monitoring and counsel 
by directors improve strategic decision quality. Also, increased counsel from the board 
improves managements decision commitment. 
 
However, family business owners tend to underutilize external information and assis-
tance provided by expert boards. Owner managers, in their quest to retain their powers, 
may overlook the importance of outside directors contributions to their firms strategic 
decision making. As the results show, the proportion of outside members increases only 
when the inside ownership (equity held by those family members who are either direc-
tors or officers) decreases. In order to reap maximal benefits associated with outside 
board members, the owner managers should consider hiring these directors in the early 
phase of the company development, well before they appear to be needed by other 
owners. This is likely to accelerate the positive development of the business. Perhaps, 
the owner managers goal of retaining control of the firm while using outside sources of 
information can be accomplished by carefully selecting independent outside directors, 
providing incentives to them, and integrating them into the family firms culture.  
 
The results indicated that board monitoring did not improve the managements decision 
commitment. This result is consistent with existing literature, which claims that exces-
sive control of managers may become counterproductive, as mutual trust may decline. 
Also, outside directors may rely more on financial controls than on subjective strategic 
controls. Consequently, the directors should be aware of the possible effects of formal 
control on the managers motivation, and seek a balance between financial and strategic 
controls. 
 
The results also showed that family ownership matters a great deal, as indicated in the 
significant influence of the relational governance system on strategic decision-making 
quality. Other types of firms may not possess this advantage. Clearly, family business 
owners need to give attention to refining the more informal, relational governance sys-
tem that strengthen familial ties and family cohesion. This can be achieved through 
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promoting effective and frequent communication, sharing a vision of the companys fu-
ture with the rest of the family, resolving disputes among family members, and behav-
ing in ways that engender trust.  
 
Social interaction was found to be a process central to promoting the formation of a 
shared vision and trust, which then improve decision quality and commitment. Owner 
families can induce more varied social interactions by implementing various family in-
stitutions. Smaller families may rely on informal and formal family meetings. When the 
family grows, family councils may be also taken into use. The role of the family council 
is to represent the whole owner family, and make preparations for family meetings. The 
process of writing a common ownership plan, or family plan, can be recommended to 
every family, regardless of its size. Although family institutions are beneficial to any 
family, extra care should be taken in larger, extended families, where the occasions for 
natural social interaction have diminished. 
 
The results demonstrated that a shared vision among the owner family members was 
associated more strongly with decision quality and decision commitment than was the 
mutual trust between the family and management. It may be that achieving the shared 
vision requires conscious effort by the owner family members, while trust could be a 
byproduct of social interaction and previous trustworthy behavior. 
 
Put simplistically, it can be argued that larger family firms have more development 
needs in relational governance, while smaller family firms are likely to lack contractual 
governance systems. However, in any kind of family business, the complementary bene-
fits of contractual and relational governance need to be understood, and actions taken to 
improve the governance systems. 
 
Systems of contractual and relational governance are not isolated from each other, but 
they are intertwined through family-related factors. First, social interactions among the 
owner family members are amplified when family members work in the company. This 
is likely to be the case in smaller family firms. On the contrary, in larger family firms 
this is not anymore the case. Second, when the company employs family members, they 
tend to be younger firms, which do not generally take advantage of outside board mem-
bers. Consequently, these firms are more entrenched against outside influence. In sum, 
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while high family participation as directors, managers, and employees is likely to in-
crease social capital within the family, it may also increase the familys entrenchment in 
the company. Family business owners should be aware of these influences, and consider 
an optimal level of the familys participation in the business. 
 
The present study has suggested that successful strategic decision making results in high 
quality decisions, and the key stakeholders commitment to execute those decisions suc-
cessfully. Reaching both of these objectives is challenging because the same conflict-
laden processes that yield high quality decisions may hamper consensus and commit-
ment. Thus, it is important that participants in decision processes promote debate and 
cognitive conflicts for achieving more varied information, while avoiding affective con-
flicts that destroy acceptance of, and commitment, to strategic choices.  
 
 
7.4 Limitations of the study  
 
The dissertations encouraging results should be interpreted with caution in view of the 
studys potential limitations. The generalizability of the findings is limited by the sam-
ple, which is taken from Finland, and from a set of family firms representing the more 
established family business. Finland is often considered to be a more relational coun-
try, as opposed, for example, to the more transaction-oriented culture in Anglo-Saxon 
countries. Thus, Finnish companies may have developed unique ownership and govern-
ance structures that mirror national culture. However, it is assumed that the general 
thrust of the findings should hold also in other cultural environments, because national 
cultures are likely not to exercise a significant influence on how different governance 
mechanisms function within a family firm.  
 
The study is likely to have some limitations concerning the generalizability of the re-
sults, because the sample of the study consisted of family businesses that were five 
years or more years old, and were corporations. These limitations were set for making it 
possible to investigate the research problem of this dissertation. Consequently, other 
organizational forms such as proprietorships and partnerships were excluded from the 
sample. A corporate form of business was selected as a criterion because equity claims 
in corporations have a limited liability feature, allowing easy transfer of equity and 
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growth of ownership base. Also, start-up companies were excluded because only corpo-
rations that were five years or more years old were accepted. Thus, new, technology-
based firms (Autio, 1997) were poorly represented in the sample. Indeed, the sample 
consisted mainly of more traditional businesses, such as manufacturing, retailing, and 
transportation. However, the selection of sample firms does not present a serious limita-
tion because the purpose of the study, in the first place, was to investigate family firms 
with certain characteristics. For example, the companies in the sample had a board of 
the directors, considerable variation in the degree to which ownership is separated from 
management control or in family size. Although the sample firms represented the more 
established industries, they were generally modern and competitive, and often had a 
strong international dimension to their business. Different industries were not controlled 
for in the analyses. Instead, as an approximation, industry effects were taken into ac-
count by controlling for environmental turbulence. In sum, it can be concluded that the 
results of the study can be generalized into a significant sub-population of family com-
panies in Finland, both in terms of total production volume and broader economic im-
pact. 
 
The fact that the data are cross-sectional, collected at a particular point in time, is a po-
tential limitation of the study. Although the research models imply several causal rela-
tions between the constructs, the cross-sectional research design does not allow testing 
causality directly. Thus, claims of causality are based on theoretical arguments. A more 
longitudinal approach is required to obtain better insight into influences such as those 
on company performance. This is an opportunity for future research. 
 
Further, collecting data of the type used in this research is a time consuming process and 
companies are often reluctant to share information about their strategy making process. 
Also, as in several parts of the world, Finnish family-controlled companies do not share 
information about their diverse operations with the public. This has led to a lack of data 
in public sources about these firms. Therefore, the data were collected from senior ex-
ecutives and owners. The fact that data were collected primarily from one source should 
also be considered when interpreting the results. While the results of the validation in-
terviews and tests for source bias were reassuring, it would have been ideal to collect 
data from multiple sources. These limitations notwithstanding, the results have several 
implications for effective managerial practice and future theory development.  
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7.5 Directions for further research  
 
The findings of this dissertation point to several further research opportunities. First, in 
the area of contractual governance, greater attention should be given to understanding 
the contribution of outside directors to counseling senior managers. The results show 
that the proportion of outside directors on the board is positively, but only marginally, 
related to board counsel. This suggests that inside board members may also provide 
counsel and advice to management. Inside members, including owner family members 
and company managers, should have superior business and family specific knowledge. 
Future research should address whether there is an optimal ratio of outside members. 
This question is important because the board counsel variable is positively and signifi-
cantly associated with decision quality and commitment.  
 
Another area in contractual governance needing further exploration is the relationship 
between the boards monitoring activities and managements decision commitment. As 
the results showed, no relationship was detected between these two variables. Because 
the board monitoring is a manifestation of formal control in corporations, its influence 
on decision commitment is of great importance. Future research could address sepa-
rately the effects of strategic and financial controls, and perhaps investigate possible 
moderating effects between monitoring and commitment. It can be speculated that at 
higher levels of trust, the monitoring may be related more strongly to decision commit-
ment. 
 
The results for relational governance suggest several areas for future research. The vari-
ety of family institutions was found to be an important factor for increasing social inter-
actions, and other forms of social capital within the owner family. Researchers need to 
better understand and document these institutions. Prior research on family institutions 
has been descriptive, suggesting a need for a more detailed analysis. Further, this study 
has treated a shared vision as a one-dimensional construct. The shared vision may con-
tain multiple dimensions, perhaps having different effects on decision-making quality 
variables. Thus, refining the shared vision construct, and testing its relationships with 
other governance and decision variables provide further research opportunities. Finally, 
the forms and roles of trust need to be elaborated in future research. This study exam-
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ined the effects of trust between the owner family and management. However, trust can 
exist in any relationship among the family, board, and management. 
 
This dissertation treated contractual and relational systems of governance as comple-
mentary approaches to governance. Empirical tests supported that proposal. However, it 
can be argued, for example, that trust substitutes for formal control, as trust is assumed 
to reduce opportunistic behavior. Also, the relative importance of contractual and rela-
tional modes of governance may depend on several factors such as family and company 
sizes. Further, relational and contractual governance may interact due to the fact that 
family members may have multiple roles in the family business. Finally, the efficacy of 
these two systems of governance in dynamic versus static environments deserves an ex-
amination. Clearly, researchers should explore the relationships of these two systems.  
 
This dissertation explored the effect of contractual and relational governance on a com-
panys financial performance by using the key respondents subjective evaluations of 
company profitability and growth. This analysis could be extended to a longitudinal 
analysis, using more objective financial data. Also, studying the direct effects of con-
tractual and relational governance variables on the firms performance constitutes an 
obvious and important avenue for further research. 
 
Finally, other outcome variables could be investigated. One such variable is entrepre-
neurial orientation, which is often considered as an important factor for a companys 
renewal and survival. Maintaining entrepreneurial orientation may present a challenge 
for family firms, because they may become stagnant over time as traditions and long-
held values develop. The question of how a family firms governance structures affect 
its entrepreneurial orientation and eventually, its growth is one possible direction for 
future research. 
 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
Family firms are an important and viable sector of the global economy. However, re-
search on the effects of family ownership structure, and governance systems has been 
limited in past research. Using data from Finnish firms, this dissertation has examined 
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the dual system of governance that exists in family-controlled companies. The results 
show that contractual and relational governance systems coexist, reflecting the unique 
characteristics of family firms. These two systems of governance complement each 
other, serving to improve the strategic decision quality of family firms and the commit-
ment of family firms to these decisions, and so ultimately improving overall firm per-
formance. 
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Appendix A  Questionnaire     Mikko Mustakallio   
Original questionnaire is in Finnish     
              
Your answers will remain strictly confidential. Results will be presented in statistical aggregate only. 
No reference will be made to individual firms. Thank you, in advance, for helping me complete my 
dissertation research! 
 
 
Section A  Business Description 
 
A1 Name of company:    _______________________________________ 
 
 Your name:   _______________________________________   
 
Your position:    ___________________________________  
 
I belong to the owner family  Yes ! No ! 
 
A2 Year company was founded _____     Family has controlled company since year _____ 
 
Generation currently in charge...  
     ! 1.     ! 2.     ! 3.     ! 4.      ! 5. or later generation   
 
If there are two generations in charge, which one is secondary? 
     ! 1.     ! 2.     ! 3.     ! 4.      ! 5. or later generation   
 
A3 Describe briefly the main business of your company. For example: Development and manufac-
turing of machinery for wood-based panel industry or providing cleaning services to industrial 
companies 
 
 Main business: ______________________________________________________________ 
 
 In how many industries does the company operate? The company operates in _____ industries  
 
A4 I would like to learn about your business and the industry in which your company operates. 
Please circle on a scale from 1-7 the extent to which you agree with the following statements.  
 DO NOT  AGREE 
COMPLETELY 
AGREE 
Products/services become obsolete very slowly in your firm's 
principal industry 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Your firm often needs to change its marketing practices to 
keep up with competitors 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Demand and customer preferences are very easy to forecast 
in your firm's principal industry 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Actions of competitors are unpredictable 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Your firm must frequently change its operating procedures to 
keep up with competitors 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Business is based on the application of a variety of different 
core competences   1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The production system of the company is highly sophisticated 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Products of the company are technically complex 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The company’s services require the highest level of compe-
tence  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
A5 What percentage of revenue in 1999 came from customers outside Finland?  _____ % 
 
  
A6 Please allocate 100 points between the statements below to describe your company’s growth 
strategy. For example, if your company is primarily trying to grow by increasing sales to present 
customers, you might mark 90-10 on the first line. 
  For increasing sales we focus     For increasing sales we focus 
  on present customers                 _____  -  _____ on new customers 
             (total 100 points) 
 
  For increasing sales we focus    For increasing sales we focus 
  on present products              _____  -  _____ on new products 
     (total 100 points) 
 
Section B  Ownership structure, Board, and family members’ participation in business 
 
B1 How large is the owner family?   ____persons  (only shareholding family members) 
 
B2 Does your company have two or more series of shares, each series having different voting 
rights? 
 ! No, the company has only one series of shares  
 ! The company has two series of shares, each with different voting rights  
 ! The company has three or more series of shares, each with different voting rights 
 
B3 How much is the family’s total voting control of the company? Voting control can be calculated 
by dividing the number of votes attached to shares owned by the family by the number votes 
attached to total outstanding shares. The family’s voting control is  _____% 
 
B4 Assess how the ownership is distributed among the following owner groups: 
  Family, directly or through holding companies:     ______ % of shares 
  Non-family management:      ______ % of shares 
  Outside small investors:      ______ % of shares 
Institutional investors (banks, venture capitalists, etc.): ______ % of shares 
Other owners:        ______ % of shares 
  TOTAL           100     %  
 
B5 Ownership of those family members who act as directors and executives in the family firm is 
approximately  ______ % of shares, representing approximately ______ % voting control 
 
B6 The Board of Directors has a total of _____ members, consisting of 
family members:           _____persons 
independent members outside family and management:    _____persons 
Non-family managers:         _____persons 
 
  Chairman of the Board is a family member:    !  Yes !  No 
 Number of family members who are part of the Board and management is ____  
  Chairman of the Board and the CEO is the same person: !  Yes !  No 
 
B7 The owner family members occupy the following positions: 
 CEO is a family member:      !  Yes !  No  
  Management positions,   total _____persons  
  Non-management positions,  total _____persons 
 
B8 When did the latest succession of the CEO take place? 
!   Has not yet taken place   
! It took place in year  _____ 
! From the year _____ the CEO has been outside the family 
 
 
  
 
When did the latest succession of the Chairman of Board take place? 
! Has not yet taken place 
! It took place in year  _____ 
! From the year _____ the Chairman has been outside the family 
  
 
Section C  Strategic decision making  
 
C1 Family firms may pursue many different goals. Each company has their unique set of goals that 
they pursue. Some goals can be seen as means to achieve higher-level goals. Please use the 
1-7 scale to evaluate the importance of the following goals to your company.  
 
Not at all 
an 
important 
goal
A rather    
important 
goal 
A very 
important 
 goal 
To maximize sales growth 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
To maximize profitability  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
To maximize the firm’s value 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
To continue the firm as a family business 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
To maximize return on equity 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
To achieve longevity for the company 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
To sell the company if an opportunity arises 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
To pay as high dividends as possible 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
To pay steady dividends 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
To be among the top three companies in the main business 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
To provide financial independence to family 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
C2 Please rank the following goals according to their importance to your company by allocating 
100 points so that the amount of points given to a goal reflects its importance.   
  Increasing revenue rapidly:      ________points 
  Profitability:        ________points 
  Retaining the company in the hands of the family  ________points 
  Secure the longevity of the company    ________points 
TOTAL              100     points  
 
C3 Please circle on a scale from 1-7 the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
 DO NOT  AGREE 
COMPLETELY 
AGREE 
Family members agree on the most important goals of the 
firm 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Management team members agree on the most important 
goals of the firm  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Family and management have discussed a lot of the most 
important goals of the firm  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
C4 Think about the three most important strategic decisions made in the near past (1-5 years) 
that contributed to achieving the most important goals in your firm. Such goals may be found in 
C1 above, but other goals can be considered too. Please circle on a scale from 1-7 the extent 
to which you agree with the following statements. 
 DO NOT  AGREE 
COMPLETELY 
AGREE 
Strategic decisions were based on the best available informa-
tion  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Strategic decisions were made on the basis of valid assump-
tions about the development of the business environment  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Strategic decisions helped (help) the company achieve its 
objectives 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Strategic decisions make sense in light of the company's cur-
rent financial situation  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Strategic decisions are consistent with the family firm's vision  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Strategic decisions contribute to the overall effectiveness of 
the company  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Family members support the strategic decisions  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Top management did not support the alternatives that be-
came the final decisions  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Family members feel there is not much to be gained by stick-
ing with the strategic decisions  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Top management is willing to put in a great deal of effort to 
see the strategic decisions be successful  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Family members are willing to talk strategic decisions up with 
other family members as being good for the company  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The decisions were consistent with top management’s priori-
ties and interests  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Family members really care about seeing the strategic de-
cisions be successful  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Top management have supported strategic decisions that 
were made  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Multiple criteria were used in decision making for eliminating 
possible courses of action  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The pros and cons of several possible courses of action were 
examined  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The group weighted multiple approaches against each other 
in decision making  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Bilateral communication existed between the family members 
and Board of Directors/top management involved in the family 
firm's strategic decision making  
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Family members could challenge and refute the strategic 
views of the Board of Directors/top management  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Family members received a full account of the final strategic 
decisions of the Board of Directors/top management   1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The Board of Directors/top management involved in strategic 
decision making were well informed about the situation of the 
family  
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C5 Please circle on a scale from 1-7 the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
  
 DO NOT  AGREE 
COMPLETELY 
AGREE 
Profitability of the business is based on higher prices of prod-
ucts and services compared to competition  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Profitability of the business is based on lower costs compared 
to competition 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Sales growth will primarily come outside from Finland 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Expanding the business will be based on utilizing current core 
competencies  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Expanding the firm will be based on developing completely 
new, unrelated businesses   1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Scarce financial resources sometimes prevent implementing 
profitable investment opportunities  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Issuing shares outside the family is a possible way to obtain 
new equity capital  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The financial structure of the firm is optimized between equity 
and long-term debt 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Long-term debt is avoided in the firm  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The firm has a very strong emphasis on research and devel-
opment  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The firm has introduced only a few new products or services 
in the past 5 years  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The firm has a strong proclivity for high risk projects (with 
changes of very high returns) 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Owing to the nature of the environment, it is best to explore it 
gradually via cautious, incremental behavior  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The firm typically initiates actions to which competitors then 
respond  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The firm is very seldom the first to introduce new prod-
ucts/services and operating technologies 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
C6 Who makes the most important decisions of the firm? Assess where the actual decision-making 
power lies among the key stakeholders. Please allocate 100 points between the following three 
alternatives. Allocate the points so that the party holding most actual decision power receives 
more points than the other altenatives. 
CEO      ________points 
Board of Directors   ________points 
Owner family     ________points 
TOTAL          100     points 
 
Please circle on a scale from 1-7 the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
 DO NOT  AGREE 
COMPLETELY 
AGREE 
CEO has a great deal of power 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
CEO does not participate much in making fundamental deci-
sions pertaining to the firm  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The Board of Directors makes all the fundamental decisions 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The Board of Directors acts only as a formal decision-making 
body  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The family can in practice influence the most important deci-
sions pertaining to the firm 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The family does not participate in decision making, not even 
in the most important cases 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
 
 
  
Section D  Governance and compensation of management 
 
D1 Please circle on a scale from 1-7 the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
 DO NOT  AGREE 
COMPLETELY 
AGREE 
Formal financial reports prepared by top management are 
reviewed in board meetings  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Return criteria such as return on assets, return on invested 
capital, and so forth are regularly followed-up in board meet-
ings 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Cash flows are regularly followed-up in board meetings   1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Return on investment of large individual investments are 
regularly monitored by the Board 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The Board closely monitors top management’s strategic deci-
sion making  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The Board formally evaluates performance of top manage-
ment in regularly held feed-back meetings 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The Board usually defers to the CEO’s judgment on final stra-
tegic decisions 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The Board is actively involved in shaping the firm's strategy 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The Board and top management often discuss the firm's fu-
ture strategic choices  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Board members give top management plenty of counsel on 
the firm's strategy  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Top management very often solicit Board assistance in the 
formulation of corporate strategy  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Outside directors (outside of family and management) functi-
on as useful "sounding boards" on strategic issues  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Directors provide advice and counsel in discussions outside 
of board meetings  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
D2 How much is the compensation of management determined by the performance of the firm?  
  ! There is no performance pay in use 
  ! Performance pay can be 20% of total compensation 
  ! Performance pay can be 20% - 40 % of total compensation 
  ! Performance pay can be 40 % or more of total compensation  
 
Does the management have an option incentive system that is based on the value of the firm? The 
value of the option can be determined from publicly listed shares, if applicable, or it can be based on 
a calculated value. 
!  Not in use !  Management has an option incentive system 
D3 Please circle on a scale from 1-7 the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
 DO NOT  AGREE 
COMPLETELY 
AGREE 
Decision rights have been delegated to lower levels of or-
ganization 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Upper management often makes day-to-day routine decisions 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Decisions are made at levels where there is the best knowl-
edge about the issue 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Decision rights of personnel are documented 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Section E  Relationships within the family and between the family and firm 
 
E1 Please circle on a scale from 1-7 the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
 DO NOT  AGREE 
COMPLETELY 
AGREE 
Family members share the same vision about their firm  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Owner family members seldom have disagreements concern-
ing the “big picture” 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Family members are committed to jointly agreed goals of the 
firm 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Family members agree about the long-term development ob-
jectives of the firm 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Owners can rely on top managers without any fear that they 
will take advantage of them, even if the opportunity arises  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Owner family negotiates joint expectations fairly with the top 
management  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Top management takes advantage of family’s problems  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Owner family tries to get the upper hand over top manage-
ment  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Top management tries to get out of its commitments  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Top management regards the owner family as reliable  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Top managers will always keep the promises they make to 
owners  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Top management and owner family rely on each other 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Family members maintain close social relations  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Family members know each other on a personal level  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Family members seldom visit each other  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
E2 Does the family at times informally come together to discuss family and business related mat-
ters?     
!  No 
    !  Yes, _______ times per year 
 
Does the family at times arrange more formal “family meetings”, in which family and business 
related matters are discussed according to a certain agenda? 
    !  No 
    !  Yes, _______ times per year 
 
Does the family have a "family council" or similar? The role of the family council is to represent 
the whole owner family, and make preparations for family meetings 
!  No !  Yes 
 
Does the family have a written "ownership plan", or similar, which states, for example, owner-
ship values and goals, principles concerning relationships between the family and firm, and 
principles concerning transfer of shares and dividend policy 
! No !  Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Section F  Company size and performance  
 
F1 Please indicate the approximate number of full-time employees and total sales of your com-
pany at the end of each year. 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 (est.) 
Total number of employees  
Total sales, million FIM  
 
F2 Please estimate how well the following goals have been reached in your company.  
 
 
 
Lagging 
badly be-
hind the 
goals
Goals have 
been met 
reasonable 
well 
Goals have 
been met 
completely 
Sales growth 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Profitability 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Return on equity 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Growth of firm value  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Amount of dividends 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
 
F3 Please evaluate the performance of your company compared with similar businesses in your 
industry. 
                                                                                                                             Top               Next               Mid               Lower           Lowest
                                            20%              20%               20%               20%               20% 
Sales growth   !             !             !             !             !  
Profitability   !             !             !             !             !  
Return on equity   !             !             !             !             !  
Growth of firm value    !             !             !             !             !  
Competitiveness as a whole    !             !             !             !             !  
 
F4 Please evaluate the average percentage of the net profit on sales of your company during the 
last 3 years. 
  ! maximum 5%          ! 5-10%          ! 10-15%          ! 15-20%          ! more than 20% 
 
 
 
 
 
